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ABSTRACT 
 
The increasingly important role played by family firms in China’s fledging capital market 
calls for a better understanding of how it works and is governed. This study aims to 
explore how corporate governance issues in family firms are tackled from the perspective 
of investor protection. The thesis addresses the question by first presenting theoretical 
models showing the relations among investor protection, family governance, and agency 
costs in family firms. It then formulates empirical models to test the predictions of the 
theoretical models by using a unique and detailed family-firm data set in China’s stock 
markets, one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world.  
In the analysis of the impact of investor protection on agency costs in family firms, 
the findings show that the dynamic improvement of written legal rules pertaining to 
investor protection is potentially beneficial to Chinese family firms by mitigating agency 
problems and thus enhancing firm performance. However, the enforcement of investor 
protection, despite provincial discrepancies in China, is found to have no influence over 
agency costs in family firms.  
The thesis also examines whether family governance arrangements are shaped by 
the legal protection of shareholders in local regimes in China. The findings reveal that an 
increase in the effectiveness of the provincial enforcement of investor protection goes hand 
in hand with an increase in ownership concentration and the involvement of family 
managers in management, but a reduction in the use of control-enhancing mechanisms in 
Chinese family firms.  
The thesis further addresses the question of how agency conflicts in family firms 
are tackled by the choice of family governance mechanisms which are to some extent 
shaped by provincial enforcement of investor protection in China. The findings show that 
concentrated ownership rights with active family management generates performance 
benefits of family firms operating under strong investor protection. However, family 
control in excess of ownership rights leads to performance losses that are proportional to 
the difference of control over cash-flow rights, when legal protection for shareholders is 
inferior. The two effects are found to be more pronounced in founder-led family firms, as 
opposed to those in which a relative serves as CEO.  
The thesis makes several methodological innovations to the growing literature: 
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(1) The thesis develops theoretical models for the first time in studies of this kind, 
illustrating how the twin agency problems in family firms are shaped and tackled by legal 
protection of shareholders.  
(2) The thesis pioneers a synthesis of more systematic and comprehensive analysis 
of characteristics of family ownership, control, and management to more accurately 
distinguish different types of Chinese family firms in terms of the governance structure and 
impacts.  
(3) The thesis remedies a gap in the literature by incorporating the analysis the 
often neglected issue of the owner-manager conflict among studies of family firms. The 
dual-triple agency framework the thesis develops also represents a more comprehensive 
and coherent analysis in studies of this kind. 
(4) Given the complexity of agency conflicts in family firms, the thesis extends the 
notion of investor protection often used in the literature, to cover legal protection of small 
shareholders against large shareholders, but also of all shareholders against managers.  
(5) The impact of family governance mechanisms on firm performance in the 
literature is often explained by the distinct institutional and regulation development in 
individual markets. The thesis reinforces this interpretation by incorporating an empirical 
analysis within one country that is characterised by significant provincial variations in 
legal and governance settings.  
Based on its methodological innovations, the dissertation’s empirical evidence 
contributes to the existing literature in the following ways:  
(1) The thesis suggests that the formal legal rules do to some extent contribute to 
the growth of family firms in the economy, while the enforcement of investor protection is 
relatively weak. More polices to enhance legal enforcement are therefore much desirable in 
China. 
 (2) Concentrated ownership rights and the preservation of family management are 
found to serve as complements rather than substitutes for weak investor protection in 
China’s context. 
(3) The thesis suggests that a descendant CEO does not necessarily have no benefit 
or inevitably hurt firm performance provided the founder occupies the position of 
Chairman. This evidence extends the analysis of Villalonga and Amit (2006) by 
demonstrating that, in Chinese family firms, founders not only need to be inspiring leaders 
through the position of Chairman of the Board, but in addition they or their relatives are 
and need to be good managers as well.    
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Background 
The increasing research interest in governance issues in family firms prevalent in emerging 
economies, and the growing law and finance literature on the subject provide the major 
research background of the thesis. The former helps set the research scope and significance 
of the study, while the latter offers the research perspective and framework for analysing 
governance issues for the thesis.   
 
1.1.1 Studies on family-controlled firms 
Family ownership is almost universal among privately held firms, and is also dominant 
among publicly traded firms in the world. In Western Europe, South and East Asia, the 
Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, family firms are at least as common in public 
firms as widely held and other nonfamily firms (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 
2002; La Porta et al., 1999). Even in the United States and United Kingdom, some of the 
largest listed firms, such as Wal-Mart Stores and Ford Motor, are family controlled 
(Burkart et al., 2003).  
This prevalence of family ownership has stimulated research interest in the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in family firms, but the 
results are mixed. Some scholars produce evidence that family firms outperform nonfamily 
firms due to the family’s diligent monitoring on managers or its active involvement in 
management (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; McConaughy et al., 1998; Sraer & 
Thesmar, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Others find the opposite results, suggesting that 
the exacerbated conflict between controlling and minority shareholders facilitates the 
expropriation of private benefits of control and thus impairs firm performance (Claessens 
et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2001; Lins, 2003; Miller et al., 2007; Morck et al., 2000).  
It is suggested that institutional and governance regimes could shape the 
differences in ownership structure and governance mechanisms (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; 
Morck & Yeung, 2004; Peng & Jiang, 2010; Wright et al., 2005). However, previous 
studies have mainly focused on the developed markets in the West, such as U.S. and 
Continental Europe, while few have paid enough attention on family firms in emerging 
economies. Further, the significant extent of family ownership, coupled with the absence 
of effective external governance mechanisms prevailing in emerging economies, makes 
agency problems in family firms more costly and problematic (Morck & Yeung, 2004; 
Wright et al., 2005). Thus, whether family firms are more or less valuable than nonfamily 
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firms, especially in emerging countries, still remains an open question and deserves better 
understanding.  
Theoretically, family firms are considered to face a twin-governance problem: the 
classic owner-manager conflict, and the conflict between large (family) and small 
(nonfamily) shareholders (Burkart et al., 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Recent studies 
on this subject have however concentrated on the divergence of interest between different 
shareholder groups, but often overlook the first agency conflict. The latter conflict thus 
tends to form the central agency issue of modern corporations in most countries (Johnson 
et al., 2000b; La Porta et al., 1999, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), leading to a new 
perspective on corporate governance (Young et al., 2008). The problems between owners 
and managers are expected to be reduced and even eliminated, because of the large 
shareholders’ close monitoring and active management of family members, (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006).  
Is it the case? In reality, many family firms in emerging economies are 
experiencing a transition from family management to professional management (Clifford, 
1973; Daily & Dalton, 1992), but few of these firms have successfully managed this 
transition (Young et al., 2008). The fact that family firms may have wanted to transfer firm 
management to professional managers for various reasons signals the existence of agency 
costs arising from family management, as suggested by Anderson and Reeb (2003). The 
widespread failure in such a transition to professional management however may support 
the superiority of family managers in family firms. Therefore, this phenomenon suggests 
that the owner-manager conflict is far from being a resolved issue, and the nature of 
agency problems in family firms is expected to be more complicated than it has been 
considered in the literature, at least in the emerging markets. Greater attention and more in-
depth academic research are thus warranted in this field. 
 
1.1.2 Development on the law and finance literature 
In traditional finance, securities are characterized by their cash flows (Modigliani & Miller, 
1958), whereas recent financial research has shown that the defining feature of various 
securities is in fact the rights endowed to their owners (Hart, 1995), which are critical to 
outside investors, especially when insiders (i.e. managers and controlling shareholders) act 
in their own interests.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) first highlight that the 
rights attached to securities and how well these rights are protected depend on the law and 
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the quality of its enforcement. The protection investors receive, in turn, determines their 
willingness to finance firms. Thereafter, a substantial body of empirical evidence on a 
strong law-finance-growth nexus has been developed in the literature. One of the central 
results is that legal protection varies sharply across countries, and this variation predicts the 
differences in financial development and ownership structures (La Porta et al., 2006; La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, b, 2002). 
Many studies have extended this line of research, noting that strong investor 
protection is empirically associated with better financial outcomes both at the firm and 
aggregate levels, as reflected in dispersed shareholder ownership (Allen et al., 2005; 
Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000b), better corporate governance 
mechanisms (Allen et al., 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004; La Porta et al., 2000b), higher 
dividend payouts (La Porta et al., 2000a), lower control premium (Djankov et al., 2008; 
Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al., 2006; Nenova, 2003), less earnings manipulation 
(Leuz et al., 2003), easier for firms accessing to a new market or industry (Djankov et al., 
2002), higher corporate valuation (Giannetti & Koskinen, 2010; La Porta et al., 2002), 
efficient allocation of capital across firms (Claessens & Laeven, 2003; La Porta et al., 
2000b; Wurgler, 2000), valuable and broad financial markets (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997; Pistor et al., 2000), less likelihood of currency 
crisis (Johnson et al., 2000a), and greater economic growth (Carlin & Mayer, 2003; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998), etc. This strand of 
literature has been developed into “law and finance”. 
The law and finance literature poses new insights to explore agency problems in 
family firms by highlighting the role of legal protection of minority shareholders in the 
financial markets. As suggested by La Porta et al. (2000b), with respect to the conventional 
theoretical framework based on bank-centred and market centred financial systems, the 
legal analytical approach is a more meaningful way to understand the nature of corporate 
governance. Yet, in respect of the governance issues in family firms, Burkart et al.(2003) 
state that the controlling shareholder, even with significant ownership, is still exposed to 
the risk of being expropriated by the manager who runs the company in practice. This 
gives credence to the existence of owner-manager conflict in large corporations. They also 
propose that such managerial expropriation is likely to be mitigated by the law and its 
enforcement. As such, while the law and finance literature provides a new perspective to 
explore the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, it is 
nonetheless necessary and fruitful to call for a broader concept of investor protection that 
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covers the twin agency issues in family firms in respect of the application of the law-
finance-growth nexus in relevant research.   
 
1.2 Motivation 
The main motivation of this research rises from addressing key issues from two strands of 
the existing literature including agency issues in family firms, and literature on law and 
finance. On one hand, the agency literature theoretically states that the conflict of interest 
between family and nonfamily shareholders (which is referred to as Agency Problem II) is 
in general presumed to overshadow the conflict between owners and managers (Agency 
Problem I), leading to an overwhelming concentration of research on Agency Problem II in 
the existing studies (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2000b; La 
Porta et al., 1999, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Young et al., 2008). However, some 
studies still argue Agency Problem I is far from being a resolved issue in family firms, and 
deserves at least as much attention as devoted to Agency Problem II (Barth et al., 2005; 
Barton & Waymire, 2004; Buchanan, 1975; Castillo & Skaperdas, 2005; Chami, 2001; 
Miller et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001; Zhou et al., 2010). It is thus important to firstly 
uncover the presence and nature of all key agency problems in family firms at the 
conceptual level.  
On the empirical side, the evidence of the effects of family-controlled governance 
on family firms is mixed in the previous research. It is partly because different samples and 
time periods are applied in different capital markets in individual studies. As most studies 
have concentrated on the developed markets, investigations of family firms in emerging 
economies are clearly worthwhile. Additionally, none of the previous studies so far has 
investigated family-firm issues in China, one of the largest and fastest emerging economies 
in the world. In effect, China provides an excellent setting for the analysis of family-firm 
issues for the following reasons.  
First, family firms are estimated to represent 80~90% of the private economy 
which has contributed substantially to the rapid growth in China in recent decades (Zhang 
et al., 2002). In 2008, private enterprises made 11.18 trillion RMB (US$1.7 trillion) fixed 
capital investment in the economy, representing 64.9% of the aggregate investment by the 
state-owned sector,1 foreign enterprises and private enterprises. Data from the sample in 
the thesis show that publicly traded family firms accounted for 34% of China’s listed 
                                               
1
 The state-affiliated businesses and solely state-owned enterprises are not included in the estimation. Data 
are sourced from National Bureau of Statistics of China (http://www.stats.gov.cn/). 
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companies, while the Small and Medium Enterprises board (SME) in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) was almost entirely constituted by family firms at the end of 2009. Thus, 
the increasingly important role played by family firms in China’s fledging capital market 
needs to be accompanied by a better understanding of how it works and is governed. This 
study aims to contribute to such an understanding.  
Second, family management is prevalent among Chinese family firms. Data in this 
research show that family firms in which family members serve as directors or managers 
represent 78% of listed family firms, and 65% of listed family firms are managed by 
family Chairman or CEO. Thus, the prevalence of family management allows for an in-
depth comparison of the role of family versus professional managers in family firms.      
            On the other hand, the growing law and finance literature has made significant 
improvements to studies on the subject by the use of the legal analytical approach that 
could provide a new perspective to undertand the nature of corporate governance (La Porta 
et al., 2000b). However, many findings in this area are drawn from studies undertaken in 
the context of developed markets. As emerging economies are typically characterised by 
the absence of effective formal institutions for investor protection, resulting in weak 
governance environment (Allen et al., 2005; Mitton, 2002), legal effects on organizational 
activities, such as corporate governance arrangements, are expected to differ significantly 
from those found in developed countries. This strand of literature therefore requires more 
attention focusing on how agency problems in family firms are tackled by the effectiveness 
of investor protection provided by the country’s legal and regulatory systems in emerging 
economies. 
Further, investor protection in the literature is generally considered to consist of the 
changes of formal legal rules and the effectiveness of legal enforcement (Allen et al., 2005; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Djankov et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998; Pistor et al., 2000), as  
the strong effectiveness of legal enforcement is assumed to substitute for weak rules (La 
Porta et al., 1998). Conventional studies in this field usually adopt the comparative 
approach by using cross-country samples, which tends to create estimate biases. 
Investigating regional (provincial) variations in the quality of law enforcement within one 
country is thus considered more fruitful (Wu et al., 2009). In this regard, China’s 
significant legal reform, particularly in the area of corporate & securities law, and the 
discrepancies in its provincial enforcement also offer a unique opportunity and data set for 
the analysis of the within-country law-finance-growth nexus for three reasons. 
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First, formal legal rules pertaining to the rights of investors have seen substantive 
improvements during the period 1991-2009 in China. By the end of 2009, China has 
transplanted a series of legal and regulatory rules pertaining to investor protection from 
developed countries.  
Second, the enforcement of investor protection in China is to a large extent 
captured by the interactions between local governments and national legal institutions (Jia 
& Tomasic, 2010; Tomasic & Fu, 1999; Xia & Fang, 2005). Therefore, despite the unified 
regulation of the written legal rules at the national level, family firms in individual 
provinces and regions are exposed to different degrees in the effectiveness of legal 
enforcement and informal alternative mechanisms in China (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 
2005; Fan et al., 2007; Wong, 1985; Wu et al., 2009).  
Third, since the 1990s, China and other emerging countries have gone through a 
fundamental transition toward market-based economies from central planning systems. 
China’s evolution of legal rules thus follows a broadly similar pattern to many emerging 
countries (Peng & Heath, 1996). As the choice of governance mechanisms is to some 
extent subject to institutional and governance regimes, China’s experience may therefore 
provide valuable lessons and insights on the way family businesses develop in other 
emerging economies. 
To recapitulate, the general lack of research on fundamental corporate governance 
issues in family firms prevailing in emerging countries, especially in Chinese context, and 
the substantive development of the law and finance literature create the major motivation 
of the thesis.  
 
1.3 Objectives of the thesis  
Based on the above research motivation, the central objective of this thesis can be 
summarized as how corporate governance issues in family firms are tackled from the 
perspective of investor protection in China’s context. This objective raises five sub-
research objectives underlying this study across five chapters. The first research objective 
is to define the presence and nature of main agency problems in family firms (Chapter 3). 
In the thesis, agency problems in family firms are deemed to include the conflict of interest 
between the controlling family and professional managers (Agency Problem IA) and the 
conflict between the family and family managers (Agency Problem IB), as well as the 
divergence of interest between family and nonfamily shareholders (Agency Problem II). 
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The entire set of agency conflicts are defined in the thesis as “dual-triple agency 
problems” in family firms. 
The second objective is to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of investor 
protection over time and across regions (provinces) in China (Chapter 6). Drawing from 
the research approaches commonly applied in the literature, the thesis develops two indices 
to measure the extent of investor protection in China. A time series index evaluating 
changes of legal rules protective of investor rights indicates the level of formal investor 
protection, and a cross-provincial index for the effectiveness of governance environment 
measures the degree of investor protection in practice. The two indices provide the basis 
for an empirical analysis of legal effects on agency issues in family firms in the subsequent 
sections of the thesis.  
The third objective is to examine whether agency costs in Chinese family firms are 
associated with a potential mismatch between the concentrated ownership structure and the 
extent of investor protection provided by China’s legal and regulatory systems (Chapter 7). 
The two indices for the extent of China’s investor protection developed in Chapter 6 are 
separately investigated in this Chapter. Further, each component of the two indices is 
tested to reveal individual effects of investor protection both on paper and in practice 
towards agency costs in Chinese family firms.       
Family dominance in ownership, control, and management structure is generally 
considered to be the attributes of family governance in family firms (Mroczkowski & 
Tanewski, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The fourth research objective is thus to 
explore the relationship between investor protection and family governance mechanisms 
involving a combination of family ownership, control, and management (Chapter 8). This 
analysis is to address the question of whether the extent of investor protection in China’s 
provincial jurisdictions is expected to shape the controlling family’s decisions on the three 
key elements of internal governance mechanisms in Chinese family firms. 
The final objective is to extend the analysis in Chapter 8 and further investigate the 
effects of family ownership, control, and management on agency costs in Chinese family 
firms (Chapter 9). It starts with an examination of how agency costs are affected by the 
three fundamental elements of family governance, and then tests how these governance 
elements interact with the extent of investor protection, thereby influencing agency costs in 
family firms. This investigation will provide evidence of whether family governance can 
be considered as an alternative mechanism in response to the weak enforcement of investor 
protection in China.  
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the previous 
research on the subject area of the thesis, including studies on corporate governance in 
family-controlled firms, and the effect of legal protection for investors towards corporate 
governance issues. In Chapter 3, the study starts by developing a new framework for 
analysing agency problems in family firms, and by extending the concept of investor 
protection in the literature. It is followed by the construction of two theoretical models 
showing the interconnectedness amongst investor protection, family governance, and 
agency costs in family firms. The mathematical relations derived from the models are 
formulated as key hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part of the thesis. The 
methodology and data used for the analysis in this thesis are explained in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The empirical tests are constructed through Chapter 6 to 9. Chapter 6 develops two 
indices to measure the quality of formal legal rules pertaining to the rights of investors 
over time, and the effectiveness of the enforcement of investor protection across provinces 
in China. The two indices provide the analytical underpinning for subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 7 presents an examination of how agency costs in Chinese family firms are 
affected by the quality and effectiveness of investor protection under China’s legal and 
regulatory systems. This is followed by an investigation of the relationship between 
investor protection and family-controlled governance involving a combination of 
ownership, control, and management in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 first examines how agency 
costs are affected by the three fundamental elements of family governance mechanisms. It 
then adds the element of investor protection to the analysis and explores the interaction 
effects of family governance with investor protection on agency costs in the Chinese 
setting.  
In Chapter 10, the thesis concludes with the main findings, outlines the major 
contributions of the study to the pre-existing literature and points out the research 
directions for future studies. The main structure of the thesis is depicted in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 The main structure of the thesis 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the literature review for the prior studies relevant to the thesis. It 
starts with the summary of agency theory and related empirical studies on corporate 
governance in family-controlled firms, which is followed by a review of the law and 
finance literature. Specifically, Section 2.2 briefly reviews the agency theory widely used 
in studies on corporate governance issues in family firms. Section 2.3 discusses the main 
prior research on the nature of corporate governance in family firms, including the 
definition of family firms, and the impact of family ownership, control, and management 
on firm performance. Section 2.4 outlines the law and finance literature and summaries 
studies that address the question of why and how financial development is affected by the 
quality and effectiveness of investor protection provided by the country’s legal and 
regulatory systems. Section 2.5 provides some conclusions. 
 
2.2 Agency theory 
2.2.1 Agency problem between owners and managers 
The owner-manager agency issue was first raised by Adam Smith in his groundbreaking 
book, The Wealth of Nations, over three centuries ago. Smith (1937, p.700) explains the 
relationship between owners and managers in joint-stock companies as follows:  
 
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well 
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and 
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence 
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.  
 
Berle and Means (1932) further illustrate the existence of the separation of 
ownership and control rights to be one of the prominent characteristics in modern 
corporations. They propose that despite small shareholdings in a firm, it is managers that 
have the real control rights over resources allocation, and the main issue of corporate 
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governance is therefore how to mitigate the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers. Berle and Means’s (1932) view is supported and developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) into the well-known “agency theory” that is integrated from elements of 
property rights theory and finance theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) consider an 
agency relation as  
 
a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both 
parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by 
establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In 
addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources 
(bonding costs) guarantee that he will not take certain actions which 
would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be 
compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally 
impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the 
agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint….We 
define agency costs as the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual 
loss.  
 
In summary, the agency theory, based on the view that man is selfish, presents a 
relation between the shareholder and the manager who attempts to maximise his own 
individual utility rather than benefiting the shareholder’s interest (Tricker, 2000). Such 
agency relationship indicates that the separation of ownership over control rights is the 
principal root leading to the potential agency problems in modern companies. There are 
two kinds of problems that occur in the agency relationship. The first problem is the 
agency conflict arising when (1) the ambitions or desires of principals and agents diverge, 
and (2) it is hard or costly for principals to identify agents’ behaviours properly. The 
second is the agency conflict arising when principals and agents have different risk 
preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). Subsequently, a substantial body of studies focus on the 
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separation of ownership and control rights in widely held companies in which dispersed 
shareholders can impose little or even no control on managers’ decisions and actions. For 
instance, Grossman and Hart (1980) claim that it is because a shareholder is exposed to all 
costs associated with taking reform in a particular company, but only obtains benefits 
proportional to his shares, which is called the “free-rider” problem, none of shareholders 
has large enough incentives to monitor managers. This problem tends to facilitate 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour to pursue their own benefits at the expense of all 
shareholders. As noted by Tricker (2000), the separation of ownership from management 
of an enterprise is commonly accepted as the source of governance issues. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argue that the reason why the owner-manager conflict 
is bound to arise in modern companies is that managers and shareholders have distinct 
divergence of interest. Specifically, managers, apart from getting rich, have many other 
personal goals which are reflected in the way they operate the company. In contrast, 
shareholders only concern about the value of their own shares as they are deprived of the 
thrill of managing the company. Thus, if managers disregard shareholders’ concern, the 
agency conflict will arise in such companies.  
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1988) view is supported by Denis (2001), suggesting that 
shareholders simply expect their share value to be as high as possible, whereas managers 
may prefer to seek for power, recognition, and achievement of challenges through their 
positions in the company. Besides this divergence of interest, Denis (2001) points out 
another three potential conflicts of interest between owners and managers, which are 
assumed to be much more important and thus lead to greater losses in shareholders’ 
welfare: (1) managers’ desire to remain in their jobs when they actually need to be 
replaced, (2) managers’ risk aversion because of having much more human investment 
(and also some financial capital) in the company relative to shareholders who have their 
well-diversified investment portfolio and thus prefer all positive net present value (NPV) 
projects regarding a particular company, and (3) managers’ view to hold onto free cash 
flows and/or invest them in negative NPV projects instead of returning them to 
shareholders.     
The agency problem is deemed to be resolved through corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as executive compensations (Core et al., 2003), board of directors (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983b; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003), blockholders (Holderness, 2003), 
shareholder activism (Karpoff, 1998; Romano, 2000), and capital and labour markets 
(Fama, 1980). However, such solutions are mainly drawn from studies undertaken in 
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developed economies which are characterised by well-regulated markets and strong 
investor protection. In the presence of weak governance environment and inferior 
protection of shareholders often prevailing in the emerging markets, the impact of 
corporate governance devices appears to be ineffective (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2009; Young et al., 2008). In essence, Dharwadkar et al. (2000) argue that 
the inadequate governance environment exacerbates the owner-manager conflict and 
meanwhile facilitates other unique agency conflicts, for example the divergence of interest 
between different shareholder groups. Consequently, in emerging economies, the presence 
of agency problems and the solutions to mitigate these problems are expected to be notably 
different from those found in the context of developed markets. 
 
2.2.2 Agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders 
The traditional owner-manager agency conflict has been researched extensively in 
conceptual and empirical fields under the key assumption of Berle and Means (1932) who 
state that large corporations are characterised as retaining greatly diffused ownership 
structures. However, this assumption has been challenged by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
who find the prevalence of substantial management ownership in large U.S. corporations. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) provide evidence, showing that in 31 per cent of 
Fortune 500 companies, board members own over 10 per cent of the shares in the firm, 
while owning over 20 per cent of the shares in 20 per cent of large companies. Burkart et 
al. (2003) further demonstrate that in the United States and United Kingdom, some of the 
largest publicly listed firms, such as Wal-Mart Stores and Ford Motor, are family 
controlled. In effect, except for the United States and United Kingdom, the concentrated 
ownership structure, rather than diffused ownership, is found to be the prominent 
characteristic of large publicly traded companies around the rest of the world, such as 
Western Europe, South and East Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). In particular, 
ownership and control rights over the company are often maintained in the hand of a group 
of individuals who are usually combined through family ties (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Pollak, 1985; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). Even in the United States, where ownership is dispersed at its highest, 
founders or families are found to exercise a substantive extent of control over most of 
public corporations (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2009). 
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With concentrated ownership and active management of family members, the 
controlling shareholder, rather than the manager, holds the ultimate control rights over the 
company, which tends to facilitate the extraction of private benefits of control at the 
expense of minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000b; La Porta et al., 1999, 2002; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In this regard, researchers have increasingly realized that the 
owner-manager conflict emphasized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) does not represent the 
realities of agency issue that dominates large companies around the world, while the 
central agency conflict of such companies is instead that of a conflict between controlling 
and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). Johnson et al. (2000b) use the term 
“tunnelling” to characterize the extraction of minority shareholders’ interest by the 
controlling shareholder. They propose that tunnelling can be reflected in a variety of forms, 
such as expropriation of corporate opportunities from a company under the same control of 
the controlling shareholder, related transactions at nonmarket prices, and loan guarantees 
by using the company’s assets as collateral.  
Studies centring on the agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders have resulted in the notable development of a new perspective on corporate 
governance, which is also known as the principal-principal agency problem (Dharwadkar 
et al., 2000). To this extent, the nature of corporate governance is how to protect minority 
shareholders from expropriation by the controlling shareholder (Johnson et al., 2000b).  
Some scholars argue that the presence and consequences of agency issue in large 
corporations are to a large extent subjected to the institutional context. In other words, in 
developed countries, due to the well-protected shareholders’ interests, ownership and 
control rights are usually separated, resulting in the traditional owner-manager conflict 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Yet, in emerging economies, the relatively weak governance 
environment and inferior protection of shareholder rights lead to the prevalence of 
significant ownership structure in large companies (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Peng & Jiang, 
2010). This concentrated ownership, in conjunction with the absence of well-functioning 
external institutional mechanisms, is deemed to predict a more frequent agency conflict 
between large and small shareholders (Morck et al., 2005). As suggested by Morck and 
Yeung (2004) and Wright et al. (2005), the institutional failure often prevailing in 
emerging economies makes the agency conflict more expensive and problematic, and the 
exact degree to which institutional variations across economies influences this agency 
issue deserves further research in the future (Claessens et al., 2002). 
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In particular, as it is evident that family ownership and control are prevalent among 
large corporations around the world, the presence of agency problems in family firms 
deserves to be better understood. Researchers in finance and economics accept the view 
that family firms in which the family stays on as the controlling shareholder, usually with 
the involvement of family members in management, are confronted with the twin agency 
problems: a conflict between owners and managers, but also a conflict between large and 
small shareholders. To distinguish the twin agency conflicts, the traditional divergence of 
interest between owners and managers is often referred to as Agency Problem I, and the 
divergence of interest between shareholder groups is referred to as Agency Problem II.  
In general, Agency Problem II is assumed in conventional literature to overshadow 
Agency Problem I in family firms, presumably because the family’s close monitoring and 
active family management can mitigate or even eliminate the agency conflict between 
shareholders and managers (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006; Young et al., 2008). However, this assumption tends to be problematic, as a 
substantial number of studies theoretically and empirically show the nonsignificant or even 
negative effects of family members acting as managers (Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Bertrand et al., 2008; 
Buchanan, 1975; Chami, 2001; Morck et al., 1998; Pérez-González, 2006; Schulze et al., 
2001; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). As suggested by Castillo and Skaperdas (2005), the 
conflict between owners and managers is far from being a perfectly settled issue, and thus 
cannot be ignored in the analysis for agency conflicts in family firms. It is thus of interest 
and significance to uncover the nature of agency issues in family firms, especially in 
emerging economies that are perevied to be burdened with weak governance environment 
and inferior protection of shareholder rights. 
 
2.3 Definitions of a family firm 
Family-firm related research has blossomed in recent years, but it is difficult to find 
consensus on the definitions of a family firm. Overall, a typical family firm has usually 
been featured as an organization controlled and (or) managed by multiple family members, 
often across generations. Table 2.1 documents various definitions of a family firm that 
have been adopted in recent studies for the analysis of family-firm issues.   
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Table 2.1 Summary of definitions of family firms in the literature 
No. Author (s) Time period  Sample Data source Data location Definition of a family firm 
Panel A: U.S. & Canada    
1 Allen and 
Panian (1982) 
1971-1980 242 major industrial 
corporations from 250 
largest industrial firms in 
terms of their sales in 1974 
or 1975 
250 largest industrial firms in 
terms of their sales in 1974 or 
1975.  
U.S. The family members or their affines own or control 
at least 5 per cent of the voting rights and are active 
in the roles of directors in a corporation. 
2 Anderson et al. 
(2003) 
1993-1998 1,052 firm-year observations 
from 252 corporations in the 
Lehman Brothers Bond 
Database, the S&P 
Industrial Index 
Compustat Industrial Files, 
Gale Business Resources, 
Hoovers, and company press 
releases   
U.S. The founding family holds fractional ownership in 
a corporation. Alternative definitions: family 
members are represented on the board of directors.   
3 Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) 
1992-1999 2,713 firm-year observations 
from 403 
nonutility/nonbanking firms 
The S&P 500 firms as of 
1992. Compustat Industrial 
Files, Gale Business 
Resources, Hoovers, and 
company press releases   
U.S. The founding family holds fractional ownership 
and (or) family members are represented on the 
board of directors in a corporation  
4 Anderson and 
Reeb (2004) 
1992-1999 2,686 firm-year observations 
from 403 
nonutility/nonbanking firms 
The S&P 500 firms as of 
1992. Compustat Industrial 
Files, Gale Business 
Resources, Hoovers, and 
company press releases   
U.S. The founding family holds fractional ownership or 
family members are represented on the board of 
directors in a corporation 
5 Ang et al. 
(2000) 
1992 1,708 small corporations FRB/NSSBF database U.S. A single family holds more than 50 per cent of the 
shares in a corporation. 
6 Gomez-Mejia et 
al. (2003) 
1995-1998 253 family-controlled firms 
from 3000 publicly traded 
companies 
COMPUSTAT database U.S. Under two conditions: (1) at least two directors 
have a family relationship; and (2) the family owns 
or control at least 5 per cent of the voting rights. 
7 Gomez-Mejia et 
al. (2010) 
1998-2001 1,440 firm-year observations 
from 360 firms 
COMPUSTAT database U.S. Under two conditions: (1) at least two directors 
have a family relationship; and (2) family members 
hold at least 10 per cent of the voting rights. 
8 Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) 
1978-1984 500 firm –year observations 
from 114 corporations 
CDA Investment 
Technologies’s Spectrum 5, 
and S&P’s COMPUSTAT II 
U.S. The family holds at least 50.1 per cent of the shares 
in a corporation. 
9 McConaughy, 
Walker, 
Henderson and 
1986-1988 219 firms  Business Week CEO 1000, 
COMPUSTAT database 
U.S. A founding family controlled firm (FFCF) is one 
whose CEO is the founder or a family member of 
the founding family. 
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Mishra (1998) 
10 Miller et al. 
(2007) 
1996-2000 896 publically traded firms 
from the Fortune 1000, and 
a random sample of 100 
small listed firms   
COMPUSTAT database, 
proxy statements, Hoovers, 
and company press releases   
U.S. Family members are active as major owners (at 
least holding 5 per cent of the shares) or managers. 
11 Palia, Ravid and 
Wang, (2008) 
1992-2000 1,271 matched-pair 
obersvations from 230 firms 
S&P’s ExecuComp (2000) U.S. A firm is led by the founder or a family member. 
12 Pérez-González 
(2006) 
1980-2001 335 firms COMPUSTAT database U.S. A firm meets at least one of the following 
conditions: (1) an individual retaining at least 5 per 
cent of the shares; (2) at least two family members 
active as directors, managers, or shareholders; and 
(3) the founder as a director or manager.  
13 Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino 
and Buchholtz 
(2001) 
1995 1,376 firms Survey of U.S. family firms U.S. A firm has more than $5 million in sales and is 
listed by the ACFB as a family firm. 
14 Schulze, 
Lubatkin and 
Dino (2003) 
1995 1,464 firms Survey of U.S. family firms U.S. A firm has more than $5 million in sales and is 
listed by the ACFB as a family firm. 
15 Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) 
1994-2000 52,787 firm-year 
observations from 508 firms 
listed on the Fortune 500 
16 Villalonga and 
Amit (2009) 
1994-2000 62,431 firm-year 
observations from 515 firms 
listed on the Fortune 500 
COMPUSTAT database, 
proxy statements, Hoovers, 
and company press releases   
U.S. 
The founder or his family members are active as 
blockholders, directors or managers. Alternative 
definitions: a minimum control threshold of 20 per 
cent of the voting rights, being the largest 
shareholder, family directors or managers being in 
the second or later generation.  
17 Smith and 
Amoako-Adu 
(1999) 
1962-1996 124 management 
successions  
Financial Post 500,Canadian 
Business 500, Blue Book of 
Canadian Business and 
Directory of Directors, 
newspapers, and CFMRC 
database 
Canada A firm meets both of the following conditions: (1) 
an individual or a family group holds the largest 
voting rights being 10 per cent of the total votes, 
and (2) the Chairman and (or) CEO is a family 
member before succession. 
Panel B: Continental Europe    
18 Andres (2008) 1998-2004 1,701 firm-year observations 
from 275 listed companies  
Hoppenstedt yearbooks, 
newspapers and company 
press releases 
German A firm meets at leas one of the following 
conditions: (1) the founding family holds more than 
25 per cent of the voting rights; and (2) if the 
family holds less than 25 per cent, family members 
are active either as officers or supervisors.   
19 Barontini and 1999-2001 675 publicly traded firms Company press releases, 11 Continental The largest shareholder holding at least 10 per cent 
                                                                                                                               22
Caprio (2006) Worldscope database European 
countries 
of the shares is a family, and either the family holds 
over 51 per cent of voting rights or over the twice 
of the second largest shareholder’s voting rights.  
20 Barth et al. 
(2005) 
1996 438 firms Survey conducted among 
firms related to the NHO 
Norway At least 33 per cent of the shares are held by an 
individual or a family.  
21 Caselli and Di 
Giuli (2010) 
2002-2004 2,124 firm-year observations 
from 708 SMEs 
Mail survey conducted in 
SMEs 
Italy The founder or a member of the family by either 
blood or marriage is an officer, a director, or the 
owner retains at least 20 per cent of the firm’s 
shares individually or as a group, and the firm’s 
CEO affirms in the survey that the firm is 
considered as a family firm, and ownership will be 
passed to heirs.  
22 Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2003) 
1991-1997 1,317 firm-year observations 
from 309 listed firms 
SIX TRUST database Sweden  A shareholder holding at least 25 per cent of the 
voting rights is an individual or a knit group 
individuals not belonging to the same family. 
23 Faccio and Lang 
(2002) 
1996-1999 5,232 firms SSEX database, Worldscope 
database 
13 Western 
European 
countries 
The ultimate owner is an individual, a family or an 
unlisted firm, where an ultimate owner is one 
holding a given threshold control rights.  
24 Faccio, Lang 
and Young 
(2001) 
1992-1996 5,897 firms Worldscope database, national 
stock exchanges and national 
company handbooks 
5 Western 
European and 
9 East Asian 
countries 
The ultimate owner is an individual, a family or an 
unlisted firm. An ultimate owner is one holding at 
least 5 per cent of ownership or control rights. 
25 Gomez-Mejia 
and Gutierrez 
(2001) 
1966-1993 276 newspapers Daily published newspapers Spain  The newspaper’s CEO has the family ties with 
editors. 
26 Maury (2006) 1996-2003 1,672 firms Faccio and Lang’s (2002) 
sample and Worldscope 
database 
13 Western 
European 
countries 
The largest shareholder retaining at least 10 per 
cent of the voting rights is an individual, a family 
or an unlisted firm. 
Panel C: Asia     
27 Bertrand et al. 
(2008) 
1996 2,153 publicly traded firms 
and the largest privately 
held firms 
TCI database, Stock Exchange 
of Thailand’s listed Company 
Info              
Thailand The family holds the largest ultimate ownership in 
a corporation. 
28 Claessens et al. 
(2000) 
1996 2,980 firms Worldscope database 9 East Asian 
countries 
The ultimate owner is a family group, where an 
ultimate owner is one holding a given threshold 
control rights. 
29 Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan 
and Lang (2002) 
1996 1,301 firms Worldscope database 8 East Asian 
countries 
The ultimate owner is a family group, where an 
ultimate owner is one holding a given threshold 
control rights. 
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30 La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
1995 540 large firms and 691 
different firms 
Worldscope database 27 wealthy 
economies 
The ultimate owner is an individual or a family or 
an unlisted firm, where an ultimate owner is one 
holding at least 10 per cent of ownership or control 
rights. 
31 Luo and Chung, 
(2005) 
1973-1996 1,124 group-year 
observations 
BGT database  Taiwan  A firm is founded by an entrepreneur.  
32 Peng and Jiang 
(2010) 
1996 634 family firms Asian Corporate Governance 
Archival Data Centre and 
Worldscope Database 
7 Asian 
countries 
A firm has a family as the largest shareholder. 
33 Saito (2008) 1990-1998 15,950 firm-year 
observations from 1,818 
listed firms 
Corporate Financial Databank 
and Kabuka CD-ROM 
Japan The family is the largest shareholder and (or) the 
founder or his relative is a president or chairman in 
the corporation.  
34 Setia-Atmaja et 
al. (2009) 
2000-2005 1,530 firm-year observations 
from 316 firms 
Annual reports Australia The founding family or family member or private 
individual controlled at least 20 per cent of the 
firm’s shares, and was involved in the top 
management.  
35 Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed (2010) 
1998-2002 1,021-1,038 firm-year 
observations from 210 OTC 
firms 
Kaisha Shikiho (Japan 
Company Handbook) 
Japan A firm that has a member (or members) of the 
largest family shareholder on the board 
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To illustrate, there are two principal criteria to identify a family firm, which are 
often applied individually or jointly in the literature. First, a family firm is one with a 
family or an individual’s ownership and (or) voting rights exceeding a given threshold. 
This group of studies usually focus on the ownership and control structure, yet with 
differential definitions of the threshold, such as at least 5 per cent (Allen & Panian, 1982; 
Faccio et al., 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2007; Pérez-González, 2006), 
10 per cent (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1999), 20 per cent (Caselli & Di 
Giuli, 2010; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), 25 per cent (Andres, 
2008; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003), 33 per cent (Barth et al., 2005), 50 per cent (Ang et al., 
2000), 50.1 per cent (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988). Others have a more restrictive 
requirement in which the family or the individual must retain the largest ownership 
(Bertrand et al., 2008; Peng & Jiang, 2010; Saito, 2008), and meanwhile at least 10 per 
cent of voting rights (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Maury, 2006; Smith & Amoako-Adu, 
1999). In some studies, the criterion is relatively vague, only requiring a fractional 
proportion of the shares in a corporation (Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 
2004; Claessens et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
The second criterion stems from the perspective of managerial power of the family. 
It requires that at least one family member is represented on the board or top management. 
In this aspect, the founder or family members need to act as directors or managers 
participating in firm management (Allen & Panian, 1982; Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003, 2004; Andres, 2008; Caselli & Di Giuli, 2010; Gomez-Mejia & Gutierrez, 
2001; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2007; Pérez-González, 2006; Setia-Atmaja 
et al., 2009; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010) or serve as Chairman 
or CEO holding actual control rights over a corporation (McConaughy et al., 1998; Saito, 
2008; Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999).  
Apart from the above, some studies propose an ambiguous concept of family firms. 
For instance, Palia et al. (2008) define a family firm as the firm led by the founder or a 
family member, but they do not give an exact explanation of “led”. In the definition of Luo 
and Chung (2005), a family firm is considered to be the firm founded by an entrepreneur, 
which is likely to encounter the risk of ignoring the current status of the family in the firm, 
making the process for identifying the family technically difficult. 
To recapitulate, the two main conditions that have been widely used in various 
studies are captured by the role of family ownership, control, or management over the firm, 
presumably leading to a prediction of the real features of family firms. As noted by 
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Villalonga and Amit (2006), the definition of family firms is determined by how the 
elements of ownership, control, and management combine with one another. Mroczkowski 
and Tanewski (2007) favour this view and argue that the three elements should be 
considered as the most appropriate attributes of family firms. However, the threshold of 
ownership or control rights in the definition of family firms remains controversial and 
often lacks convincing justifications in individual studies. In addition, these definitions so 
far have not provided a coherent connection between family ownership and management, 
and have not distinguished the characteristics among different categories of family firms. 
To compensate for the deficiencies in the existing literature, this study will attempt to 
make a significant improvement to the definition of family firms, proposing a new defining 
approach from the perspective of family ownership, control, and management. This newly-
developed definition of family firms will be documented in detail in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
 
2.4 Family governance and firm performance 
Recent studies on the influence of dominant shareholders on firm performance are wide-
ranging both theoretically and empirically. Most of them propose that there exists 
significant distinction between companies with concentrated ownership and those with 
diffused ownership. Some argue that, because of the concentrated ownership structure, the 
classic owner-manager agency conflict tends to be greatly mitigated (Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), while others point out the potential drawbacks of 
blockholders’ shareholdings, such as seeking for private benefits of control at the expense 
of minority shareholders’ interest (Faccio et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2000b; La Porta et 
al., 1997, 1998, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
A family or an individual is more prominent as large shareholder in the Western 
European, South and East Asian, the Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African publicly 
traded companies (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). 
Even in the United States and United Kingdom, some of the largest listed firms, such as 
Wal-Mart Stores and Ford Motor, are family controlled (Burkart et al., 2003). It is thus 
necessary and fruitful to distinguish between the family and other types of large 
shareholders in companies with the concentrated ownership structure. 
If the large shareholder is an institution (i.e. a bank, an investment fund, or a widely 
held corporation), the private benefits of control are arguably diluted among several 
unrelated owners so that its incentives of both monitoring managers and expropriation of 
minority shareholders are rather small, reverting to the classic owner-manager agency 
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problem (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). On the other hand, if a family or an individual is the 
blockholder, the incentives of both monitoring and expropriation arise and may tend to 
increase, possibly due to the fact that it invests most of its private wealth in the firm with 
poorly-diversified portfolios (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Farrar, 2005, 2008). In this regard, 
the owner-manager conflict appears to be alleviated, but another divergence of interest 
between controlling and minority shareholders is fuelled up. Anderson et al. (2003) and 
Andres (2008) also claim that the founding family is a unique class of investors different 
from other large shareholders in family firms.   
Consequently, agency issues in family firms are likely to be more complicated, and 
the role of corporate governance in family firms appears to represent a distinct form 
theoretically distinguished from other types of companies (Andres, 2008; Schulze et al., 
2001; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), such as widely-held companies and companies with other 
types of large shareholders. The relevant theories and empirical studies so far have 
provided much evidence on the effects of three elements of corporate governance over 
family firms, including family ownership, control, and management.  
 
2.4.1 Family ownership and firm performance 
The usual concentrated ownership structure is expected to pose both potential benefits and 
costs for family firms.  
 
Potential advantages of family ownership 
Family ownership can provide competitive merits relative to other concentrated and 
dispersed ownership. First, family shareholders tend to invest most of their personal wealth 
in the firm, leading to a close association with firm welfare. With such undiversified 
shareholdings, family shareholders have stronger financial incentives to monitor managers 
and therefore diminish the agency conflict between owners and managers (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003, 2004; Andres, 2008; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
lengthy tenure along with the development of the firm also potentially grants them the 
required knowledge and experience at a firm or market-specific technology, resulting in a 
superior oversight on managers (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  
Second, despite substantial power to extract private benefits of control at the 
expense of minority shareholders’ interest, family shareholders have greater economic 
incentives not to do so (La Porta et al., 2002). To this extent, higher cash-flow rights would 
minimize the divergence of interest between family and nonfamily shareholders, and 
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therefore generate efficiency benefits to family firms. In a study of publicly traded East 
Asian companies, Claessens et al. (2002) show direct evidence that firm value rises with 
increasing cash-flow rights by the largest shareholder. La Porta et al. (2002) present a 
model of the impact of cash-flow rights on firm value, and find empirical evidence from 27 
wealthy countries to support this positive incentive effect of concentrated ownership by the 
founding family. Villalonga and Amit (2006) show that family ownership benefits minority 
shareholders, but further note that this benefit would be offset when it is interacted with 
certain pattern of family control and management.   
Third, the family’s sustained presence can also form a long-term reputation in and 
out of the firm, which would be conducive to mitigate the conflict between the controlling 
family and other stakeholders (i.e. other shareholders, suppliers or capital providers). 
Anderson et al. (2003) point out that  family shareholders with concentrated ownership 
have a strong impetus to minimize the agency conflict between shareholders and debt 
claimants, and family ownership is thus associated with a lower cost of debt financing.  
To recapitulate, undiversified family shareholdings provide the family greater 
financial incentives to alleviate conflicts between shareholders and managers, and between 
family and nonfamily shareholders, as well as between the family and other stakeholders.  
In this regard, family firms are usually considered to outperform nonfamily firms. 
 
Potential drawbacks of family ownership 
Concentrated ownership by the controlling family is also presumed to generate some 
potential costs. For instance, the controlling family, with significant cash-flow rights, has 
substantial incentives and abilities to employ suboptimal investment decisions to benefit 
itself rather than shareholder value, due to the family’s misalignment of interest with other 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1985; Farrar, 2005, 2008). The controlling family is 
assumed to evaluate investment projects with the concern on firm growth and survival, 
whilst diffused shareholders may make investment decisions by applying the rules that 
maximize the value for all shareholders in the firm. In this case, shareholders would be 
better off in widely-held firms than they would have been in family firms (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006).  
In support of this argument, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) investigate a sample of 
309 listed Swedish firms and find a negative and significant effect of increasing ownership 
concentration on both firm value (Tobin’s q) and accounting performance (Return on 
Assets, ROA). They further argue that the inferior accounting performance appears to 
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result from suboptimal investment decisions by the controlling shareholder rather than 
direct stealing from the firm.  
 
Mixed empirical evidence 
Other empirical studies show more complicated and inconsistent results regarding the 
effect of family ownership on firm performance. In a study of U.S. corporations, Morck et 
al. (1988) first find a nonlinear relation between board ownership and market valuation. 
Their results show that Tobin’s q goes up with increasing board ownership from 0 to 5 per 
cent, and decreases as ownership increases further to 25 per cent. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) uncover similar finding in the U.S. markets, suggesting that family ownership is not 
linearly associated with firm performance across all levels of ownership; performance first 
rises with increasing ownership to a threshold and then tapers off. Their result shows that 
when the family retains great control of the firm, the benefits from family ownership can 
overshadow the costs of entrenchment effects of excess control rights, whereas if family 
ownership is too great, such efficiency gains tend to be dramatically offset.  
Demsetz (1983) views that ownership structure is actually an endogenous outcome 
of profit-maximizing process, and it is thus not necessary to have any association with firm 
performance. This argument has been empirically supported by some studies. For instance, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no significant relationship between ownership structure and 
accounting performance in a study of 511 U.S. corporations. Himmelberg et al.(1999) 
extend Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) results and further point out that both ownership 
concentration and performance are endogenous consequences of the firm’s contracting 
environment, and after controlling for firm characteristics, there is no evidence showing 
that ownership structure affect firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) also 
provide evidence in favour of such nonsignificant relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. Without considering the endogeneity of ownership 
concentration, McConaughy et al. (1998) still show no evidence that large ownership holds 
a positive effect on firm value.   
Taken as a whole, the above studies mainly provide evidence of the interaction 
effects of family ownership, control, and management on the performance of family firms. 
They however do not distinguish the individual role of each element of family governance 
mechanisms nor address the question of whether family ownership per se benefits or 
damages firm performance. Villalonga and Amit (2006) fill this gap but they do not take 
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into account the endogeneity of ownership concentration and the potential nonlinear 
relationship between family holdings and firm performance. 
 
2.4.2 Family control and firm performance  
Family-controlled corporations usually show a substantial separation between ownership 
and control rights, in which the controlling shareholder is able to exercise greater control 
rights over a company with relatively less cash-flow rights. Such divergence is presumed 
to facilitate and even exacerbate the agency conflict between large and small shareholders. 
Because of its fractional ownership rights with substantial control rights, the controlling 
shareholder has both incentives and abilities to free ride on minority shareholders’ interest, 
such as to act opportunistically or to make self-regarding decisions (Faccio et al., 2001; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983a, b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Schulze et al., 2003). 
The above arguments are supported by many empirical studies. For instance, 
Faccio et al.(2001), Claessens et al.(2002) and Lins (2003) find that in East Asian large 
corporations, the excess of control rights over cash-flow rights by the controlling 
shareholder damages firm value. Wong et al. (2010) show similar evidence in Taiwanese 
companies, suggesting that such divergence has a strong and negative impact on stock 
market reactions to corporate venturing and even long-run stock performance. Using a 
sample of Western European corporations, Maury (2006) find that family control in excess 
of ownership rights, as measured by the difference between control rights and cash-flow 
rights, reduces firm performance, and at higher control levels, this reduction is more 
significant. Villalonga and Amit (2006) test the same excess control variable in the U.S. 
markets and find that this variable is negatively associated with firm value, suggesting that 
the benefits gained from family ownership tend to be offset by the entrenchment effects of 
excess control rights. Bertrand et al. (2008) show that in Thailand, family firms with 
greater involvoment of sons appear to exhibit larger separation between ownership and 
control rights, which is intimately linked to stronger incentives for tunnelling and thus 
lowering firm-level performance.  
La Porta et al. (1999) note that the controlling shareholder can exercise control 
rights in the excess of cash-flow rights by the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, such 
as pyramids, management participation, dual-class shares and cross-shareholdings. Faccio 
et al. (2001) and Claessens et al. (2000) provide evidence in Continental European and 
East Asian studies, respectively, showing that the largest shareholder’s control rights are 
typically enhanced by the presence of pyramids and dual-class shares in large corporations. 
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Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that in Sweden, the control-enhancing mechanisms are 
more often employed by families than other types of owners, such as corporations and 
financial institutions, and the use of these mechanisms leads to a prediction of significant 
efficiency losses in firm value. Villalonga and Amit (2006) take the control-enhancing 
instruments as a proxy for the presence of agency problem between controlling and 
minority shareholders in family firms when examining agency issues in the U.S. markets. 
They find that these instruments usually impair firm value. Barontini and Caprio (2006) 
state that family shareholders hold larger control rights in the excess of their cash-flow 
rights in 11 Continental European countries, but they argue that the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms by the controlling shareholder does not necessarily indicate a 
global negative effect on family firms.  
Among all control-enhancing devices,  La Porta et al. (1999) propose that the use of 
pyramidal structure is the most pronounced instrument in large corporations in developing 
countries by documenting that approximately 25 per cent of these corporations are 
pyramidal members. This finding is in favour of the argument of Wolfenzon (1998), who 
views that pyramids are more commonly used in countries with poor investor protection. It 
is because in these countries, the controlling shareholder is more inclined to enable 
minority shareholders pay for new subsidiaries of the existing firms and enjoy almost full 
benefits from this new venture without sharing with minorities. Morck, Stangeland and 
Yeung (1998) show that the use of pyramids may give rise to the controlling family’s 
incentives in rent-seeking activities, thereby extracting private benefits of control.   
 
2.4.3 Family management and firm performance  
Previous literature shows that in corporations with concentrated ownership around the 
world, controlling shareholders usually participate in firm management by acting as 
directors and officers. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find that family members are 
represented on nearly 20 per cent of board seats in the largest U.S. corporations held by 
families. In Continental Europe, Barontini and Caprio (2006) document that roughly 35 per 
cent of their sample corporations have a family CEO and half of them have at least one 
family member acting as a director. In East Asia, this phenomenon is even more striking. 
Claessens et al.(2000) state that in approximately 60 per cent of East Asian companies with 
concentrated ownership, the controlling shareholder appoints a family member in his or her 
group of top management. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and Claessens et al.(2000) 
provide some explanation for the prevalence of family management, suggesting that from 
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the perspective of controlling shareholders, participating in firm management enables them 
not merely monitor managers but also directly lead managers. La Porta et al. (1999) argue 
that family management is actually one of crucial instruments undertaken by the 
controlling family to enhance control rights over the firm.  
 
Family management versus professional management 
Recent accounts focus on the question of whether family management is superior to 
professional management in terms of benefiting performance in family firms. Relevant 
research shows that family managers or directors generally raise two major concerns 
regarding this issue.   
On one hand, family management is superior to professional management in terms 
of delivering better performance of family firms. It is because compared to unrelated 
managers, family managers’ interests are more readily to be aligned with the family, and 
they therefore tend to have a long-term vision with the firm’s survival and share 
nonmonetary rewards (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Further, family members are considered 
to be better able to acquire certain hard-to-obtain and firm-specific knowledge and higher 
trust from principle stakeholders through a long family history (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Andres, 2008; Young et al., 2008). In this regard, family management can mitigate or even 
eliminate the classic owner-manager conflict in family firms (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
This argument towards the positive effect of family management has been 
empirically proved in the literature. Likewise, in the U.S., McConaughy et al. (1998) show 
that family firms in which the founder or a descendant serves as CEO are more efficient 
than those having managers without family relationship. They further find that a 
descendant-CEO is even more efficient than a founder-CEO, possibly due to the 
descendant’s strong desire of maintaining and consolidating the wealth passed on by the 
founder. Ang et al. (2000) observe that agency costs between owners and managers are 
significantly higher in family firms run by an outsider rather than those with an affiliated 
manager. Anderson et al. (2003) also find the lower agency costs of debt financing in 
family firms in which CEOs are family members with respect to those managed by hired 
CEOs. Anderson and Reeb (2004) provide more detailed evidence, showing that while 
family firms with relatively high representation of family directors suffer from value losses, 
a moderate incidence of family board presence indeed generates benefits to the firm.  
In Continental Europe, similar results have been revealed. Maury (2006) note that 
active family control, measured by the presence of a family member acting as CEO, 
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Honorary Chairman, Chairman, or Vice Chairman, is more profitable than nonfamily firms 
in 13 Western European countries. Barontini and Caprio (2006) document that in 11 
Continental European family-controlled firms, the arrangement in which the founder 
participates in firm management or descendants act as non-executive directors can 
contribute to market valuation and accounting performance. But they further suggest that 
family firms with a descendant CEO are not significantly more valuable or profitable 
relative to nonfamily firms. Andres (2008) find that the superiority of family firms to 
widely-held firms and firms with other kinds of blockholders stems from those in which 
the family is involved in firm management or the supervisory board. They state that if the 
founding-family is active with board or management representation, the family will have 
deeper association with the firm and therefore minimize the agency conflict between large 
and small shareholders. In the sample of 210 Japanese companies, Yoshikawa and Rasheed 
(2010) state that family control, as measured by the number of family directors 
participating on the board, is positively associated with dividend payouts, and therefore 
predicts superior firm performance.  
On the other hand, family management is still considered to pose some drawbacks. 
For instance, family managers or directors are assumed to be selected from a small pool of 
managerial talent, which is exposed to the cost of exclusion of more capable and qualified 
professional mangers (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gomez-Mejia & Gutierrez, 2001; Schulze 
et al., 2001). The inferior talent of family managers tends to result in suboptimal 
investment decisions and thus lowers firm performance (Singell Jr & Thornton, 1997).  
Another problem is the asymmetrical altruism between family members, which can 
worsen the divergence of interest between owners and managers instead of mitigating it 
(Chami, 2001; Schulze et al., 2001). Because the family is composed of individuals with 
their own personal interests in the firm, an erosion of trust would easily arise within the 
family when confronting the asymmetrical altruism among family members (Bertrand et 
al., 2008). In this regard, a selfish family member, if acting as the manager, will be 
avaricious rather than grateful for what he has obtained (Buchanan, 1975), and thus tend to 
damage firm performance.  
Numerous empirical studies show evidence of the negative effect of family 
managers, especially the founder’s descendants participating in management. Morck et al. 
(1998) find that in Canada heir-controlled family firms underperform other firms in terms 
of financial performance, labour capital ratios, and R&D spending. They call it as “the 
Canadian disease” and view that this disease stems from the entrenched inherited family 
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control that inefficiently influences investment decisions. Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) 
examine 124 management succsessions in Candian family-controlled firms by Event 
Analysis (EA) and observe that the appointment of a family CEO entails a striking deline 
by 3.20 per cent in stock prices during a three-day event window,  whereas when an 
unrelated succersor is appointed, there is no significant drop in stock prices. They further 
point out that the negative reaction to the appointment of a family CEO possibly results 
from this family CEO’s insufficient experience in firm management. Pérez-González 
(2006) shows the similar results in U.S. corporations, suggesting that companies having a 
family CEO are exposed to large costs of nepotism and are thus significantly less profitable 
and valuable relative to those having a hired CEO. Villalonga and Amit (2006) also find 
that when a descendant takes the helm as Chairman of the Board or CEO, firm value is 
destroyed.   
Similar evidence is recognized in Continental European countries. Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2003) find that in Sweden family members are likely to be involvoed in executive 
management as directors or managers, which provides them with large discretion on 
decision-makings and thus facilitates expropriation in family-controlled firms. Barth et al. 
(2005) find supportive results in Norwegian family-owned firms, showing that the 
productivity of family firms in which CEOs are family members is significantly lower than 
other firms. Hillier and McColgan (2009) investigate a particular circumstance of the  
departure of a family CEO and find that both the stock market and accounting performance 
display a favourable reaction to such a departure. Bennedsen et al.(2007) suggest that in 
Denmark, family managers in general underperform professional managers even when the 
controlling family is still represented on the board of directors. They further note that 
family managers are more costly in fast-growing industries and industries where 
managerial skills are presumably more valuable. Caselli and Di Giuli (2010) state whether 
the position is occupied by a professional Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is in fact the 
critical determinant of positive performance in most Italian family firms. This nonfamily 
CFO tends to mitigate the divergence of interest between family ownership and 
management.  
Evidence from East Asia is relatively scant. Saito (2008) investigates the effect of 
family management in family-controlled firms in Japan, and find that family firms that are 
both owned and managed by descendants are less valuable than nonfamily firms, while 
those managed only by descendants can outperform nonfamily firms. Luo and Chung 
(2005) observe a nonmonotonic relationship between family involvement and family 
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business group performance during market transition in Taiwan. Specifically, group 
performance rises as the number of family members involved in group management 
increases to a threshold, and performance falls with the increasing number of family 
members. This finding is in support of Anderson and Reeb’s (2004) argument that great 
family influence contributes to firm performance, but too great influence tends to sizably 
diminish this benefit.  
In sum, to examine the role of family management in family firms, the above 
empirical research either uses dummy variable to proxy for the presence of family CEO or 
uses continuous variable to indicate the percentage of family members involved in 
management. In effect, these two proxies represent different extent of the involvement of 
family management in companies. Family management however can be reflected in both 
circumstances. Therefore, this thesis will employ these two measures as indicators of 
managerial participation of family members, thereby investigating the owner-manager 
agency conflict in family firms.  
 
Founder-CEO effects 
Although findings on the effect of family management over family firms are inconclusive, 
a substantial group of empirical studies provide strong evidence in favour of a positive role 
of the founder-CEO in his or her firm.  
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggest that companies operated by founders 
are less likely to be exposed to internally caused turnover. McConaughy et al.(1998) 
observe that firms in which the founder serves as CEO are more efficient and valuable than 
other types of firms. Such positive founder-CEO effect is supported by Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) and Palia et al.,(2008). Further, Adams et al.(2009) take into account the 
endogeneity of founder-CEO status by using instrumental variables method, and realize 
that the founder-CEO status is endogenously related to firm performance. After controlling 
for this disturbance, they still find a positive effect of the founder-CEO on performance. 
Fahlenbrach (2009) extends the above arguments. He demonstrates that founder-CEO 
firms are not only valuable than other types of firms but also have different investment 
behaviours. Founder-CEO firms on average have earned 8.3 per cent of a benchmark-
adjusted return from an equal-weighted investment project annually for the period 1993-
2002.  
Founder management is expected to add firm value for various reasons. For 
example, the founder is often highly committed to the firm’s survival and growth, and thus 
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has less incentives to pursue short-term strategy (Fahlenbrach, 2009). The founder-CEO 
may also have more firm-specific knowledge and skills in firm management and work 
more diligently and invest more efficiently. To this extent, the classic owner-manager 
conflict can be greatly mitigated (Jayaraman et al., 2000). Moreover, the founder enjoys 
higher reputation and stronger influence over his or her firm, which can help reduce the 
divergence of interest associated with other stakeholder groups, such as suppliers and 
capital providers (Zhou et al., 2010).  
Still, there are a few contrasting views and findings on this issue. Daily and Dalton 
(1992) find that there is no significant difference in financial performance between 
founder-CEO firms and other firms. Willard et al. (1992) suggest that founder-managed 
firms exhibit no significantly higher rates of profitability. Considering the endogeneity of 
founder-CEO status, Jayaraman et al. (2000) show that there is no significant efficiency in 
stock returns gained from founder management. They explain that this nonsignificance of 
superiority of founder-CEOs may stem from the excessive perquisite consumption and 
rejection of cash-flow payout or dividend policies.  
 
As a whole, despite the inconsistent conclusions, the impact of family governance 
involving a combination of family ownership, control, and management on performance of 
family firms has been extensively studied in the conceptual and empirical literature. While 
most studies have concentrated on the U.S. or Continental European markets, few has 
devoted enough attention to the family-firm issues in emerging economies which is 
characterised by the inadequate and ineffective institutional and governance environment. 
As institutional regimes would result in significant variances in ownership structure and 
governance mechanisms (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Morck & Yeung, 2004; Peng & Jiang, 
2010; Wright et al., 2005), there is a considerable need to investigate governance issues of 
family firms in the emerging markets. Further, the literature on family firms mainly 
focuses on internal governance mechanisms rather than the impact of external legal 
protection for shareholders over family firms. In essence, the legal analytical approach 
governing the relation between legal protection and financial development is seen by some 
scholars to be a better way to understand the nature of corporate governance (Burkart et al., 
2003; La Porta et al., 2002; Zhou et al., 2010). This strand of literature therefore provides a 
new perspective to explore agency issues in family firms. A brief introduction of studies on 
law and finance is summarized as follows. 
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2.5 Literature on law and finance 
2.5.1 Law and finance 
In traditional finance, securities are characterized by their cash flows (Modigliani & Miller, 
1958), whereas recent financial research has shown that the defining feature of various 
securities is in fact the rights endowed to their owners (Hart, 1995), which are critical to 
outside investors, especially when insiders (i.e. managers and controlling shareholders) act 
in their own interests.  
La Porta et al.(1998) first highlight that the rights attached to securities and how 
well these rights are protected depend on the law and the quality of its enforcement. The 
protection investors receive, in turn, determines their willingness to finance firms. 
Thereafter, a substantial body of empirical evidence on a strong law-finance-growth nexus 
has been developed in the literature. One of the central results is that legal protection varies 
sharply across countries, and that this variation predicts the differences in financial 
development and ownership structures (La Porta et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000a, b, 2002).  
Many studies have extended this line of research, noting that strong investor 
protection is empirically associated with better financial outcomes both at the firm and 
aggregate levels, as reflected in dispersed shareholder ownership (Allen et al., 2005; 
Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000b), better corporate governance 
mechanisms (Allen et al., 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004; La Porta et al., 2000b), higher 
dividend payouts (La Porta et al., 2000a), lower control premium (Djankov et al., 2008; 
Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al., 2006; Nenova, 2003), less earnings manipulation 
(Leuz et al., 2003), easier for firms accessing to a new market or industry (Djankov et al., 
2002), higher valuation of corporations (La Porta et al., 2002) or banks (Caprio et al., 
2007), higher turnover of sales in big businesses (Fogel et al., 2008), more corporate risk-
taking and thus value-enhancing investments (John et al., 2008), higher merger premium 
(Bris & Cabolis, 2008), higher expected returns of stocks (Giannetti & Koskinen, 2010), 
more efficient allocation of capital across firms (Claessens & Laeven, 2003; La Porta et al., 
2000b; Wurgler, 2000), more valuable and broad financial markets (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997; Pistor et al., 2000), less likelihood of currency 
crisis (Johnson et al., 2000a), and greater economic growth (Carlin & Mayer, 2003; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998), etc. This strand of 
literature has been developed into “law and finance”.  
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2.5.2 The role of investor protection 
La Porta et al. (1999) observe that an overwhelming number of corporations around the 
world are exposed to the concentrated ownership structure and typically have families or 
the State as controlling shareholders. Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) 
provide supportive evidence in East Asian and Western European countries, respectively. 
In this regard, the notion of investor protection in the literature mainly refers to legal 
mechanisms protective of minority shareholders who stay in the inferior positions of 
corporate governance in companies.  
The law and finance literature highlights the role of legal protection of minority 
shareholders on financial markets, thus giving new insights to explore the agency conflict 
between large and small shareholders. As suggested by La Porta et al. (2000b), with 
respect to the conventional theoretical framework based on bank-centred and market 
centred financial systems, the legal analytical approach is a more meaningful way to 
understand the nature of corporate governance. This strand of literature empirically shows 
that the expropriation by the controlling shareholder is legally constrained by the law and 
its enforcement, and the extent and strength of legal protection of minority shareholders 
leads to a prediction of differences in financial outcomes both at the firm and aggregate 
levels in individual countries.  
 
Firm level 
La Porta et al. (1998) conduct an assessment of legal rules protective of shareholders and 
creditors and the quality of legal enforcement across 49 countries. They find that English-
common-law countries provide the strongest legal protection of investors, whereas 
protection with French-civil-law countries is recorded at the weakest. La Porta et al. (1998) 
show that ownership concentration in large publicly traded companies is negatively linked 
to the extent of investor protection within individual countries. That is, small and diffused 
shareholders are less likely to be in the essential role in countries with weak protection of 
their rights. Such inverse relationship between ownership concentration and investor 
protection has been supported and extended by a following group of studies in which 
measures of the extent of legal protection of minority shareholders mainly draw from the 
methodology introduced by La Porta et al. (1998).  
Boubakri et al. (2005) show that the level of investor protection can partly explain 
the differences in ownership concentration across companies, and the positive effect of 
concentrated ownership on firm performance is more pronounced in countries with inferior 
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investor protection. By using a corrected index of the original anti-director rights based on 
a forty-six country data, Spamann (2010) however fails to find evidence supportive of the 
relations between legal investor protection and ownership concentration. Unlike La Porta 
et al. (1998) using static measures, Wu et al. (2009) develop a dynamic time series index as 
an indicator of investor protection for the period 1992-2003 in China. They find that while 
there is no significantly negative relation between ownership concentration and investor 
protection in all Chinese listed companies, this inverse relation holds for non-state-owned 
companies in which the state per se can serve as a substitute for inferior investor protection 
by exercising its political power in China.  
Demirgüç-kunt and Maksimovic (1998) examine the differences in legal systems 
affecting external financing by companies, and show that companies are more inclined to 
count on long-term external financing in countries with higher score of legal systems. It is 
presumably because firms are exposed to lower profit costs in these countries. Similarly, 
Pistor et al. (2000) extend the measures of investor protection taken by La Porta et al. 
(1998) and first analyse the impact of legal protection of shareholders and creditors on 
external financing of firms in transition economies. They realize that the effectiveness of 
legal enforcement rather than the evolution of written legal rules has greater impact on 
external financing of firms, suggesting that legal reforms in transition countries are not 
sufficient for market institutions. 
In a sample from 33 countries, La Porta et al.(2000a) find that firms pay higher 
dividends in countries where the rights of minority shareholders are well protected, 
because in these regimes minority shareholders are able to pressure insiders to relinquish 
cash. The benefits from higher investor protection can also be reflected in many forms, 
such as a higher valuation of corporations (La Porta et al., 2002) or banks (Caprio et al., 
2007), a more corporate risk-taking and thus value-enhancing investments (John et al., 
2008), a higher merger premium (Bris & Cabolis, 2008) and higher expected returns of 
stocks (Giannetti & Koskinen, 2010). Fogel et al. (2008) state that stronger shareholder 
protection also correlates with higher turnover in big U.S. businesses. 
Another group of studies also focuses on the nexus between law and finance, 
though they do not follow the way that usually evaluates the level of investor protection 
proposed by La Porta et al. (1998). Barton and Waymire (2004) examine the quality of 
financial information reporting in the U.S. market in October 1929, suggesting that 
stronger investor protection featured by the better quality of financial reporting helps firms 
to avoid the dramatic stock price declines during the financial crash. Newman et al.(2005) 
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exploit the role of auditing in investor protection and show that stock markets with higher 
penalties for audit failures and insider extraction have greater investment levels, a larger 
fraction of the companies owned by outside investors, and higher expected operating 
returns, etc. Wang and Zhou (2006) suggest that the level of investor protection can also 
influence the auditor’s choice towards Chinese businesses. They show that compared to 
non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned firms are more likely to employ small auditor 
firm. Djankov et al.(2008) use the anti-self-dealing index as a new indicator of legal 
protection of minority shareholders. This index is assembled from 72 countries and focuses 
on private enforcement devices regarding specific self-dealing transactions. They find that 
this new index in general works better than the anti-director rights introduced by La Porta 
et al.(1998), and the higher level of investor protection is related to lower control premium 
and less concentrated ownership structure. Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
also suggest that private benefits of control are lower in firms located in countries with 
strong investor protection.   
 
Country level 
At country level, the literature highlights the role of legal systems in supporting the 
development and growth of financial sector, such as financial interdediations and stock 
markets. This strand of literature views that the legal origin is a more fruitful way than 
bank-based or market-based theory to understand the differences in the nature of financial 
development in individual countries (La Porta et al., 2000b). It suggests that the reason 
why legal orignis appear to matter in financial development is that legal traditions differ in 
their efficient adaptability to changing economic circumstances. In other words, given the 
quicker adjustment of legal systems to economic conditions, financial development tends 
to be more effective (Beck et al., 2003). The benefits gained from strong legal protection at 
the aggregate level can be reflected in many aspects as follows. 
In a sample of 49 economies, La Porta et al. (1997) stress that capital markets, 
including debt and equity markets, are significantly smaller and narrower in countries with 
weak protection of minority shareholders in terms of the quality of legal rules and the 
effectiveness of legal enforcement. Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that in countries 
with poorer investor protection, bank-centred systems tend to be more benefitial for 
economic development and growth, whereas with the increasing level of legal systems 
market-centred systems appear to better enhance economies. Wurgler (2000) propose that 
legal protection of minority shareholders is positively related to the efficiency of capital 
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allocation, and it particularly hampers overinvestment in decreasing indurstries. Johnson et 
al.(2000a) apply the law-finance-growth nexus to explain the Asian Crisis in 1997-1998, 
suggesting that countries with weaker institutional governance lead to a prediction of 
greater expropriation by insiders and a larger decline in stock markets. They pose that this 
explanation is more effective than conventional macroeconomic interpretations. Levine 
(2002) supports the veiw that financial development is strongly determined by the legal 
system regarding the qualtiy of investor protection and the effectivenss of its enforcement, 
thereby being associated with economic growth. Hyytinen et al. (2003) construct an index 
for measuring investor protection for Finland during the period 1980-2000, and reveal that 
shareholder protection, rather than creditor protection, has been enhanced during the legal 
reform. They further find that the evolution of shareholder protection is a critical 
determinant of a reorganisation of the financial market in Finland which has been 
gradually shifting away from a relationship-centred financial system. Laeven and Majnoni 
(2005) investigate the relationship between judicial efficency and bank’s lending spreads, 
and show that higher level of judicial efficiency is strongly related to lower lending costs 
of banks for households and enterprises. La Porta et al. (2006) examine the impact of 
securities laws on the growth of equity markets and find no significant evidence of benefits 
provided by public enforcement to stock markets, whereas laws mandating information 
disclosure and private enforcement are conducive to the markets.  
 
2.5.3 The role of alternative mechanisms  
Apart from the main effects of investor protection on financial development both at the 
firm and aggregate levels, the law and finance literature also outlines the role of other 
alternative mechanisms as a response to formal legal protection failures. Likewise, La 
Porta et al. (2000b) propose that when protection of minority shareholders provided by the 
law is insufficient, well-constructed internal corporate governance mechanisms can serve 
as an effective substitute, such as the two-tier board system in the case of Germany (Farrar, 
2005). That is, beyond legal restraints, de facto control of corporations and especially the 
system of self-regulation and business ethics are relatively important (Farrar, 2005).2 Peng 
and Heath (1996) and Lins (2003) suggest that organizations in emerging economies are to 
a greater extent supported by alternative mechanisms, one of which is family governance. 
It is because such a governance arrangement featured by a concentrated ownership 
                                               
2
 Farrar (2005) proposes that business ethics, in a narrow sense, refers to principles that are beyond the range 
of law and institutional codes governing corporate governance.   
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structure creates incentives for close monitoring and impairs managerial entrenchments 
(Tirole, 2006).  
Others consider the culture and network-based relations as being an explanation of 
the determinants of financial development and growth in countries with poor legal systems 
pertaining to the rights of investors. As suggested by Farrar (2005), it is the network of 
formal and informal interconnectednesses involving corporations and their consequences 
for the society that comprise the system of corporate governance. McMillan and Woodruff 
(1999a) find evidence showing that Vietnam’s firms count on other mechanisms, such as 
community sanctions, to ensure contract enforcement. They document that trading 
relationship in networks in Vietnam is positively related to the amount of credit that firms 
can offer to their customers, and the networks are thus used to constrain defaulting 
customers (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999b). McMillan and Woodruff (2002) highlight the 
central role of entrepreneurs in determining the failure or success in transition economies.  
Guiso et al. (2006) claim that culture can be a potential determintant of economic 
development, and this culture-based approach would greatly enrich the literature and our 
understanding on economic phenomena. They point out that bilateral trust plays a leading 
role in the trade between European countries, which would affect the amount of portfolio 
and direct investment (Guiso et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2009).  
Allen et al. (2005) argue that studies on the law-finance-growth nexus often use 
cross-country samples but disregard one of the most important country, China. They find 
that in Chinese setting, this nexus works well in the state-listed companies, but is violated 
in the private sector that grows relatively faster within a poor and underdeveloped legal 
system. The growth of the private sector is however likely to be supported by some 
alternative governance devices, such as reputation- and relationship-based mechanisms. 
This is very similar to the relational contract considered to exist widely among Japanese 
corporations, where the social, rather than the legal, enforcement system is considered to 
take primary effect (Farrar, 2005).    
Another strand of recent accounts highlight the role of the government and the 
entrepreneurs’ political connections as an effective response to formal institutional 
governance deficiencies, especailly in emerging countries that are perceived as being 
highly corrupt (Faccio, 2006). Glaeser et al. (2001) compare the judges and regulators 
between Polanish and Czech financial markets, and reveal that the government has 
imposed strict enforcement of the securities laws on Poland’s stock markets in the 1990s, 
which has been associated with a dramatic improvement of stock markets. In contrast, the 
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relatively loose regulations in the Czech Republic are meant to hamper the development of 
stock markets.  
In respect of studies on political connections, researchers generally show that 
political connections can have a significant and positive effect on firm value (Claessens et 
al., 2008; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Fisman, 2001). This benefit can be reflected in 
various forms, such as preferential treatment by government controlled banks (Backman, 
1999; Claessens et al., 2008) and tax discounts and regulatory benefits  (De, 1989). Chen et 
al. (2005), Li et al. (2006) and Wu et al. (2009) also find evidence in support of this 
argument in China’s context.   
 
2.5.4 Investor protection and corporate governance 
The law and finance literature proposes that ownership concentration in a firm is 
negatively associated with the quality of investor protection provided by the country’s 
legal and regulatory systems (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002; Wu et al., 
2009). It implies that institutions could affect organizational routines (Boyer & 
Hollingsworth, 1997) or help determine strategic choices facing organizations (Peng et al., 
2003; Young et al., 2008). The widely-held view in the literature shows that concentrated 
ownership structure is negatively associated with the quality of legal protection for 
investors, suggesting that ownership concentration and investor protection are substitutes.  
For example, based on the classical trade-off between risk and incentives, 
Himmelberg et al. (2001) present an adverse relationship between legal protection and 
ownership concentration. La Porta et al. (2002) develop a model showing that better legal 
protection increases the controlling shareholder’s willingness to sell their shares to the 
public. This argument is supported by their empirical test based on 27 wealthy economies. 
Burkart et al. (2003) present a model, showing that the decision to keep control in family 
firms is also to some extent shaped by the quality of legal protection. Their model suggests 
that in regimes with the strongest legal protection of minority shareholders, there is no 
need for monitoring in equilibrium, and the best arrangement of the founder is to structure 
a widely-held and professionally-managed firm. This gives rise to the classic owner-
manager agency problem in the firm. When the law is not strong enough to control 
managerial discretion, the founder still hires a professional manager, but he or his family 
must stay on as large shareholders to monitor the manager, leading to the coexistence of 
the twin agency conflicts in the firm. Finally, with poor legal protection, it is too risky for 
the family to surrender control and management to outsiders, even when outsiders can 
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actually run the firm better. This results in a significant conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders.   
However, some studies still find an opposite result, suggesting that ownership 
concentration and legal protection of shareholders are not necessarily substitutes, but are 
complements in some circumstances (Burkart & Panunzi, 2006). Castillo and Skaperdas 
(2005) propose that better protection of shareholders can intensify the competition between 
owners and managers, thereby giving rise to the appropriative costs associated with the 
owner-manager agency conflict. For example, the two parties may have distinct opinion on 
resources allocation in various legal environments (a resource-cost effect). To counteract 
this negative effect, shareholders would commit to a lower extent of appropriation by 
holding more shares of the company. Burkart and Panunzi (2006) improve their initial 
work (Burkart et al., 2003) by considering the possible interaction effects between legal 
protection and the large shareholder’s monitoring. They find that legal protection does not 
necessarily substitute for ownership concentration. In fact, when weaker legal protection 
increases the large shareholder’s incentive to monitor, a more concentrated ownership 
structure is less needed. In contrast, large shareholders should reduce their shares to restore 
the manager’s incentives. Similarly, Stepanov (2003) also develops a model showing that 
ownership concentration increases with the level of legal protection.   
The theoretical predictions are also supported by some empirical evidence. Aganin 
and Volpin (2003) show a positive relation between legal protection and ownership 
concentration in Italian corporations for the period 1947-1987. In a cross-country analysis, 
Claessens et al. (2000) examine ownership concentration and management composition in 
9 East Asian countries. They reveal that in Hong Kong where investor protection is strong, 
the cash-flow rights by the ultimate owner is 24.30 per cent on average, which is higher 
than in Malaysia (23.89 per cent) or in Philippines (21.34 per cent) with weaker investor 
protection. For management composition, they find that for 80.7 per cent of companies in 
South Korea, the top management positions (i.e. the CEO, board chairman, or vice-
chairman) are occupied by members from the controlling family. This percentage is only 
42.3 percent and 67.5 per cent in Philippines and Thailand, respectively.  
In an analysis of the ultimate ownership and control in 13 Western European 
conturies, Faccio and Lang (2002) also show evidence to challenge the commonly 
accepted view. For instance, they find that ultimate owners on average hold 42.72 per cent 
of cash-flow rights in Spanish companies, while 34.66 per cent in Swiss companies. 
According to the anti-director rights (ADRI) introduced by La Porta et al. (1998) or the 
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revised ADRI by Spamann (2010), Spain however has stronger investor protection than 
Switzerland. In particular, according to revised ADRI, Germany and Italy both have 
stronger investor protection than Switzerland, while ultimate owners in the first two 
countries hold more concentrated ownership rights than in the latter.    
 
In sum, the law and finance literature indicates that besides the direct effect of legal 
mechanisms on constraining expropriation of minority shareholders, the quality and 
effectiveness of investor protection can also result in different choices of the family on 
internal governance mechanisms, such as the arrangements of family ownership, control, 
and management. While legal protection is seen as a substitute or a complement for family 
governance mechanisms, the differential combination of family governance arrangements 
facilitates the various presence or absence of agency problems in family firms. Yet, it is 
important to note that the manager is considered as “insiders” with the controlling family 
in the literature, which tends to result in the negligence of the potential impact of legal 
mechanisms on resolving the owner-manager conflict in family firms. Moreover, studies 
on the interaction effects of legal protection and family governance are relatively scant. 
Therefore, to fully understand the impact of legal protection on agency problems in family 
firms is another principal concern of the thesis. 
Further, the majority of this strand of literature empirically concentrates on cross-
country based comparisons, which tends to create the omitted-variables and aggregation 
biases (Wu et al., 2009). The comprehensive analysis of legal reform over time and across 
regions within one country and its impact over agency issues in family firms so far have 
not been well studied. This thesis therefore aims to mitigate these deficiencies commonly 
in the cross-country studies in the existing literature.  
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter reviews the theory concerning on agency problems, the major empirical 
studies on corporate governance in family firms, and the related literature on law and 
finance. This review provides a framework for the analysis carried out in the study and 
points out several research focuses emerging from the extant literature. 
(1) The agency theory states that family firms are confronted with the 
coexistence of twin agency problems of a conflict between owners and managers (Agency 
Problem I), and also a conflict between large and small shareholders (Agency Problem II). 
In general, Agency Problem II is assumed in the literature to overshadow Agency Problem 
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I in family firms, leading to an overwhelming concentration on the agency conflict 
between shareholder groups in conventional studies. Yet, the divergence of interest 
between owners and managers far from being a resolved issue, and deserves at least as 
much as attention paid to Agency Problem II among family firms. It is therefore important 
to uncover the presence and nature of key agency issues in family firms at the theoretical 
level.  
(2) The definition of family firms in the literature is mainly determined by the 
extent of combination of family ownership, control, and management. However, the 
threshold of ownership or control rights in conventional definitions remains controversial 
and lacks convincing justifications. In addition, researchers so far have not provided a 
systematic and comprehensive connection between family ownership and management in 
the definition, thus unable to distinguish the characteristics among different categories of 
family firms. To compensate for the deficiencies, this thesis aims to improve the definition 
of family firms by proposing a new approach that identifies and incorporates detailed 
associations among family ownership, control, and management. 
(3) The inconclusive evidence and findings from previous studies on the 
superiority or inferiority of family firms are based on empirical studies of individual 
capital markets with different samples and time periods, while the in-depth investigation 
on the development of family firms in the emerging markets are relatively scant, especially 
in China, one of the largest and fastest emerging economies in the world. In effect, Chinese 
family firms have been revived and are playing a significant role in China’s fledging 
capital market, which calls for a better understanding of how it works and is governed. 
This study thus attempts to contribute to such an understanding.  
(4) The law and finance literature gives new insights to explore the 
expropriation of minority shareholders’ interest from the perspective of investor protection. 
Yet, it is important to note that the extant studies may overlook the impact of investor 
protection in the context of the owner-manager conflict in family firms and the potential 
interaction effects between legal protection and family governance. This thesis will 
therefore examine how the twin agency issues in family firms are tackled by the quality 
and effectiveness of investor protection provided by the country’s legal and regulatory 
systems. 
(5) The majority of studies in the law and finance literature concentrate 
empirically on country-based comparisons, while the comprehensive analysis of legal 
reform within one country and its impact over agency issues in family firms so far have not 
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been well studied. This thesis will be a first systematic study to explore within-country 
variations over time and across regions in the effects of legal protection on agency issues 
in family firms in China’s context. This approach will also mitigate estimate biases that are 
commonly pronounced among cross-country studies.  
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Chapter 3 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
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3.1 Introduction  
This chapter starts by developing an analytical framework of agency problems in family 
firms and extending the notion of investor protection in the literature. It then presents two 
theoretical models showing how agency problems in family firms are affected by the 
extent of investor protection. Theoretical predictions derived from the models are 
formulated as key hypotheses to be tested in the empirical parts in later of the thesis. 
 
3.2 Dual-triple agency problems 
Family firms are commonly accepted to face the twin agency problems: the owner-
manager conflict (which is referred to as Agency Problem I) and the conflict of interest 
between family and nonfamily shareholders (Agency Problem II). Recent literature on 
family firms has paid great attention to Agency Problem II, which has become the 
prominent issue in studies of corporate governance in developed and emerging economies 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2000b; La Porta et al., 1999, 
2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Young et al., 2008). Researchers reveal that Agency 
Problem II often arises from a separation of control rights over cash-flow rights, which 
increases the incentive and ability of the controlling family to expropriate at the expense of 
minority shareholders. It is because in this case the controlling shareholder can exercise 
greater control in the firm by retaining less cash-flow rights associated with his shares 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2001; Lins, 2003; Maury, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). Such family control in excess of ownership rights is assumed to be amplified by the 
use of control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual-class shares, pyramids, cross-
shareholdings and management participation (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006), thereby exacerbating the conflict between large and small 
shareholders. Villalonga and Amit (2006) take the use of control-enhancing instruments as 
a proxy for the presence of Agency Problem II in family firms and find evidence that in the 
U.S. market these instruments reduce firm value.  
 The view that Agency Problem II is likely to overshadow Agency Problem I is in 
part supported by the positive effect of family management. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
assume that family management can mitigate or even eliminate the classic owner-manager 
conflict in family firms, because of family managers’ diligent efforts made to performance 
and efficient enforcement of deep industry skills and knowledge gained through a long 
family history into management (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Young et al., 
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2008). This assumption reflects a superior role of family managers over professionals, and 
has been empirically investigated. Likewise, studies of U.S. and Continental European 
family firms show that firms with a family member serving as CEO are more valuable or 
profitable than other family firms or even nonfamily firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Andres, 2008; Ang et al., 2000; Maury, 2006), especially when the founder acts as CEO 
(Adams et al., 2009; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Fahlenbrach, 2009; McConaughy et al., 
1998; Palia et al., 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
However, the positive effect of family management might be offset by the 
asymmetrical altruism among family members (Chami, 2001; Schulze et al., 2001; Wang 
& Zhou, 2006). An erosion of trust would easily arise within the family which is composed 
of individuals with their own personal interests regarding how to operate or benefit from 
the firm (Bertrand et al., 2008). In this regard, a selfish family member, if acting as the 
manager, will be avaricious rather than grateful for what he has obtained (Buchanan, 
1975), and thus tend to damage firm performance. Empirically, some studies also find that 
descendant-CEOs have no distinguishable effect from nonfamily managers (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Miller et al., 2007). Indeed, some studies show that 
descendant-CEOs can even destroy firm performance (Anderson et al., 2003; Barth et al., 
2005; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Morck et al., 1998; Pérez-González, 2006; Saito, 2008; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006), presumably due to the inferior or inadequate job qualifications. 
The nonsignificant or detrimental effect of descendant-CEOs implies that the 
commonly-held argument that family management eliminates the owner-manager agency 
issue should be challenged. Alternatively stated, the owner-manager conflict is far from 
being a resolved issue (Castillo & Skaperdas, 2005; Wang & Zhou, 2006), and cannot be 
ignored in the analysis for agency problems in family firms. As suggested by Tricker 
(2000), the separation of ownership from management of an enterprise always gives rise to 
governance issues, even though managerial positions are taken by family members. 
As such, the thesis complements the existing literature that often disregards the 
possible costs of family management. Following Wang and Zhou (2006), it provides an 
analysis that further divides the owner-manager conflict into two issues: 3  the owner-
professional manager conflict (Agency Problem IA) and the owner-family manager 
conflict (Agency Problem IB). These two conflicts jointly with Agency Problem II are 
developed into an integrated analytical framework called “dual-triple agency problems” in 
                                               
3
 Due to the existence of free-rider problem of small shareholders in companies with concentrated ownership 
(Burkart & Panunzi, 2006; Burkart et al., 2003), the conflict between shareholders and managers in family 
firms is in principle featured by the conflict between controlling family shareholders and managers. 
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family firms (as depicted in Figure 3.1).4 More precisely, “dual” refers to the conventional 
twin agency problems in a modern corporation (Agency Problem I and II), and “triple” 
refers the two-layer Agency Problem I (IA and IB) and Agency Problem II. This 
framework distinguishes from the conventional principal-principal agency framework that 
only emphasizes the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders in family firms 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2000b; La Porta et al., 1999, 
2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Young et al., 2008).  
 
Figure 3.1 Dual-triple agency problems in family firms 
 
 
  Notes: In reality, non-listed company (A1 or A2) and listed company (B1 or B2) may not exist in the above 
structure. 
 
Based on this analytical framework for agency issues in family firms, the thesis will 
first present theoretical models showing the relations among investor protection, family 
governance mechanisms, and agency costs in family firms. Predictions derived from the 
models will be formulated as hypotheses to be tested in China’s context (Chapter 7 to 9).  
  
                                               
4
 A similar terminology of dual-triple agency problems has been employed in an early Chinese article by 
Wang and Zhou (2006). However, their study neither distinguishes each component of agency issues in 
family firms as developed in this study, nor compares the probable cost of each agency problem under an 
integrated framework. 
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3.3 Investor protection 
As outlined in the law and finance literature, the nature of corporate governance in large 
companies is how to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by insiders 
(including the controlling shareholder and the manager) (Johnson et al., 2000b; La Porta et 
al., 1999). Investor protection therefore usually refers to the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights provided by the country’s legal and regulation systems (Allen et al., 
2005; Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000b, 2002). 
However, given the dual-triple agency framework for analysis of family-firm issues, the 
controlling shareholder, although with significant ownership, is still exposed to 
misalignment of interest with manager and the risk of being expropriated by the manager 
who runs the company in practice (Burkart et al., 2003; Chami, 2001). Therefore, the 
nature of corporate governance in family firms is that of mitigating expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the insiders, as well as mitigating expropriation of all 
shareholders by the manager.  
The law and finance literature provides new insights to explore agency conflicts by 
highlighting the role of legal protection of minority shareholders on the financial markets. 
It empirically shows that the expropriation by the controlling shareholder is legally 
constrained by the law and its enforcement. The efficiency of legal protection of minority 
shareholders leads to a prediction of differences in financial outcomes both at the firm and 
aggregate levels in individual countries. In respect of the governance issues in family 
firms, managerial expropriation is also assumed to be restricted by the law (Burkart et al., 
2003). Hence, unlike conventional studies in which the measures for investor protection 
only concentrate on the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, the 
thesis extends the notion of “investor protection”, which covers the twin agency issues in 
family firms. The concept of investor protection in this thesis therefore refers to the 
country’s legal mechanisms regarding the protection of minority shareholders against 
controlling shareholders, and also of all shareholders against managers.  
In particular, investor protection is initially measured by an assessment of 
shareholder rights and creditor rights (La Porta et al., 1998). Subsequently, the anti-director 
rights index, an index aggregating shareholder protection, is widely used in relevant studies 
where “investors” and “shareholders” are used interchangeably, such as La Porta et 
al.(2002), La Porta et al. (2006), Djankov et al. (2008) and Wu et al. (2009). Following the 
literature, the thesis thus focuses on legal mechanisms only pertaining to the rights of 
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shareholders and considers shareholders indistinguishable from investors. Figure 3.2 
depicts the relationship between investor protection and agency problems in family firms.  
 
Figure 3.2 Investor protection and dual-triple agency problems 
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3.4 Hypotheses development 
To the best of our knowledge, theoretical studies on the impact of investor protection on 
governance issues in family firms are relatively scant in the recent literature. Burkart et 
al.(2003) provide a model showing how the founder’s decision on ownership concentration 
and management composition is shaped by the legal environment. Other studies however 
only focus on the relations between family governance mechanisms and agency costs, but 
neglect the effect of investor protection interacted with family governance mechanisms 
(Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Chami, 2001).  
This thesis will link the two strands of studies and address the interconnectedness 
among investor protection, family governance, and agency costs in family firms within one 
analytical framework. It presents two theoretical models of a family firm in which all 
activities are considered to be a project of investment. The first model of a firm is one fully 
owned by the family, and the second model of a firm is one not fully owned but controlled 
by the family. In general, these two models signify the twin agency problems in family 
firms, respectively: the conflict between shareholders and managers, and the conflict 
between family and nonfamily shareholders. The study derives several testable predictions 
of the models based on the following assumptions:  
(1) The project yields income 0≻R  with the probability of success p  ( 10 ≺≺ p ). 
The firm has to pay wage 0≻w  to the manager; if the project fails, the firm has no 
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income and the manager gets nothing. The manager is assumed to be an unrelated 
manager rather than a family member. 
(2) The probability of success p  is determined by the manager’s moral hazard. The 
manager has two statuses - “behave” (“exert effort” and “take no private benefits”) 
and “misbehave” (“shirk” and “take private benefits”). When behaving, the 
probability of success is uHpp =  and the manager’s payoff is wpuH ; misbehaving 
yields the probability of success uHuL ppp ≺=  and private benefits 0≻B  to the 
manager, and the manager’s payoff thus becomes BwpuL + . In order to give an 
incentive to the manager to behave, the following constraint is satisfied:  
                                          Bwpwp uL
u
H +≥ ,                                                  (3.1) 
     which can be rewritten as 
u
L
u
H pp
B
w
−
≥ .                                                    (3.2) 
          Condition (3.2) can infer an equation 
 
u
L
u
H pp
B
w
−
= ,                                                      (3.3) 
          which indicates the lowest cost of the firm in the case of success that makes the       
manager behave. Assuming that a family member acting as the manager has alignment of 
interest with family shareholders, a family manager therefore always behaves with the 
probability of success fHpp = . However, due to the inferior or inadequate job 
qualifications of family members, such probability is smaller than that of a professional 
manager who exerts his or her effort to the project. That is, uHfH pp ≺ . 
(3) The extent of family involvement in the firm is e  ( [ ]10，e∈ ), which can be reflected 
by a combination of family ownership, control, and management. Family 
involvement imposes a negative effect )(eg on the probability of success p . 
Therefore, 0)(' ≺eg , 0)('' ≺eg , uHpg =)0( , and fHpg =)1( . Family involvement 
also yields a monitoring effect )(ef  on the manager, which reduces the probability 
of managerial expropriation. 0)(' ≻ef , 0)('' ≺ef , 1)(0 ≤≤ ef  and 0)0( =f . Both 
)(' eg  and )(' ef  are continuous on the closed interval ]10[ ， , and are differentiable 
on the open interval )1,0( . 
(4) As suggested by Burkart and Panunzi (2006), the interaction effects between legal 
protection and the large shareholder’s monitoring should be taken into 
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consideration when examining the relationship between legal protection and 
ownership concentration. Therefore, in the derivation of this thesis, the quality of 
legal protection to shareholders is denoted by k , which can yield a multiplier effect 
)(kh  on the monitoring effect )(ef , and 0)(' ≻kh , 0)('' ≺kh , 1)( ≻kh .  
 
3.4.1 The firm fully owned by the family 
When there is only one shareholder (all family shareholders are considered as one group, 
called the family), the main agency problem in the firm is featured by the conflict of 
interest between the family and the manager who runs the business in practice. In the case 
that the family participates in the firm with the extent e , expression (3.3) can be rewritten 
as  
[ ]
u
L
u
H pp
efB
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−
−
=
)(1
  .                                               (3.4) 
The family shareholders’ welfare is therefore formulated as  
[ ]
u
L
u
H pp
efBRegeU
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−=
)(1)()(1  .                                      (3.5) 
       When considering both the internal ( e ) and external ( k ) governance mechanisms, the 
lowest cost of the firm becomes  
[ ]
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  .                                            (3.6) 
The family shareholders’ welfare is therefore given by  
[ ]
u
L
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)()(1)(),(2  .                               (3.7) 
The derivative of equation (3.7) with respect to k  is 
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,                                   (3.8) 
which implies that the increasing quality of the external legal protection of shareholders 
can improve the welfare of shareholders. The first testable prediction of the model is thus 
summarized as follows: 
 
        Result 1: Family shareholders are better off in regimes with better investor protection. 
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        Assuming that the quality of investor protection 0≻k  is randomly selected, and 
family shareholders maximize their welfare in the above two cases, the first order 
condition for this problem is given by     
0)()()( 1
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'
1
'
1 =
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+=
u
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eBfRegeU ,                                  (3.9) 
and  
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.                         (3.10) 
The difference between expression (3.9) and (3.10) is 
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which infers  
       0)]()([)]()([ 2'1'2'1' ≻efefpp
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as 1)( ≻kh . Following the mean value theorem and the assumptions specified above, 
condition (3.12) can yield  
021 ≺ee − ,                                                   (3.13) 
which implies that the positive incremental extent of involvement of the family stems from 
the effect of external legal protection of shareholders. The proof of expression (3.13) is 
given in Appendix A3.1. This model therefore can be used to address one further 
prediction.   
 
        Result 2: In regimes with better investor protection, the extent of family involvement 
in the firm is higher.  
 
This result departs from the commonly accepted view that legal protection and 
ownership concentration are substitutes (Burkart et al., 2003; Himmelberg et al., 2001; La 
Porta et al., 1999, 2002; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002; Wu et al., 2009). It is however 
consistent with the argument by Burkart and Panunzi (2006), who propose that ownership 
concentration does not necessarily substitute for legal protection of shareholders. In fact, 
when the law and the controlling shareholder’s monitoring are substitutes in all 
circumstances, ownership concentration and legal protection can be complements. In 
respect of the derivation in this thesis, the critical assumption is 1)( ≻kh , implying that 
legal protection can magnify the effect of the controlling family’s monitoring on 
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managerial expropriation. Greater private benefits extracted by managers are reduced by 
such monitoring effect. Therefore, better investor protection tends to encourage the family 
to increase the extent of family involvement in the firm, thereby exerting more monitoring 
to limit managers’ expropriation.      
 
        Condition (3.5) and (3.7) show that there exist 1e  and 2e  with randomly selected 
0≻k   such that  
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The second derivatives of equation (3.5) and equation (3.7) with respect to e  are  
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respectively. Therefore, the welfare of family shareholders is evident to be nonlinearly 
related to the extent of family involvement with a maximum value when the extent reaches 
1e  or 2e . This calculation can be concluded into another testable implication. 
 
       Result 3:  Irrespective of the effect of investor protection, the relationship between 
family involvement in the firm and the welfare of family shareholders is nonlinear with an 
inflection point.  
 
3.4.2 The firm not fully owned but controlled by the family 
While the firm is not 100% owned by the family but the family can still have dominant 
power to control it. In this circumstance, the conflict of interest between controlling and 
minority shareholders dominates governance issues in family firms. The study further 
assumes that  
(1) The fraction of the controlling family’s shareholdings is α . α  is exogenously 
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determined by the history and the life-cycle of the family firm, and the reduction of 
equity (i.e. sale by the shareholders) is not considered.  
(2) As a benefit of controlling the firm, the controlling family can divert private 
benefits 0≻FB  of the profits from the firm to itself, before the rest is distributed as 
dividends. The diversion of corporate resources from the corporation to the 
controlling family, known as “tunnelling”(Johnson et al., 2000b), can take a 
number of forms, such as internal asset sales at nonmarket prices, equity sales, 
transfer pricing contracts favouring the controlling family, subsidized personal 
loans, and outright cash appropriation. In some cases, outright cash appropriation 
and other resource transfers directly to the family are generally considered as illegal 
and face severe punishments (Riyanto & Toolsema, 2008). In this section, the study 
only focuses on tunnelling-actions taken by the controlling family which may 
benefit itself at the expense of other investors, but are compliant with existing legal 
procedures (Djankov et al., 2008).  
(3) The involvement of the family in the firm facilitates “tunnelling” behaviours, thus 
yielding an expropriation effect )(er  on private benefits FB  . La Porta et al. (2002) 
state that despite the substantial power to expropriate minority shareholders, 
controlling shareholders still have strong financial incentives to moderate such 
expropriation, one of which is their ownership rights. La Porta et al. (2002) further 
argue that with higher cash-flow ownership, the expropriation by controlling 
shareholders tends to be lower. Therefore, as the extent of family involvement e  
increases, the expropriation effect )(er  will be reduced, indicating 0)(' ≺er and 
0)('' ≺er . At one extreme when the family fully participates in the firm with 1=e , 
the derivation is equivalent to Model 1 in which the firm is 100% owned by the 
family, suggesting 0)1( =r . Therefore, 1)(0 ≤≤ er . )(' er  is continuous on the 
closed interval ]10[ ， , and differentiable on the open interval )1,0( .  
(4) The constrained effect of investor protection on )(er  is denoted by )(km , and 
0)(' ≻km , 0)('' ≺km , 1)(0 ≺≺ km . 
        In the case that the family participates in the firm with the extent e , the family 
shareholders’ welfare is given by  
[ ] )(])(1)([)(1 erBpp
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−= α  .                       (3.16) 
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        When considering both the internal ( e ) and external ( k ) governance effects, the 
family shareholders’ welfare is formulated as  
[ ] )](1)[(})()(1)({),(2 kmerBpp
khefBRegkeU Fu
L
u
H
−+
−
−
−= α  .        (3.17) 
The derivative of equation (3.17) with respect to k  is 
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Condition (3.18) infers that 
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−
α
, which indicates that when the change in the effect of 
legal protection in constraining the managerial expropriation is greater than that of legal 
protection in mitigating the extraction by the controlling family, the increasing quality of 
legal protection to shareholders can improve the welfare of family shareholders.  
 
           Result 4: Family shareholders are better off in regimes with better investor 
protection only when the marginal effect of legal protection of all shareholders (including 
both family shareholders and nonfamily shareholders) is greater than that of legal 
protection of minority shareholders. This result suggests that the protection for all 
shareholders should also be considered in family firms, which affirms the new concept of 
investor protection provided earlier in this chapter. 
                       
          Following the derivation in section 3.3.1, equation (3.16) and (3.17) are 
differentiated with respect to e  to obtain 
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To maximize the family shareholders’ welfare, the first order condition is that there exist 
1e and 2e  with randomly selected 0≻k  such that 
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and  
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Equation (3.22) - (3.23) yields 
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Recalling assumptions 1)( ≻kh  and 0)(' ≺er  that indicates 0)()( 2' ≺kmerBF , equation 
(3.24) infers 
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Based on the mean value theorem and the assumptions of this model, condition (3.25) 
can yield  
021 ≺ee − ,                                             (3.26) 
which implies that the external shareholder protection contributes to the incremental extent 
of family involvement in the firm. The proof of expression (3.26) is similar to that of 
expression (3.13) provided in Appendix A3.1. 
 
        Result 5: In regimes with better investor protection, the extent of family involvement 
in the firm is higher.   
 
        Condition (3.16) and (3.17) suggest that there exist 1e  and 2e  with 0≻k   such that  
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The second derivatives of equation (3.16) and (3.17) with respect to e  are  
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respectively. Therefore, the welfare of family shareholders increases as the extent of family 
involvement reaches 1e  or  2e , and then tappers off.   
 
          Result 6:  Irrespective of the effect of investor protection, the relationship between 
the involvement of the family in the firm and the welfare of family shareholders is 
nonlinear with an inflection point.  
 
           In summary, this section develops two mathematical models illustrating how agency 
conflicts in family firms are tackled by the extent of legal investor protection and family 
involvement that are to some extent shaped by such legal effect. The thesis derives three 
testable predictions from each of the two models, depicting the relations among investor 
protection, family involvement, and the welfare of family shareholders.  
      Result 1 (of Model 1) and 4 (of Model 2) regarding relations between investor 
protection and the family shareholder’s welfare are somewhat different. In the second 
model, the effect of investor protection on the family shareholders’ welfare depends on 
whether the marginal effect of legal protection of all shareholders is greater than that of 
legal protection of minority shareholders only, which can be characterised by two opposing 
hypotheses. As family firms are assumed to be confronted with the twin agency problems 
in this thesis, Result 1 and 4 are thus combined and developed into the following 
hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 7. Particularly, given the practical difficulty in 
measuring family shareholders’ welfare, the thesis adopts firm performance as the 
dependent variable in the empirical test. 
 
H1a: Family firms in regimes with better investor protection should have higher firm 
performance; and 
H1b: Family firms in regimes with better investor protection should have lower firm 
performance. 
 
Both models predict the same results (Result 2 and 5) regarding the relations 
between investor protection and the involvement of the family in the firm. Empirically, the 
involvement of the family in the firm is reflected in the thesis by a combination of family 
ownership, control, and management. That is, a higher extent of family involvement can be 
denoted by higher concentration of ownership rights, less separation of ownership and 
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control rights, and more appointment of family members serving as directors or managers. 
Consequently, the second hypothesis to be tested in Chapter 8 is formulated as follows: 
 
H2: In regimes with better investor protection, family firms should have higher 
concentration of ownership rights, less separation of ownership and control rights, and 
more appointment of family directors or managers.  
 
          Given the nonlinear relationship between family involvement and the family 
shareholder’s welfare that is obtained from Result 3 and 6, the third testable prediction is 
thus featured by two sub-hypotheses in Chapter 9:   
 
          H3a: Family firms with higher extent of family involvement should have higher firm 
performance; and  
H3b: Family firms with higher extent of family involvement should have lower firm 
performance.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In Chapter 3, the study firstly develops a new framework for analysing agency problems in 
family firms. This analytical framework considers the twin agency problems in family 
firms of a conflict between owners and managers, and also a conflict between family and 
nonfamily shareholders. It further divides the first agency problem into two issues by 
distinguishing the manager between a professional and a family member. The entire set of 
agency conflicts is defined in the thesis as “dual-triple agency problems” in family firms. 
Secondly, the thesis extends the notion of investor protection that refers to legal protection 
both of all shareholders against managers, and also of minority shareholders against 
controlling shareholders. This new concept will complement the literature that only focuses 
on the latter agency issue in conventional studies. Lastly, the thesis constructs two 
mathematical models capturing the relations among investor protection, family 
governance, and agency costs in family firms. The mathematical calculations obtained 
from the models are summarized as key hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part of the 
thesis carried out through Chapter 7 to 9.  
 
                                                                                                                               62
 
Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY  
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4.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the methodology used in this study. It describes two main 
estimations for panel data analysis, followed by a description of the regression models 
employed in the empirical chapters: the two-stage least squares estimation of the fixed 
effects panel data models are used in Chapter 7 and 9 of the thesis, while the random 
effects estimation is used in Chapter 8.  
 
4.2 Panel data analysis 
4.2.1 Two-stage least squares estimation of the fixed effects panel data models 
A panel data set usually faces two general forms of correlation in finance application. One 
is defined as an unobserved firm effect that is caused by the dependence of the errors terms 
across years for a given firm, and the other by definition is a time effect due to the 
correlation of the residuals across different firms for a given year. In general, the 
unobserved firm effect is more pronounced in the panel data set of corporate finance field 
which is captured by the shorter time periods but larger clusters in firm dimension 
(Petersen, 2009). Hence, the thesis will focus on addressing the unobserved firm effect in 
the main analysis, but adds the time effect into consideration in robustness check.  
A single-equation model with constant slope coefficients and variant intercept 
across companies is most widely used in the analysis of panel data (Hsiao, 2003), which 
can be written as 
 
ititiit XY µβα ++= ,                                                    (4.1) 
  
where itY  is the dependent variable, itX  represents the independent variable vector, and iα  
is a dummy variable representing the unobserved firm effect.  
The fixed effects (FE) estimation is generally considered to be a more convincing 
method to eliminate the unobserved firm effect. This method allows for correlation 
between iα  and independent variables ( itX ). By time-demeaning each variable, Model 
(4.1) can be rewritten as  
 
）（）X（XYY iitiitiit
−−−
−+−=− µµβ .                                   (4.2) 
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As the unobserved effect iα  disappears in equation (4.2), this equation can be estimated by 
the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, if the idiosyncratic error term itµ  is 
correlated with explanatory variables and serially correlated over all time periods, the 
simple FE estimation is also biased (Wooldridge, 2002).  
The clustered standard errors are presumed to control for arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and within-group correlation in a data set and produce unbiased 
estimators (Petersen, 2009).5 The thesis thus applies the standard errors clustered by firm 
to correct these two disturbances in the panel-data models, including the fixed effects (FE) 
and random effects (RE) estimation. The RE estimation will be further discussed in the 
next section. 
The reason for using only single clustering rather than double clustering is to 
mitigate the distortions that the noise caused by the double-clustered standard errors brings 
to the results. Thompson (2009) proposes that when there are too few clusters in one 
dimension, the estimates from the double-clustered standard errors tend to be noisy, and 
the double clustering works well only when there are sufficient clusters along both 
dimensions. He further points out that the application of the double-clustered standard 
errors is conditionally on more than 25 observations on both firms and time periods, which 
is evidently violated in the data set of this study: only 9 clusters in time dimension. 
Petersen (2009) also claims that when the number of clusters on dimensions differs much, 
the results from clustering on the most frequent dimension is almost identical to clustering 
on both firm and time. Thus, this study only considers the firm effect in the main context, 
but allows for potential time effect in the data set by using double-clustered standard errors 
or adding time dummies to the regression models in the robustness test. 
Further, endogeneity is also prone to make the simple FE estimation biased in a 
panel data set. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation is a more generally used 
method to deal with this problem (Wooldridge, 2002). To obtain unbiased estimators for 
probable endogenous regressors, the study undertakes the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation of the fixed-effects panel-data models (FE2SLS) in the regression analysis. If 
there is no endogenous variable in the regressions, the heteroskedastic OLS (HOLS) 
estimator is calculated, which is more efficient than OLS in the presence of arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity (Davidson et al., 1993). 
                                               
5
 In STATA 11.1, the standard errors and statistics are robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intra-
group correlation when option cluster is specified. 
                                                                                                                               65
In summary, the study implements the FE2SLS estimation with the standard errors 
clustered by firm to control for the disturbances of endogeneity, arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity, and within-panel autocorrelation in the panel data set. Additionally, the 
double-clustered standard errors or time dummies will be used to account for the potential 
time effect in the data set in robustness test. The FE2SLS estimation will be applied in the 
analysis carried out in Chapter 7 and 9 of the thesis.  
 
4.2.2 Random effects estimation with panel data  
According to the methodology of the FE estimation, the time-invariant variable would be 
swept away and cannot be estimated by a FE model. Therefore, although the FE estimation 
is more widely used in corporate finance application, the random effects (RE) estimation is 
applied in certain situations, especially when the key explanatory variable is constant over 
time (Wooldridge, 2002). The RE estimation assumes that the unobserved effect iα  is 
independent with each explanatory variable, and equation (4.1) can be written as  
 
ititit XY νβ += ,                                                         (4.3) 
 
where itiit µαν += . As each error term includes iα , itν  is serially correlated over time. In 
this case, the pooled OLS estimator is incorrect and the generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimation is thus required in an analysis of the RE models.  
Chapter 8 of the thesis examines the relationship between investor protection and 
family governance mechanisms, in which the key explanatory variable- the governance 
environment index - is invariant across time periods. Therefore, different from the 
estimation method in other two empirical chapters, Chapter 8 uses the RE estimation in the 
regression analysis.    
 
4.3 Regression models 
Following the theoretical framework presented earlier, the empirical analysis (Chapter 7-9) 
comprises three main examinations by using a detailed panel data set of Chinese family 
firms. First, the study examines how agency costs in Chinese family firms are affected by 
the quality and effectiveness of investor protection under China’s legal and regulatory 
systems. It is followed by an investigation of whether the family’s choice of decision on 
internal governance mechanisms is to some extent shaped by the extent of investor 
                                                                                                                               66
protection in China’s provincial jurisdictions. Lastly, the study further explores the 
interaction effects of family governance mechanisms with investor protection on agency 
costs in Chinese family firms. 
 
4.3.1 Models of investor protection and agency costs in family firms 
To gain insight of the relation between investor protection and agency costs in family firms, 
Chapter 7 employs the following regression model: 
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Dependent variables 
The accounting performance of a family firm is considered as the evidence of the costs of 
dual-triple agency problems in family firms. The accounting Return on Assets (ROA) is 
computed as the ratio of firm’s earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to the average total 
assets for the period. Industry-adjusted ROA is used to control for industry effects. 
Industry-adjusted ROA is the difference between the firm’s ROA and the asset-weighted 
average ROA for the firm’s industry, which is computed at the CSRC level of industry 
classification. 
Tobin’s q, which measures the market valuation in most U.S. and Continental 
European studies, is not applied as the dependent variable in this research. It is because 
most Chinese listed companies have suffered from the problem of having two thirds of 
their issued shares as non-tradable shares before 2005 when the reform of the split share 
structure was lunched in China. At the end of 2008, the proportion of non-tradable shares 
was still 45% in companies that were ultimately controlled by individuals or families. 
Therefore, Tobin’s q which is computed on the basis of the full-circulation stock markets is 
inappropriate and unreliable in China’s context.   
 
Explanatory variables 
The study employs the cumulative legal index (CLAW) and the governance environment 
index (GENVIRON) developed in Chapter 6 of the thesis as two main explanatory 
variables to proxy for the extent of formal investor protection and its enforcement, 
respectively. VOICE, EXIT, SMINTEGR, ANTIBLOCK, ANTIDIRECT, 
ANTIMANAGE and ANTINONTRADABLE indices and each component of 
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GENVIRON are applied to examine the individual effect of investor protection on agency 
conflicts in Chinese family firms.   
 
Control variables             
Although the privatization of state enterprises and assets in various forms has been pursued 
over the years in China, the government still retains significant ownership in most listed 
companies (Allen et al., 2005; Amit et al., 2011; Sun & Tong, 2003). Therefore, it is of 
interest and significance to control for the effects of large state shareholders in Chinese 
family firms. The thesis attempts to do so by setting a dummy variable equalling one when 
the second largest shareholder is the state or state-controlled companies and the equity 
stake of this shareholder is more than 10 per cent. However, only 5.61 per cent of the 
sample observations are specified with value one during the period of 2007 to 2009, with 
4.36 per cent in 2009. This tends to result in a relatively low variance of the dummy 
variable, and thus low precision with which the effect of that variable supposed to measure, 
i.e. large standard errors and confidence intervals (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Further, due to 
the uneven and incomplete quality of information disclosure at the early stage of China’s 
stock markets, the missing value rate of this dummy variable is recorded at 29.96 per cent 
from 2000 to 2002, especially 61.19 per cent in 2000, which will also affect the precision 
of the variable. As a result, this dummy variable is not included in the regression models in 
the thesis.      
Recent studies show that business affiliates sustained by their association with the 
same family would either benefit (Faccio et al., 2001; Granovetter, 2005; Luo & Chung, 
2005) or suffer from this interfirm relationship (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). The study thus 
uses SYSTEM to control for this potential effect, which equals one when the firm is under 
the same family’s control as at least one other listed firm in the same year, and zero 
otherwise. SALE is the ratio of annual operating revenue to total assets; SIZE is the natural 
log of annual total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of liabilities to total assets. AGE is the 
number of years since the initial public offerings (IPO) of the firm.6 This set of control 
variables are also used in the regression analysis in Chapter 8 and 9 of this thesis.  
 
                                               
6
 Because listed companies follow the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) regulations by 
ticking the right boxes, the current literature on corporate governance in Chinese listed companies uniformly 
shows a fulfilment of the exact numerical one-third independent directors requirement. This results in a 
negligible impact of independent directors against firm performance in studies of this kind (Hu & Shen, 
2002; Li et al., 2001; Wang, 2007). Therefore, despite numerous advantages of independent directors in 
modern companies, the thesis dose not control for this effect in the regression analysis. 
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4.3.2 Models of investor protection and family governance mechanisms 
Chapter 8 applies the following regression models to investigate individually the impact of 
investor protection on family governance mechanisms involving a combination of family 
ownership, control, and management. 
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Dependent variables 
Dependent variables are captured by three sets of variables: family ownership, control, and 
management. Family ownership variable is measured by the cash-flow rights held by the 
family (CASHFLOW). The calculation of cash-flow rights and control rights follows the 
method introduced by La Porta et al.(1999) and developed by Faccio and Lang (2002) and 
Claessens et al.(2002) (see A4.1).  
Family control is featured by the presence of control-enhancing instruments that 
allow the excess of control rights over cash-flow rights (Barontini & Caprio, 2006). 
Control-enhancing mechanisms include dual-class shares, pyramids, cross-shareholdings 
and management participation (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). Among all devices, pyramids are found to be more prevalent in developing 
countries (La Porta et al., 1999), especially in the case of China. In effect, the dual-class 
share structure is formally prohibited by China’s law, and the incidence of cross-
shareholding is much rarer than pyramiding among Chinese family firms (Chen et al., 
2007; Liu et al., 2003; Wang & Zhou, 2006). The thesis thus uses pyramids to describe the 
way in which the controlling family maintains dominant significant control over a 
company, with less cash-flow rights associated with its shares. Specifically, family control 
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variables in the study contain (1) EXCESSCONTROL, the difference between the family’s 
control rights and cash-flow rights; and (2) PYRAMIDS, equalling one when the family 
exercises control over a listed company through at least one other company, and zero 
otherwise.  
Management variable is captured as FAMILYRATIO, the number of family 
members serving as directors or managers divided by the total number of senior 
management that refers to directors, supervisors, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the 
Vice General Managers, the Assistant General Managers, the Secretary of the Board and 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). The study does not discriminate between directors and 
managers among family members in firm management. It is because in Chinese family 
firms, taking the sample of 2008 as an example, 30 per cent of family directors are 
involved in executive management. Caspar et al. (2010) also propose that a board in a 
family firm is characterised by a routine and active family participation in top-executive 
management. These arguments thus stress the role overlap and interaction between family 
directors and family managers in the management of family businesses.  
 
Explanatory  variables  
The effectiveness of provincial enforcement of investor protection is measured by the 
governance environment index complied in Chapter 6 of the thesis. This index is used to 
examine the impact of investor protection on the choice of family governance mechanisms 
in the multivariate regression analysis.  
A dummy variable is also applied to indicate the high or low level of investor 
protection. The dummy equals one, suggesting strong investor protection, if the value of 
governance environment of a particular province is above the upper quartile (25%) score 
across 31 provinces, and zero otherwise. This approach is different from conventional 
studies that usually adopt the median score as a breakpoint for the degree of investor 
protection, such as Maury (2006) and Yu and Pan (2008).  
   
Control variables  
The set of control variables remains the same as those undertaken in Chapter 7. SYSTEM 
is a dummy variable, equalling one when the firm is under the same family’s control as at 
least one other listed firm in the same year, and zero otherwise. SALE is the ratio of annual 
operating revenue to total assets. SIZE is the natural log of annual total assets; 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of liabilities to total assets. AGE is the number of years since the 
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initial public offerings (IPO) of the firm. Industry and time dummy variables are also used 
in the random effects models to control for industry and time effects, respectively.  
 
4.3.3 Models of family governance and agency costs in family firms 
The analysis of Chapter 9 will consist of two main parts. First, it explores the individual 
effect of family governance mechanisms on agency costs of Chinese family firms by using 
Model (4.9). It then adds the factor of investor protection, and further analyses the 
interaction effects of family governance and investor protection on agency costs.  
For the second analysis, the thesis adopts two approaches. One is the categorical 
method in which the data set is divided into two subsets depending on the level of investor 
protection in China’s provincial jurisdictions. The two subsets are individually estimated 
by empirical Model (4.9). The alternative approach is applied in the robustness check by 
conducting Model (4.10) with a construction of the interaction variables of family 
governance mechanisms and investor protection as explanatory variables.  
 
titititi
titititi
titititi
AGELEVERAGESIZE
SALESYSTEM、OFAMILYRATIPYRAMIDS
ROLEXCESSCONTCASHFLOWCASHFLOWROA
,,10,9,8
,7,6,5,4
,3
2
,2,1,
εβββ
ββββ
βββα
++++
++++
+++=
                       (4.9) 
 
tititi
tititiiti
itiiti
itiititi
AGELEVERAGE
SIZESALESYSTEMGENVIRONOFAMILYRATI
GENVIRONPYRAMIDSGENVIRONROLEXCESSCONT
GENVIRONCASHFLOWGENVIRONCASHFLOWROA
,,10,9
,8,7,6,5
,4,3
2
,2,1,
*
**
**
εββ
ββββ
ββ
ββα
+++
++++
++
++=
              (4.10) 
 
Dependent variable 
Consistent with Chapter 7, the Return on Assets (ROA) is taken as the primary 
performance measure in both models. ROA is computed as the firm’s earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) divided by average total assets for the period. Industry-adjusted 
ROA is used to control for industry effects. Industry-adjusted ROA is the difference 
between the firm’s ROA and the asset-weighted average ROA for the firm’s industry, 
which is computed at the CSRC level of industry classification. 
 
Explanatory variables 
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As Model (4.9) analyses the main effects of family governance mechanisms on agency 
costs, explanatory variables in this model consist of three sets of variables, indicating 
family ownership, control, and management, respectively.  
Family ownership variable is measured as CASHFLOW, the cash-flow rights held 
by the family (including all family members). As the relation between family-holdings and 
firm performance is likely to be nonlinear (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), this study includes 
both CASHFLOW squared and CASHFLOW as explanatory variables in the regression 
analysis. The calculation of cash-flow rights and control rights held by the family remains 
the same as specified in Chapter 8 of the thesis.  
Family control variables contain (1) EXCESSCONTROL, the difference between 
the family’s control rights and cash-flow rights; and (2) PYRAMIDS, equalling one when 
the family exercises control over a listed company through at least one other company, and 
zero otherwise.  
Family management variable is captured as FAMILYRATIO, the number of family 
members serving as directors or managers divided by the total number of senior 
management. 
The extent of investor protection within different local regimes is measured by the 
governance environment index which remains unchanged through years. Although the FE 
models cannot obtain the estimators of time-constant variables, these variables interacting 
with variables that change over time can be estimated by the FE models (Wooldridge, 
2002). Model (4.10) thus constructs explanatory variables-CASHFLOW*GENVIRON, 
CASHFLOW2*GENVIRON, EXCESSCONTROL* GENVIRON, 
PYRAMIDS*GENVIRON, and FAMILYRATIO*GENVIRON- in the regression analysis 
to investigate the interaction effects of family governance and investor protection on 
agency costs in Chinese family firms. 
 
Control variables  
Model (4.9) and (4.10) contain the same set of control variables in the previous regression 
analyses. SYSTEM is a dummy variable, equalling one when the firm is under the same 
family’s control as at least one other listed firm in the same year, and zero otherwise. 
SALE is the ratio of annual operating revenue to total assets; SIZE is the natural log of 
annual total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of liabilities to total assets. AGE is the number 
of years since the initial public offerings (IPO) of the firm. Industry and time dummy 
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variables are also used in the random effects models in robustness check to control for 
industry and time effects, respectively.  
 
4.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter describes the methodology adopted in the empirical parts of this thesis. 
Specifically, the two-stage least squares estimation of the fixed effects panel data models 
(FE2SLS) is applied in Chapter 7 and 9 of the thesis, for investigations of the impact of 
investor protection and family governance mechanisms on agency costs in Chinese family 
firms, respectively. The FE2SLS estimation is adopted to account for disturbances of 
endogeneity, arbitrary heteroskedasticity, and within-panel correlation in a panel data set. 
As the key explanatory variable is constant over time in the analysis of the impact of 
investor protection on family governance mechanisms, Chapter 8 employs the random 
effects (RE) estimation in the regression analysis. In addition, all examinations (including 
robustness tests) reported in the thesis use the clustered standard errors for each estimator.    
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Chapter 5 
DATA 
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5.1 Introduction 
The data set used in this study comprises two categories of data: data on corporate 
governance in Chinese listed firms; and data on the quality and effectiveness of China’s 
investor protection. This chapter dicusses the first category of data on Chinese listed firms, 
detailing the sampling process and data sources, while data on legal protection for 
investors in China are to be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. This chapter starts by 
discussing the rules for choosing sample and time period for the empirical analysis. These 
rules are held for Chapter 7, 8 and 9 of the thesis. The chapter then proposes a more precise 
definition of family firms and illustrates data sources for corporate governance and 
financial information of Chinese family firms. Lastly, it presents the descriptive statistics 
for governance and financial characteristics of the sampled Chinese family firms in the 
thesis.    
 
5.2 Sample 
The sample for the thesis comprises a panel of 13,365 firm-year observations from 1,624 
non-financial companies listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China 
during the period 2000-2009. Banks and insurance companies are excluded due to the well 
known problem in computing Return on Assets (ROA) for financial institutions. By closely 
examining the ownership and management composition of each company, the full sample 
is broken down into two sub-samples, yielding 2,924 family-firm observations and 10,441 
nonfamily-firm observations.  
The year of 2000 is chosen as the start point of the time period. It is because given 
substantial supports from the gradual opening of China’s capital market and the policies 
implemented by the government, the number of private enterprises going public has soared 
since 2000. In effect, very few observations are found piror to 2000. Firms with missing 
data on ownership, board composition, and financial information are also excluded. 
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5.3 Defining a family firm: A new approach  
 
Figure 5.1 Process of sorting family firms 
 
 
 
In this study, a family firm is defined as one whose ultimate owner is a family or an 
individual.7 On 30 January 2007, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
introduced the “Listed Companies Information Disclosure Regulations” to China’s stock 
markets. The regulations require mandatory disclosure of any shareholder retaining more 
than 5 per cent of a listed company’s stakes and any changes to these shareholdings, 
because the CSRC considers a 5 per cent stake as having material interest and influences in 
a company. Accordingly, in the context of China’s family firms with multiple major 
shareholders, the criterion to identify the ultimate owner in this study is based on the 
                                               
7 The fact that an individual-controlled firm is considered as a family firm has been employed in many 
relevant studies, such as Faccio and Lang  (2002), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), Barth et al. (2005), Maury 
(2006) and Caselli and Di Giuli (2010). 
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notion of a shareholder having 5 per cent control rights greater than the next largest 
shareholder (who typically holds more than 10 per cent shares).8  
In some cases, a shareholder can have smaller ownership rights but greater control 
rights than others (see case I in A5.1). The thesis thus uses control rights, rather than 
ownership rights, as the critical criterion in the definition of ultimate owner. Following 
Faccio and Lang (2002), control rights are measured by the weakest shareholdings in the 
shareholder’s control chain, while ownership rights are measured by the product of 
shareholdings along the shareholder’s control chain of a listed company. The calculation of 
ownership and control rights follows the method introduced by La Porta et al.(1999) and 
developed by Faccio and Lang (2002) and Claessens et al.(2002) (see A4.1). 
More specific criteria for identifying the ultimate owner are given as follows (A5.1 
provides some examples): 
• If the disparity of control rights among major shareholders does not exceed 5 per 
cent (including 5 per cent), the ultimate owner is considered as one holding the 
largest ownership rights; 
• if the disparity of neither control rights nor ownership rights among shareholders is 
more than 5 per cent, the ultimate owner is considered as one whose family 
occupies the majority of positions in firm management; and  
• for the equally-controlled case, the study does not label it as a family firm. A 
equally-controlled firm is defined as one in which the disparity of neither control 
rights nor ownership rights among shareholders is more than 5 per cent, and each 
shareholder with his/her family members occupy almost equal number of positions 
in management.  
           The whole set of family-firm sample is then spilt into three subcategories - outsider-
managed, family-involved, and family-controlled family firms - under two additional 
conditions: (1) the founder or his/her relatives act as directors or managers in management; 
and (2) the founder or one of his/her relatives acts as Chairman/CEO. For the purpose of 
the analysis, the founding family in this study is equivalent to the current ultimate owner 
who has either founded or acquired the sample firm. This criterion for the founding family 
is different from those including the family who has previously founded a predecessor 
company (Andres, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). As sample firms in this study are 
typically first generation of family firms which either began with an IPO or through 
                                               
8
 If a threshold of 10% is used in this definition, taking the sample of 2005 as an example, the sample size is 
noticeably reduced by 34%, which may lead to an underestimation of the incidence of family firms and a 
distortion in the analysis. 
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acquisition of an existing listed companies owned by the state and/or other public 
companies or organisations, predecessor “founder” is in practice irrelevant in China’s 
context. The thesis focuses on family relationship by either blood line or marriage in the 
current ultimate owner of the sample firm. Definition of relatives include the founder’s 
father, mother, sister, brother, son, daughter, spouse, in-laws, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew 
and cousin (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003).  
To further examine whether there are distinct differences among founder-, relative-, 
and outsider-led family firms, family-controlled subset is divided into a finer partition with 
nine possible combinations of founders, relatives, and outsiders in their roles as Chairman 
of the Board and/or CEO. The overall sorting process of family firms is given in Figure 
5.1. 
 
5.4 Data sources 
Data on family ownership, control rights, and financial variables are mainly sourced from 
CSMAR Database,9 and double-checked against annual reports, prospectus, and interim 
announcements of listed companies. The publicly accessible reports or announcements are 
obtained from two official websites in China – the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). 
Family management data are manually obtained through two approaches: (1) 
information on the relations of the top ten shareholders of a listed company is disclosed in 
“Statements of Associated or Concerted Shareholders Action” in the annual report, while 
information on the ultimate controller is detailed in “Diagram of Property and Control 
Relation between the Ultimate Controller and the Listed Company”. For each firm-year 
observation, I scrutinize these two parts to identify the founder and his/her relatives, as 
these family members may serve as directors or managers in firm management. (2) I match 
the founder with each person disclosed in “Information on Directors, Supervisors and 
Senior Management” section in annual reports, and retrieve remaining family members by 
looking up public sources such as prospectus, annual reports, and interim announcements. 
 
5.5 Descriptive statistics of family firms 
Distribution of all listed firms 
                                               
9
 CSMAR Database developed by GTA IT Co., Ltd, is a professional database system specially designed to 
disclose Chinese financial market information. It contains 6 databases covering stock market, corporation, 
bonds, funds, industry and macro economy. 
                                                                                                                               78
Table 5.1 reports the number and percentage of family firms in China’s stock markets for 
the period 2000-2009. In 2000, there are only 68 listed companies identified as family 
firms under the definition of family firms proposed in the thesis, representing less than 7 
per cent of all listed companies. By the end of 2009, this number has soared to 551, 
accounting for 33.93 per cent of publicly traded companies. Although the percentage of 
family firms is slightly lower than that in the U.S. or German stock markets (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), it represents an 8 times increase 
since 2000, indicating an explosive development of family firms in China. 
 
Table 5.1 Number and percentage of family firms in 2000-2009 a 
Year  All listed firms Family firms Nonfamily firms Family firms (% of total)b 
2000 1,044 68 976 6.51  
2001 1,124 94 1,030 8.36  
2002 1,186 135 1,051 11.38  
2003 1,246 183 1,063 14.69  
2004 1,337 275 1,062 20.57  
2005 1,336 305 1,031 22.83  
2006 1,397 365 1,032 26.13  
2007 1,498 446 1,052 29.77  
2008 1,573 502 1,071 31.91  
2009 1,624 551 1,073 33.93 
Total 13,365 2,924 10,441 21.88 (average) 
Notes: a The full sample comprises 13,365 firm-year observations from 1,624 companies listed in China’s 
stock markets during 2000-2009. After filtering five outliers as presented in A5.2, the sample of all firms and 
family firms comprises 13,360 and 2,920 observations, respectively. As the number of outliers is too small to 
change the descriptive statistics much, this table reports the unfiltered results. 
            
b
 Family firms (% of total) are computed as the number of family firms divided by the total number of 
firms in each year.         
 
Distribution of family firms 
On closer examination of the distribution of family firms in Figure 5.2, a much higher 
incidence of family-managed firms is apparent, as opposed to outsider-managed firms in 
China’s stock markets. In particular, outsider-managed category includes 628 observations, 
representing only 21.48 per cent of family firms, suggesting that the persistence of family 
management is more popular than professional management. In family-managed category 
in which the founder or his/her family occupies the position of Chairman or CEO are 
dominant: 84.63 per cent versus 15.37 per cent belonging to family-involved group in 
which family members only act as directors or managers. Further, the table in Figure 5.2 
shows that the incidence of family firms in which the founder himself/herself serves as 
Chairman is almost 8 times higher than that of firms led by a descendant- or a relative-
Chairman. This result suggests that the majority of Chinese family firms are at the first-
generation stage of development and relatively young. 
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Figure 5.2 Distribution of family firms (Number of observations) 
 
 
 
Industry distribution of family firms 
Table 5.2 presents the CSRC code industry distribution of family firms and nonfamily 
firms, which is computed on industries with at least five firms. It reveals that family firms 
are not uniformly distributed across all industries. At one extreme are 11 industries in 
which there are no family firms. At other extreme are other wholesale trade (H09), real 
estate broker (J09), professional, scientific research and services (K20), sanitation, health 
care, nursing services (K37) as well as other communication and cultural (L99), which are 
entirely composed of family firms. Family firms also tend to prevail in at least eight 
industries, such as textiles (C11), livestock (A05), other fibre products manufacturing 
(C13), instrumentation and culture, office machinery manufacturing (C78), 
communications and equipment manufacturing (G81), decoration (E05), communication 
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services (G85) and printing (C35).10 This variance of industry distribution highlights the 
importance of controlling for industry in the regression analysis.   
 
Table 5.2 Industry distribution of firms by CSRC standard industry classification code (2001)a 
CSRC 
Code Industry description All firms 
Family 
firms 
Nonfamily 
firms 
Family firms in 
Industry (%)b 
A01 Agriculture 14 4 10 28.57 
A03 Forestry 6 1 5 16.67 
A05 Livestock 7 4 3 57.14 
A07 Fishery 4 3 1 75.00 
A09 Agriculture, forestry, Livestock and fishery services 3 2 1 66.67 
B01 Coal mining 18 1 17 5.56 
B03 Oil and natural gas mining 2 0 2 0.00 
B05 Ferrous metals mining and dressing 2 0 2 0.00 
B07 Nonferrous metals mining and dressing 8 1 7 12.50 
B50 Mining Services 2 1 1 50.00 
C01 Food processing 31 12 19 38.71 
C03 Food manufacturing 10 3 7 30.00 
C05 Beverage manufacturing 26 5 21 19.23 
C11 Textiles 42 24 18 57.14 
C13 Clothing and other fibre products 
manufacturing 21 12 9 57.14 
C14 Leather, fur, feather and products 
manufacturing 2 1 1 50.00 
C21 Wood processing and bamboo, rattan, palm and grass products 4 4 0 100.00 
C25 Furniture manufacturing 3 2 1 66.67 
C31 Paper and paper products 26 9 17 34.62 
C35 Printing 6 5 1 83.33 
C37 Cultural sporting goods manufacturing 4 4 0 100.00 
C41 Oil processing and coking 15 6 9 40.00 
C43 Chemical materials and chemical products manufacturing 109 31 78 28.44 
C47 Chemical fibre manufacturing 25 6 19 24.00 
C48 Rubber manufacturing 8 2 6 25.00 
C49 Plastics manufacturing 19 11 8 57.89 
C51 Electronic components manufacturing 50 21 29 42.00 
C55 Household electronic appliances 
manufacturing 17 4 13 23.53 
C57 Other electronic equipment 
manufacturing 12 7 5 58.33 
C61 Non-metallic mineral products 60 14 46 23.33 
C65 Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing 30 3 27 10.00 
C67 Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing 37 10 27 27.03 
C69 Fabricated metal products 22 9 13 40.91 
C71 Ordinary machinery manufacturing 44 14 30 31.82 
C73 Special equipment 64 23 41 35.94 
C75 Transport equipment 73 18 55 24.66 
C76 Electrical machinery and equipment 
manufacturing 62 29 33 46.77 
C78 Instrumentation and culture, office 
machinery manufacturing 12 8 4 66.67 
                                               
10
 This examination is computed on industries with at least five firms. 
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C81 Pharmaceutical 86 39 47 45.35 
C85 Biological products 17 4 13 23.53 
C99 Other manufacturing 20 8 12 40.00 
D01 Electricity, steam, hot water production 
and supply 57 2 55 3.51 
D03 Gas production and supply 3 1 2 33.33 
D05 Tap water production and supply 6 0 6 0.00 
E01 Civil engineering construction 33 7 26 21.21 
E05 Decoration 5 4 1 80.00 
F01 Rail transport 3 0 3 0.00 
F03 Road transport 6 0 6 0.00 
F07 Water transport 13 0 13 0.00 
F09 Air transport 6 0 6 0.00 
F11 Auxiliary transport 32 3 29 9.38 
F19 Other transport 2 0 2 0.00 
F21 Warehousing 3 1 2 33.33 
G81 Communications and equipment 
manufacturing 37 22 15 59.46 
G83 Computers and equipment 
manufacturing 7 3 4 42.86 
G85 Communication services 7 5 2 71.43 
G87 Computer application services 50 25 25 50.00 
H01 Food, beverages, tobacco and household goods wholesale trade 11 1 10 9.09 
H03 Energy, materials and machinery and 
electronics equipment, wholesale trade 5 1 4 20.00 
H09 Other wholesale trade 1 1 0 100.00 
H11 Retail 62 21 41 33.87 
H21 Commercial brokerage and agencies 22 3 19 13.64 
J01 Real estate development and 
management 104 37 67 35.58 
J05 Real estate management 4 1 3 25.00 
J09 Real estate broker 1 1 0 100.00 
K01 Public facilities services 9 3 6 33.33 
K20 Professional, scientific research and 
services 2 2 0 100.00 
K30 Catering 3 2 1 66.67 
K32 Hotel and guesthouse accommodation 9 3 6 33.33 
K34 Tourism 14 1 13 7.14 
K37 Sanitation, health care, nursing services 1 1 0 100.00 
K39 Rental services 1 0 1 0.00 
K99 Other social services 3 2 1 66.67 
L01 Publishing 3 0 3 0.00 
L10 Radio, Film and Television 5 0 5 0.00 
L20 Information dissemination services 4 1 3 25.00 
L99 Other communication and cultural 2 2 0 100.00 
M Miscellaneous 65 31 34 47.69 
Total  1,624 551 1,073 33.93 
Notes: a The full sample comprises 1,624 companies listed in China’s stock markets in 2009. 
            
b Family firms in Industry is computed as the number of family firms divided by the total number of 
firms in each industry.  
 
5.6 Chapter summary 
The thesis uses two categories of data sets: data on Chinese listed firms regarding 
corporate governance and financial information, and data on the extent of investor 
protection in China. This chapter discusses the family-firm data set to be used for analysis 
from Chapter 7 through to Chapter 9. The descriptive statistics show that the development 
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of family firms has experienced rapid growth in China for the period 2000-2009. While 
Chinese family firms are relatively young, the phenomenon that family members serve as 
directors or managers is prevalent in these firms. Industry variance of Chinese family firms 
also matters in the analysis. The data set for the level of China’s investor protection will be 
discussed in details in Chapter 6 of the thesis.  
                                                                                                                                                 83 
 
Chapter 6 
MEASUREMENT OF INVESTOR PROTECTION IN CHINA 
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6.1 Introduction  
The law and finance literature gives new insights to explore agency issues by highlighting 
the role of legal protection of minority shareholders in the financial markets. It empirically 
shows that the expropriation by the controlling shareholder is legally constrained by the 
law and its enforcement (Allen et al., 2005; Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 2006; La 
Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000b, 2002). However, this strand of literature often overlooks 
the legal effects on the owner-manager conflict in family firms, while usually adopting 
cross-country samples which tend to create omitted-variables and aggregation biases (Wu 
et al., 2009). Therefore, investigating the within-country legal effects on the twin agency 
conflicts in family firms will contribute to our understanding of the key issue of corporate 
governance in the literature.  
Investor protection is generally considered to consist of the changes of formal legal 
rules and the effectiveness of legal enforcement (Allen et al., 2005; Anderson & Reeb, 
2004; Djankov et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998; Pistor et al., 2000). Following the 
literature, the study starts by developing two indices in this chapter to measure the two 
aspects of the extent of investor protection in China, and then investigates the effects of 
investor protection on how agency conflicts in Chinese family firms are tackled in this 
major emerging country in latter chapters.  
To illustrate, as emphasised in Chapter 3 of the thesis, investor protection in this 
research is a newly-extended notion that refers to legal protection of minority shareholders 
and also of all shareholders. In this context, the thesis first explores for the period 1991-
2009 all relevant formal legal rules promulgated in China, which are protective of minority 
shareholders against the controlling shareholder, and also of all shareholders against the 
manager. Based on the selected criteria, the study constructs a time series index evaluating 
the quality of the protection that is rendered by the evolution of written legal rules as an 
indicator for China’s investor protection on paper, including seven specific dimensions, 
namely, VOICE, EXIT, SMINTEGR, ANTIBLOCK, ANTIDIRECT, ANTIMANAGE 
and ANTINONTRADABLE. 
The thesis also builds a cross-sectional index assessing provincial variations in the 
effectiveness of governance environment to proxy for investor protection in practice.11 The 
actual governance environment is to a large extent subjected to the arbitrary interference 
                                               
11
 In this thesis, the level of legal enforcement is defined by a broader concept - the quality of governance 
environment in which a listed company has chosen to operate as its base. The exact definition of governance 
environment will be provided in Section 6.3.2. 
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by local governments in China (Xia & Fang, 2005). Therefore, despite the unified written 
legal rules and regulation at the national level, family firms in individual provinces and 
regions are exposed to different degrees in the effectiveness of legal enforcement and 
informal alternative mechanisms in China (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2005; Fan et al., 
2007; Wong, 1985; Wu et al., 2009).  
The measurement of the two indices in the thesis reveals, on one hand, that the 
level of legal protection for investors on paper has been significantly improved for the 
period 1991-2009, especially in 2006 when the Company Law and Securities Law were 
provided with considerable amendments. On the other hand, the thesis finds that the 
overall quality of China’s governance environment is relatively inferior compared to the 
world average, especially in terms of the efficiency of the government, and the reliability 
of the legal system and the business infrastructure. The analysis also shows that among all 
the four constituents of the governance environment index, the government corruption 
index accounts for the largest proportion and is the most effective element, whereas the 
judicial system index represents the smallest proportion and appears to be greatly 
disregarded on the path of the evolution of legal reform in China.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the 
construction and results of the legal investor protection index in China, including a brief 
review of the measurements of on-paper investor protection often used in the literature, the 
methodology and data adopted in this research, and the main results of this assessment. 
Section 6.3 provides the way the governance environment index develops and the 
descriptive statistics of this index. Conclusion is given in Section 6.4.  
 
6.2 Investor protection on paper: Legal investor protection index 
6.2.1 Investor protection indices-a review 
LLSVsh 
The assessment of legal protection of shareholder rights conducted by La Porta et al. 
(1998) covers 49 countries, including 9 dummy measures, namely, one share-one vote, 
proxy by mail allowed, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting or 
proportional representation, oppressed minorities mechanism, pre-emptive rights to new 
issue, percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, anti-
director rights, and mandatory dividend. The dummy variable equals one when the clause 
is specified in a particular legal provision, and zero otherwise. The anti-director rights 
index which is constructed as the sum of scores of the aggregate shareholder rights from 
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the second to the seventh measure is used as an indicator of legal rules in favour of 
protection of minority shareholders against the controlling shareholder and management. 
These measures of shareholder protection are known as LLSVsh (Pistor et al., 2000). The 
exact definitions are given in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Definitions of indicators of LLSVsh 
 Definitions of indicators of shareholder protection 
One share- one vote Equals one if the company law or commercial code of the country requires that 
ordinary shares carry one vote per share, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, this 
variable equals one when the law prohibits the existence of both multiple-
voting and nonvoting ordinary shares owned, and zero otherwise. 
Proxy by mail allowed Equals one if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to 
mail their proxy vote to the firm, and zero otherwise. 
Shares not blocked before 
meeting 
Equals one if the company law or commercial code does not allow firms to 
require that shareholders deposit their shares prior to a general shareholders 
meeting, thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days, 
and zero otherwise. 
Cumulative voting or 
proportional representation 
Equals one if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to cast 
all their votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of directors 
(cumulative voting) or if the company law or commercial code allows a 
mechanism of proportional representation in the board by which minority 
interests may name a proportional number of directors to the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
Oppressed minorities 
mechanism 
Equals one if the company law or commercial code grants minority 
shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management 
or of the assembly or the right to step out of the company by requiring the 
company to purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental 
changes, such as mergers, asset dispositions, and changes in the articles of 
incorporation. The variable equals zero otherwise. Minority shareholders are 
defined as those shareholders who own 10 per cent of share capital or less. 
Pre-emptive rights to new 
issue 
Equals one when the company law or commercial code grants shareholders the 
first opportunity to buy new issues of stock, and this right can be waived only 
by a shareholders’ vote; equals zero otherwise. 
Percentage of share capital 
to call an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting 
The minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting; it ranges from 1 
to 33 per cent. 
Anti-director rights An index aggregating the shareholder rights we labelled as “anti-director 
rights.” The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not 
required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of 
directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 per cent (the 
sample median), or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can be 
waived only by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from zero to six. 
Mandatory dividend Equals the percentage of net income that the company law or commercial code 
requires firms to distribute as dividends among ordinary stockholders. It takes 
a value of zero for countries without such a restriction. 
Source: La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F, Shleifer, A & Vishny, RW 1998, 'Law and finance', Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 106, no. 6, pp. 1113-55. 
 
By using this assessment of shareholder protection across 49 countries, La Porta et 
al. (1998) find that countries with English common-law origin establish the strongest legal 
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institutions to protect shareholders’ interest (the value of anti-director rights is 4), while 
countries with French civil-law origin bear the weakest protection of shareholder rights 
(the value of anti-director rights is 2.33). Subsequently, an extensive body of empirical 
evidence shown in their following studies suggests that the degree of legal protection of 
minority shareholders also predicts the differences in financial outcomes at both firm and 
aggregate levels in individual countries (La Porta et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000a, b, 2002).  
Allen et al. (2005) apply the LLSVsh approach to evaluate the level of investor 
protection in China, and make comparisons with the result across 49 countries measured by 
La Porta et al. (1998). They find evidence that the majority of LLSV sample countries in 
general outperform China in terms of the extent of legal protection of minority 
shareholders. 
 
Improvement of LLSVsh 
LLSVsh indicators are commonly applied to developed countries rather than transition 
economies in relevant studies (Anderson et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, b, 2002). The comprehensive measurement of investor protection 
is thus relatively scant for the emerging markets. Pistor et al. (2000) first attempt to build a 
legal index to exclusively assess the level of investor protection in transition markets. 
Based on LLSVsh indicators, they create five additional indices called VOICE, EXIT, 
ANTIMANAGE, ANTIBLOCK, and SMINTEGR to indicate the different aspects of 
shareholder protection. Pistor et al. (2000) find that the dynamic change of legal written 
rules pertaining to the rights of shareholders is less effective for the evolution of legal and 
market institutions in transition economies, with respect to the effectiveness of legal 
enforcement.   
In a study of legal protection of shareholder rights in Poland and Czech Republic, 
Glaeser et al. (2001) point out that some legal rules more protective of minority 
shareholders are not included in the elements of LLSVsh. They therefore add ten more 
indices for the evaluation of the effectiveness of legal rules that are designed to protect 
outside investors. Likewise, minority shareholders have the rights to appoint an additional 
board of auditors, and to check the list of attendance at the general shareholders’ meeting. 
By using this refined index, Glaeser et al. (2001) find that Poland adopts legal rules 
relatively more protective of investors, as opposed to Czech Republic.  
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Wu et al. (2009) construct an index for legal rules protecting minority investors’ 
interest for the period 1992 to 2003 in China. Besides six indicators demonstrated by La 
Porta et al. (1998), Wu et al. (2009) identify nine more specific clauses as the measures of 
legal rules designed to protect all shareholders or enhance the integrity and effectiveness of 
capital market, just as information disclosure, accounting and audit policy, outside 
independent directors, dividend policy, share transfer by insiders, manager shareholding 
restriction, insider trading, related transactions, and restriction on large shareholders. 
Differential from the majority of previous literature using dummy variables to measure the 
level of investor protection, Wu et al. (2009) adopt a progressive approach that 
chronologically assigns scores for each indicator of investor protection according to the 
selected criteria. The results show that, from 1992 to 2003, the overall level of investor 
protection in China is: 8, 14.5, 29, 29.5, 33, 41, 43, 50, 52, 57, 65.5, 70. 
Spamann (2010) argue about the accuracy of the anti-director rights initially 
introduced by La Porta et al. (1998). He proposes that the original indicators did not allow 
local lawyers to ascertain the relevant legal rules, thus impairing the reliability of the value 
from the indicators. Following the concept of the original, he develops a finer-grained 
index that involves the lawyers’ efforts and focuses only on mandated laws. His findings 
show that the corrected index cannot explain the relations between legal investor protection 
and ownership concentration or stock market size.    
Other studies develop alternative methods to improve measures of laws pertaining 
to, for example, the specific provisions governing initial public offerings (La Porta et al., 
2006), or mechanisms against corporate insiders’ self-dealing or tunnelling (Djankov et al., 
2008) or related-party transactions (Berkman et al., 2011). The pioneering anti-director 
rights have been argued for the reliability in many aspects, while alternative indices for 
investor protection have been derived over the years. The original indicators however 
continue to be widely used in numerous studies (Spamann, 2010).  
 
6.2.2 Development of investor protection in China 
In general, the development of investor protection in China, following the evolution of 
laws and regulations, has gone through three main phases, namely, primary, developing, 
and more developed phase (Shen et al., 2004).  
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Primary stage of investor protection 
Prior to 1994, provisions pertaining to the rights of investors were specified in legal 
regulations promulgated by either local governments or the national ministries and 
commissions. These regulations were highly arbitrary and sometimes even contradictory, 
and thus they were easily replaced by new provisions or legal explanations. The 
inconsistency and involution of the regulations introduced in this period suggest that legal 
rules are commonly captured by obvious local and temporary circumstances, and the 
protection of investors’ interest is therefore greatly subjected to regional (provincial) 
jurisdictions in China.  
 
Developing stage of investor protection 
The Company Law which regulates corporation behaviours in China was enacted on 29 
December 1993 and took effect on 1 July 1994 [henceforth “Company Law (Version 
1994)”], indicating that the legal evolution of China’s investor protection has been brought 
into the second stage.12 In the Company Law (Version 1994), the local legal regulations 
issued before 1994 were first formally specified as legal rules at the national level. It is 
noted that in the Company Law (Version 1994), the interests of shareholders and creditors 
were mentioned for the first time, as the law drafters realized the economic order of a 
market-based economy can only be ensured unless shareholders and creditors’ interest 
were fully safeguarded (Wang & Tomasic, 1994). The Company Law, although noticeably 
amended in 2006, contained quite comprehensive  and fundamental legal rules protective 
of shareholders (Tomasic & Fu, 1999), including shareholder rights on voting and 
convocation of extraordinary shareholders’ meetings, accounting and audit polices, 
dividend and placement issues of shares polices, and information disclosure rules. 
Subsequently, a series of legal provisions pertaining to the rights of investors have been 
introduced to the capital market mainly from the perspective of information disclosure. As 
a result, a substantial and systematic institution regarding information disclosure has been 
officially established in China by 1998.  
 
More developed stage of investor protection 
The beginning of developed era of investor protection in China is featured by the 
enactment of the Securities Law on 1 July 1999 [henceforth “Securities Law (Version 
                                               
12
 This is the first Company Law promulgated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Tomasic and Fu 
(1999) review the previous versions of company laws enacted by Qing Dynasty (in 1904), republican (in 
1914) and Nationalist (in 1929 and 1946) in the history of China.  
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1994)”]. Apart from the efforts made to the establishment of information disclosure 
institutions, the Securities Law (Version 1999) started to pay essential attention to 
corporate governance issues. It was further highlighted in the tenth five-year plan (2001-
2005) in China that an effective corporate governance system plays a important role in 
establishing a modern company system (Jia & Tomasic, 2010). Thereafter, a number of 
legal regulations on internal control of listed companies have been issued to China’s stock 
markets, which has significantly enhanced the protection of shareholders’ interest from the 
prospective of corporate governance. Further, the reform of the split structure with a series 
of promulgation of relevant regulations launched in 2005 has also substantially contributed 
to the improvement of integrity and effectiveness of China’s capital market, thus giving 
rise to the protection of outside tradable shareholders. By the end of 2006, the majority of 
listed companies have finalised the reform of the split share structure, suggesting that 
China is likely to match the kinds of capital market practices found in developed markets 
since 2007 (Tang, 2006).  
 
6.2.3 Measurement of legal investor protection index 
As outlined in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the notion of investor protection in this study covers 
twin agency issues in family firms. By using this extended concept and drawing on the 
measures of La Porta et al.(1998) and Pistor et al.(2000), the study first identifies 29 
specific clauses pertaining to the rights of minority shareholders against controlling 
shareholders, and also of all shareholders against managers. It then locates 101 provisions 
designed to protect shareholder rights from all laws and regulations issued in China for the 
period 1991 to 2009. Based on the selected criteria for calculating scores in a progress way, 
the thesis matches the content of each provision with the specified clauses, and computes 
the value of the quality of formal legal rules for each period by adding or subtracting the 
corresponding scores.  
The total sum of the value of each clause for each year makes up the legal investor 
protection index - a time series index indicating the evolution of written legal rules 
regarding shareholder protection for the period 1991-2009 in China. Following the 
literature (Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 2002; Wu et al., 
2009), the thesis focuses on legal rules only pertaining to the rights of shareholders and 
uses the term “shareholder protection” and “investor protection” interchangeably unless 
stated otherwise. 
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Constituents of legal investor protection index 
The measures of legal investor protection index in the thesis build on but extend those of 
La Porta et al.(1998) and Pistor et al.(2000). The thesis starts by identifying 29 clauses in 
legal provisions related to investor protection, and groups them into seven dimensions, 
namely, VOICE, EXIT, SMINTEGR, ANTIBLOCK, ANTIDIRECT, ANTIMANAGE 
and ANTINONTRADABLE. Definitions of indicators are detailed in Table 6.2. 
Shareholders can exercise their rights over firm management by either voting on a 
particular decision (which is referred to as vote-by-hand, “VOICE”) or selling out their 
stakes (vote-by-foot, “EXIT”) (Coffee, 1991; Farrar, 2005; Hirschman, 1970; Pistor et al., 
2000). The two rights are argued to be essential for shareholder protection (Pistor et al., 
2000). Many indicators for investor protection, such as those of La Porta et al.(1998), are 
targeted at “voice” right. Pistor et al.(2000) add five more indicators to denote VOICE. In 
the assessment of the thesis, VOICE refers to legal mechanisms on entitling shareholder 
rights of delegation to management, decision-making and judicial access, including 
seventeen specific clauses protective of shareholder rights.  
EXIT highlights shareholders’ rights on liquidating their stakes once they do not 
agree with the way the firm is managed. The thesis defines four clauses as indicators of 
“exit” rights: no restrictions on shares transfer by laws or corporate statutes, limited formal 
requirements on shares transfer, minority shareholders’ put options, and mandatory take-
over rules.  
SMINTEGR is designed to indicate the integrity and effectiveness of capital 
market, rather than any particular protection regarding shareholder rights (Pistor et al., 
2000). This index covers regulations on information disclosure, self-dealing and insider 
trading, polices on accounting and audit, dividend and placement issues of shares, and 
provisions on the independence of shareholdings registration and capital market 
supervision. Notably, most Chinese listed companies have suffered from the problem of 
having two thirds of their issued shares as non-tradable shares, resulting in low liquidity 
and efficiency of stock markets. The reform of the split share structure conducted in 2005 
aims to improve this situation. SMINTEGR index is thus applied to capture the potential 
variation in capital market by defining one additional clause pertaining to the reform of the 
split share structure in China. 
Further, to directly evaluate the legal effects on agency problems in family firms, 
the thesis reorganises the above 29 clauses into four dimensions - ANTIBLOCK, 
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ANTIDIRECT, ANTIMANAGE and ANTINONTRADABLE. ANTIBLOCK refers to 
legal mechanisms against large shareholders, and ANTIDIRECT and ANTIMANAGE 
refer to mechanisms against directors and managers, respectively. In particular, 
ANTINONTRADABLE is to feature legal protection for tradable shareholders, referring to 
mechanisms against non-tradable shareholders.  
 
Table 6.2 Definitions of legal investor protection indices 
No. Indicator VOICE EXIT SMIN TEGR 
ANTIB
LOCK 
ANTID
IRECT 
ANTIMA
NAGE 
ANTIN
ONTR
ADAB
LE 
1 
Mandatory One 
Share-One Vote Rule 
(both the multiple-
voting and nonvoting 
shares are prohibited 
by the law, and a 
maximum number of 
votes per shareholder 
irrespective of the 
number of shares 
owned is also 
prohibited) 
X  
 
 X   
2 
Vote by proxy (i.e. 
proxy by mail is 
allowed) 
X  
 
    
3 Shares is not blocked before meeting X  
 
 X   
4 
No registration cut-
off date before 
meeting 
  
 
   
 
5 
Cumulative voting 
for election of 
members of the 
(supervisory) board 
X  
 
X X  
 
6 
Other rules to ensure 
proportional board 
representation (i.e. 
rules on independent 
directors) 
X  
 
X X  
 
7 
Shareholders may 
take judicial venue to 
challenge the 
decisions of 
management or 
(supervisory) board 
X  
 
 X X 
 
8 
Shareholders may 
take judicial venue to 
challenge the 
decisions taken by 
the shareholders’ 
meeting 
X  
 
X   
 
9 
Current shareholders 
have a pre-emptive 
right in case new 
shares are issued by 
X  
 
X X  
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company 
10 
The minimum 
percentage of shares 
entitling a 
shareholder to call for 
an extraordinary 
shareholders’ 
meeting is less than 
or equal to 10 per 
cent 
X  
 
 X X 
 
11 
The minimum 
percentage of shares 
entitling a 
shareholder to call for 
an audit commissions 
is less than or equal 
to 10 per cent 
X  
 
  X 
 
12 
Corporate statutes are 
required to distribute 
a certain percentage 
of net income as 
dividends among 
ordinary shareholders 
X  
 
X X  
 
13 
Executives (incl. 
general directors) are 
appointed/dismissed 
by the (supervisory) 
board rather than the 
shareholder’s 
meeting  
X  
 
X  X 
 
14 
Members of the 
management or 
(supervisory) board 
may be dismissed at 
any time without 
cause 
X  
 
 X X 
 
15 
At least 50 per cent 
of total voting shares 
must be represented 
at a shareholders’ 
meeting to take 
binding decisions 
X  
 
X    
16 
Fundamental 
decisions, incl. 
charter changes, 
liquidation of 
companies, sale of 
major assets, issues 
of new shares,  
require at least 3/4 of 
voting shares 
X  
 
X    
17 
All (supervisory) 
board members are 
elected by 
shareholders (no 
mandatory 
representation of 
employees or the 
public)  
X  
 
    
18 Right to transfer 
shares is not  X 
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restricted by law and 
corporate statutes 
19 
Formal requirements 
for the transfer of 
shares are limited to 
endorsement (bearer 
shares) and 
registration 
(registered shares) 
 X 
 
 
 
  
20 
Minority 
shareholders have a 
put option (may 
demand that their 
shares are bought by 
the company at fair 
value) in case they 
have voted against 
fundamental 
decisions, incl. 
mergers, 
reorganization, sale 
of major assets, 
charter changes etc. 
 X 
 
X 
 
  
21 Mandatory take over bid (threshold)   X 
 X    
22 Disclosure rules    X     
23 Accounting and audit policies   
X 
 
 
  
24 
Dividend and 
placement issues of 
shares policies 
  
X 
 
 
  
25 
Restriction rules on 
self-dealing, incl. 
insiders’ (i.e. 
controllers, 
blockholders, 
directors and 
managers)  
compensation policy  
  X X X X  
26 
Restriction rules on 
insider trading, incl. 
Insiders’ 
shareholding trading  
  X X X X  
27 
Shareholder 
registration must be 
conducted by an 
independent firm 
  X  
 
  
28 
A state agency 
conducts Capital 
Market Supervision 
  X  
 
  
29 
Rules on the reform 
of split share 
structure 
  X  
 
 X 
 
Criteria for adding or subtracting scores 
Most studies use dummy variables to calculate the value of indicators for the investor 
protection index, in which the dummy equals one when a particular clause concerning 
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investor protection is specified in a law or regulation, and zero otherwise (Allen et al., 
2005; Glaeser et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1998; Pistor et al., 2000). This approach 
distinguishes between the presence and absence of shareholder protection in legal 
evolution, but says little about the improvement and intensity of such legal protection over 
time (Tang, 2006).  
In effect, China’s legal provisions protective of shareholder rights mainly consist of 
three categories of regulations - laws (stipulated by the National People’s Congress, NPC), 
national administrative regulations (stipulated by the State Council), and departmental 
regulations (stipulated by the CSRC). These categories of regulations would have varying 
degree of  influence on shareholder protection (Wu et al., 2009). Further, even the same 
government agency may introduce different regulations to reinforce a particular provision 
at different periods, and thus improve the intensity of legal protection of investors (Tang, 
2006). Therefore, based on the principle for adding or subtracting scores adopted by Wu et 
al.(2009), the thesis develops a progressive approach that chronologically scores each 
indicator of investor protection according to the criteria given in Table 6.3. Particularly, 
distinguished from Wu et al. (2009), the indicator is assigned with 1.5 rather than 1, if the 
new provision that is stricter and more detailed than the old one is specified in a particular 
regulation.   
 
Table 6.3 Criteria for adding or subtracting scores 
Protective Provisions Laws or Regulations 
Corresponding 
Score Added or 
Subtracted 
Law 2 The provision first regulated 
by laws or regulations Administrative Regulation 1 
Law 1 The new provision is the same as 
the old one Administrative Regulation 0 
Law 1.5 
The provision previously set 
and regulated again by the 
later laws or regulations The new provision is stricter and 
more detailed than the old one Administrative Regulation 0.5 
Notes: When the provision is positive to investor protection, it is labelled with the added score according to 
the above criteria. Otherwise, the provision should be subtracted by corresponding score. 
 
Sources of laws and regulations 
Based on the “Index of main laws, rules, regulations and other regulatory documents on 
investor protection” of “Investor Rights Education Handbook”, the thesis discovers 101 
pieces of legal provisions protective of investor rights introduced during the period 1991-
2009 in China. The provisions contain laws, national administrative regulations, and 
departmental regulations. The reason for choosing the year of 1991 as the start point of the 
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time period is that the establishment of the Chinese Securities Registration and Clearing 
Corporation (CSRCC) in 1991 signalled the start of the process of developing greater 
integrity of capital market and the enhancement of investor protection in China (Tang, 
2006).  
 
To recapitulate, the thesis defines seven dimensions of investor protection, namely, 
estimates of VOICE, EXIT, SMINTEGR, ANTIBLOCK, ANTIDIRECT, 
ANTIMANAGE, and ANTINONTRADABLE, and scores these dimensions by 
chronologically matching them with the content of each legal provision regarding investor 
protection enacted from 1991 to 2009 in China. The value of each dimension makes up an 
individual index of investor protection. As there is no overlap of clauses specified in 
VOICE, EXIT and SMINTEGR, the sum of the three indices constitutes the incremental 
legal index of investor protection (ILAW). The cumulative legal index (CLAW) is 
constructed by the total cumulative sum of ILAW. Figure 6.1 shows the way how ILAW 
and CLAW are developed. 
 
Figure 6.1 Constructing process of legal investor protection index 
 
  
 
6.2.4 Main results  
Table 6.4 shows the overall results of the incremental legal index of investor protection 
(ILAW) and the cumulative legal index (CLAW) from 1991 to 2009 in China, while the 
constructing process and results for each index of investor protection are given in A6.1. 
As shown in Table 6.5, the cumulative legal index of investor protection has been 
gradually enhanced for the period 1991 to 2009 in China. The value of CLAW for each 
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year is 2.0, 8.0, 13.5, 31.5, 32.0, 35.5, 44.5, 45.5, 52.0, 55.5, 59.0, 67.0, 71.0, 74.0, 79.0, 
110.0, 113.5, 116.0, 118.5. In general, the result of the assessment in this thesis differs 
from that of Wu et al.(2009), especially in terms of the starting point of the measuring time 
period. As mentioned before, the establishment of the Chinese Securities Registration and 
Clearing Corporation (CSRCC) in 1991 signalled the start of the process of developing 
greater integrity of capital market and the enhancement of investor protection in China. 
Therefore, the thesis chooses the year of 1991 as the start point of the time period in the 
construction of legal investor protection index. Yet, this point has been ignored in the 
assessment of Wu et al.(2009).  
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Table 6.4 Indices of legal investor protection from 1991-2009 
 ILAW CLAW 
year VOICE EXIT 
SMINT
EGR 
ANTI
BLO
CK 
ANTI
DIRE
CT 
ANTIMA
NAGE 
ANTINO
NTRADE Sum VOICE EXIT 
SMINT
EGR 
ANTI
BLO
CK 
ANTI
DIRE
CT 
ANTIMA
NAGE 
ANTIN
ONTR
ADE Sum 
1991 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2.0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2.0 
1992 3 -1 4 2 2 1 0 6.0 3 -1 6 2 2 1 0 8.0 
1993 0 1 4.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 0 5.5 3 0 10.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 0 13.5 
1994 8 4 6 4 6 2 0 18.0 11 4 16.5 8.5 9.5 4.5 0 31.5 
1995 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 11 4 17 8.5 9.5 4.5 0 32.0 
1996 0 0 3.5 1 1 1 0 3.5 11 4 20.5 9.5 10.5 5.5 0 35.5 
1997 3 0 6 4 4.5 3 0 9.0 14 4 26.5 13.5 15 8.5 0 44.5 
1998 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.0 14 4 27.5 13.5 15 8.5 0 45.5 
1999 0 1.5 5 3 1.5 1.5 0 6.5 14 5.5 32.5 16.5 16.5 10 0 52.0 
2000 0 0 3.5 1 0 1 0 3.5 14 5.5 36 17.5 16.5 11 0 55.5 
2001 0.5 0 3 0.5 0.5 0 0 3.5 14.5 5.5 39 18 17 11 0 59.0 
2002 4 0.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 2 0 8.0 18.5 6 42.5 21.5 21.5 13 0 67.0 
2003 0.5 0 3.5 0.5 1 1 0 4.0 19 6 46 22 22.5 14 0 71.0 
2004 1.5 0.5 1 1.5 1.5 0 0 3.0 20.5 6.5 47 23.5 24 14 0 74.0 
2005 0 0 5 0 0 0 3 5.0 20.5 6.5 52 23.5 24 14 3 79.0 
2006 11.5 5.5 14 13 16 9 0.5 31.0 32 12 66 36.5 40 23 3.5 110.0 
2007 0 0 3.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 3.5 32 12 69.5 37 40.5 23.5 3.5 113.5 
2008 0.5 1.5 0.5 2 0.5 0 0 2.5 32.5 13.5 70 39 41 23.5 3.5 116.0 
2009 0 0.5 2 0.5 0 0 0 2.5 32.5 14 72 39.5 41 23.5 3.5 118.5 
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Figure 6.2 depicts the evolution of ILAW and CLAW in China. The graph shows 
that despite an upward trend, legal protection for investors in China has not been equally 
developed for the period 1991-2009, but has experienced a relatively fluctuating pattern of 
improvement instead. The lower line in Figure 6.2 indicating the incremental legal index of 
investor protection first arrives its pink point in 1994, possibly because it is the time when 
the Company Law (Version 1994) was firstly introduced to China’s capital market. The 
second notable period of this improvement is the year of 2006, when significant 
amendments were provided to both the Company Law and the Securities Law. This jump 
is even higher than that in 1994, implying that investor protection on paper has been 
greatly asserted by the improvement in the Company Law (Version 2006) and the 
Securities Law (Version 2006). In contrast, in 1995 and 1998, the value of ILAW is almost 
equivalent to zero, and thus the degree of the cumulative legal index (CLAW) captured by 
the upper line almost remains unchanged with respect to its value at the former periods. 
 
Figure 6.2 The evolution of ILAW and CLAW from 1991 to 2009 
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Figure 6.3 and 6.4 present the evolution of seven dimensions of the legal investor 
protection index in China. Both graphs show that among all indices, SIMNTEGR 
dimension has seen the most dramatic enhancement for the period 1991-2009, whereas the 
least attention has been devoted to EXIT dimension. A closer look at the distribution of 
SMINEGR index shows that all eight indicators included in this dimension are almost 
uniformly developed from 1991 to 2009, which reveals that the integrity and effectiveness 
of China’s capital market has gone through a relatively stable evolution. Further, among 
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three other dimensions - ANTIBLOCK, ANTIDIRECT and ANTIMANAGE – indicating 
agency conflicts in family firms, ANTIMANAGE index is depicted by the lowest line, 
suggesting that legal rules pertaining to the mitigation of the owner-manager conflict are 
less enacted than legal rules protective of minority shareholders. It is partly because the 
significant ownership structure in Chinese listed companies leads to a more costly and 
problematic divergence of interest between large and small shareholders in China’s stock 
markets, as opposed to the classical owner-manager agency problem often prevailing in the 
U.S. or U.K. equity markets. 
 
Figure 6.3 The evolution of seven incremental indices from 1991 to 2009 
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Figure 6.4 The evolution of seven cumulative indices from 1991 to 2009 
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The analysis in this section provides a quantitative description of the evolution of 
investor protection over years in China. The following analysis then analyses specific legal 
provisions pertaining to shareholder protection from a qualitative perspective in order to 
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uncover a more comprehensive understanding on the development of China’s investor 
protection.  
In general, laws and regulations introduced by different government agencies are 
deemed to be playing an important role in giving rise to the level of different aspects of 
investor protection in China. Shareholder rights captured by VOICE index are mainly 
specified in the Company Law. For example, Article 33 of the Company Law (Version 
1994) and Article 72 of the Company Law (Version 2006) highlight the feasibility of 
shareholders’ pre-emptive rights when new shares are issued by the company. Article 106 
of the Company Law (Version 1994) and Article 104 of the Company Law (Version 2006) 
stipulate the regulation of “one share-one vote” and state “decisions of shareholders’ 
meeting must be taken by at least 50 per cent of total voting shares”. These two provisions 
are captured by the first and the fifteenth clauses of VOICE index in the assessment of the 
thesis, respectively. Shareholder rights on judicial venue to challenge the decisions of 
shareholders’ meeting (Clause 7) and management (Clause 8) are also regulated in Article 
111 of the Company Law (Version 1994) and Article 22 of the Company Law (Version 
2006). Alternatively, most clauses of SMINTEGR index are reflected in provisions 
specified in the Securities Law and the Criminal Law, especially in terms of legal rules 
regarding information disclosure and insider trading.  
A series of regulations promulgated by the CSRC also complement or enhance the 
effectiveness of laws protective of shareholders. Likewise, “Regulations of Companies” 
introduced by the CSRC on 15 May 1992, first specified that the delegation of 
management be carried out by the Board rather than the shareholders’ meeting, which 
assigns one positive score to VOICE index in the assessment of the thesis. This provision 
is also stated in the Company Law (Version 1994). Relatedly, information disclosure rules 
regarding the context and format of annual reports of listed companies have been amended 
by the CSRC for nine times from 1994 to 2007. Each amendment has made a stricter and 
refiner improvement to the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, which 
contributes an incremental of 0.5 score to SMINTEGR index of this assessment. In 
particular, China’s reform of the split share structure started in 2005, coupled with five 
critical regulations issued by the CSRC. This reform has extensively improved the 
liquidation of China’s stock markets and the level of protection of minority tradable 
shareholders, leading to a significant jump at SMINTEGR and ANTINONTRADE indices 
from 2005 to 2006 in the assessment. 
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However, some legal regulations appear to impair the development of China’s 
investor protection. For instance, “Vote by proxy” is prohibited in “Regulations of 
Shareholders’ Meeting of Listed Companies” promulgated by the CSRC in 2000, which is 
detrimental to investor protection. VOICE index is thus subtracted by corresponding value 
according to the selected criteria in the thesis. Another example, Article 124 of the 
Company Law (version 1994) first proposes the mandatory representation of employees in 
supervisory board. This provision is then reinforced by a regulation enacted by the CSRC 
in 1998, specifying that the employee representation be one thirds of the supervisory board 
members. These provisions exhibit an opponent sign to the selected criteria for calculating 
scores of investor protection index provided in the thesis. The value of Clause 17 of 
VOICE index is thus assigned by a negative score when this provision is specified in a 
particular regulation.  
Apart from the negative impact of legal regulations on investor protection, there 
still exist vacant values of some clauses of investor protection indices in the assessment, 
indicating more potential deficiencies of shareholder protection in China. For example, 
“Shares is not blocked” and “The minimum percentage of shares entitling a shareholder to 
call for an audit commission is less than or equal to 10 per cent” so far have not been 
mentioned in any laws or regulations. 
Taken as a whole, the above analysis reveals that for the period 1991-2009, China 
has transplanted a series of laws and regulations from developed countries to improve the 
level of legal protection pertaining to shareholder rights. However, some aspects of 
investor protection in China’s stock markets are relatively inferior and vulnerable 
compared to the mature markets in the West.  
 
6.3 Investor protection in practice: Governance environment index 
It is noted that the changes of legal rules alone are insufficient in providing investor 
protection (Allen et al., 2005; Djankov et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998; Pistor et al., 
2000). The strong effectiveness of legal enforcement is assumed to substitute for weak 
legal rules (La Porta et al., 1998). The thesis thus builds an index of governance 
environment (GENVIRON) as an indicator of the effectiveness of investor protection in 
practice in China’s provincial jurisdictions. 
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6.3.1 Measurement of the enforcement of investor protection-a review 
The enforcement of investor protection is named in a variety of patterns, such as legal 
enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998), effectiveness of legal institutions (Pistor et al., 2000), 
institutional environment (Wang et al., 2008) and legal environment (Wu et al., 2009). 
Table 6.5 presents the variables and description that proxy for the essential indicators of 
the enforcement of investor protection often used in the previous literature.  
 
Table 6.5 Variables and description of the enforcement of investor protection in the literature 
Variable Description 
Legal enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998)a 
      Efficiency of judicial system      Assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business, particularly foreign 
firms” produced by the country risk rating agency Business 
International Corp.  
      Rule of law Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country 
produced by the country risk rating agency International 
Country Risk (ICR). 
      Corruption ICR’s assessment of the corruption in government. 
      Risk of expropriation ICR’s assessment of the risk of “outright confiscation” or 
“forced nationalization.” 
      Repudiation of contracts by government ICR’s assessment of the “risk of a modification in a contract 
taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling 
down” due to “budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a 
change in government, or a change in government economic 
and social priorities.” 
Effectiveness of legal institutions (Pistor et al., 2000) b 
     Rule of law Rating assessment provided by the Central European 
Economic Review (CEER) (closest to the ICR’s assessment 
taken by LLSV). 
     Legal effectiveness And index of the effectiveness of corporate and bankruptcy 
law in transition economies constructed by the EBRD. 
     Enforcement  Assessment of the protection of firms’ property rights and 
enforcement of contracts by the legal system produced by 
the World Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance (BEEPS).  
Institutional environment (Wang et al., 2008) c 
     Credit market index Assessment of the percentage of deposits taken by non-state 
financial institutions and the percentage of short-term loans 
to the non-state sector, constructed by Fan et al.(2007). 
     Government decentralization index Assessment of government spending as a percentage of 
GDP, the tax rates, and the amount of government 
administrative regulations (Fan et al., 2007).  
     Legal environment index The number of lawyers as a percentage of the population, the 
efficiency of the local courts and protection of property 
rights (Fan et al., 2007). 
Legal environment (Wu et al., 2009) d 
     Development of market intermediaries The number of lawyers as a percentage of the provincial 
population; 
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The number of certified public accountants as a percentage 
of the provincial population. Source from Fan et al.(2007) 
     Protection of producer’s interests Source from Fan et al.(2007) 
     Protection of consumer’s interests Source from Fan et al.(2007) 
     Protection of intellectual property rights Source from Fan et al.(2007) 
Source: a La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F, Shleifer, A & Vishny, RW 1998, 'Law and finance', Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 106, no. 6, pp. 1113-55. 
              
b
 Pistor, K, Raiser, M, Gelfer, S & Square, OE 2000, 'Law and finance in transition economies', 
Economics of Transition, vol. 8, pp. 325-68. 
            
c Wang, Q, Wong, TJ & Xia, L 2008, 'State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor 
choice:  Evidence from China', Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 112-34. 
                       dWu, SN, Xu, NH & Yuan, QB 2009, 'State Control, Legal Investor Protection, and Ownership 
Concentration: Evidence from China', Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 17, pp. 176-92. 
 
Table 6.5 suggests that indicators measuring the quality of the enforcement of 
investor protection usually comprise elements evaluating the effectiveness of both the 
government and the legal system. This reveals that the government in effect exerts critical 
influence on the effectiveness of legal and regulatory systems, thereby affecting the extent 
of investor protection in practice. In China, it may indeed be a case that the effectiveness of 
the enforcement of investor protection depends to a large extent on how the government 
and legal institutions interact with each other (Jia & Tomasic, 2010; Tomasic & Fu, 1999; 
Xia & Fang, 2005). On the path to a market-based economy from a centralized system, the 
majority of Chinese listed companies are controlled by local governments who can either 
grant them preferential treatments or impose on them additional fees and penalties (Chen et 
al., 2005). As a result, despite the unified regulation of the written legal rules, arbitrary 
interventions by local governments possibly lead to a prediction that the extent of investor 
protection varies across regions (provinces) in China.  
Further, compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), family firms are subjected to 
considerable discrimination in resource allocation, access to credit,  and are more inclined 
to suffer from arbitrary harassment by local governments (Li et al., 2006). The provincial 
variations in investor protection are thus expected to be more pronounced to family firms 
located in different regions in China. 
 
6.3.2 Measurement of public governance environment index  
As shown in Table 6.5, the quality of investor protection in practice is often measured by 
the effectiveness of the national government, credit markets and judicial system in the 
literature (La Porta et al., 1998; Pistor et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2009). The 
enforcement of investor protection in the thesis is thus defined by a broader concept - the 
quality of public governance environment (henceforth “governance environment”) in 
which a listed company has chosen to operate as its base - and is evaluated by four specific 
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measures: (1) Government corruption (GOVERN); (2) Development of financial market 
(FINANCE); (3) Development of market intermediaries (INTERMEDIARY); and (4) 
Efficiency of the judiciary (JUDICIARY).  
Data on the four measures are sourced from NERI INDEX of Marketization of 
China’s Provinces 2009 Report compiled by Fan et al. (2010). The NERI index targets to 
assess the marketizaiton process of individual provinces in mainland of China from 1999 
to 2007,13 which has been widely applied in recent accounts, such as Chen et al.,(2005), Li, 
Meng, Zhang and Shatin (2006), Wang, Wong and Xia (2008) and Wu et al. (2009). The 
value of each measure in the thesis is computed by the three-year average from 2005 to 
2007.14 Table 6.6 displays the variables and description of the government environment 
index developed in the thesis. 
 
Table 6.6 Variables and description of governance environment index 
Variable Description  
Corruption of government (GOVERN) Measurement of the relations between the government and 
market, including (1) the percentage of economic resources 
allocated by the market, (2) the reduction of factors’ tax, (3) 
interference by the government, (4) the enterprises’ other burden 
except tax, and (5) the scale of government. Sourced from NERI 
index between 2005 to 2007 
Development of financial market 
(FINANCE) 
Measurement of the extent of financial factor in the maturity of 
products market index, including the measurement on the 
competition of financial factor, and the marketization of credit 
allocation. Sourced from NERI index between 2005 to 2007 
Development of market intermediaries 
(INTERMEDIARY) 
Measurement of service conditions of lawyers and certified 
public accountants, and the assistance level of industry 
associations on enterprises. Sourced from NERI index between 
2005 to 2007 
Efficiency of the judiciary (JUDICIARY) Measurement of the efficiency of judicial system and 
administrative executing departments. Sourced from NERI index 
between 2005 to 2007 
Governance environment(GENVIRON) The average of the above four indicators.  
 
6.3.3 Main results  
Table 6.7 presents the descriptive statistics of the governance environment index 
(GENVIRON) and the four constituents of this index. The analysis finds that the overall 
level of governance environment is not uniformly developed across all 31 provinces in 
China. To illustrate, the results show that the difference of the governance environment 
index between the minimum and maximum score is 7.3, and that standard deviation is 
1.54, suggesting that there exist noticeable distinctions in provincial level of governance 
                                               
13
 The sample of the NERI index excludes Hong Kong and Macao.  
14
 Fan et al. (2010) state that the aggregate score of NERI index is evident to be little different between that 
computed by Principal Component Analysis and arithmetic average. 
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environment in China. In this circumstance, some companies may benefit, while others 
may suffer from the legal and institutional environment. As for the constituents of the 
governance environment index, the analysis reveals that the impact of local governments 
accounts for a relatively large proportion amongst the four elements, with a mean value of 
8.10, whereas the average improvement in the efficiency of judicial system is the weakest 
(3.41).      
Another notable result is that no more than 50 per cent of provinces have a more 
protective governance environment than the mean level (48.39 per cent), especially in 
terms of the efficiency of the legal system (only 41.94 per cent). This phenomenon implies 
that the effectiveness of governance environment is relatively inferior in the majority of 
provinces in China. More efforts are therefore desirable to further enhance a balanced 
evolution of China’s governance environment across individual provinces.  
In effect, the AMB Country Risk Report released on 31 August 2009 also confirms 
the relatively weak effectiveness of governance environment in China. In this report, China 
is rated as a CRT-3 country with slow development of legal environment, the legal system, 
business environment and capital market. Also, although the efficiency of local 
governments is revealed as the most effective element among four constituents of the 
governance environment index in the thesis, the political risk regarding the efficiency of 
the government bureaucracy and the reliability of the legal system is significantly higher 
than the world average. This suggests that China is still highly likely to suffer from 
government or bureaucratic inefficiencies and inadequate legal system compared to other 
developed countries (AMB, 2009). 
 
Table 6.7 Descriptive statistics of governance environment index and the constituents 
 Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std. Deviation Provinces with scores more than means (%) 
GOVERN 0.00 10.64 8.53 8.10 1.98 54.84 
FINANCE 3.56 11.49 7.45 7.48 1.86 45.16 
INTERMEDIARY 2.28 10.00 5.25 5.33 1.63 45.16 
JUDICIARY 0.21 8.25 3.15 3.41 1.83 41.94 
GEVIRON 2.32 9.62 6.04 6.08 1.54 48.39 
 
Table 6.8 and Figure 6.5 report the provincial distribution of the governance 
environment index and the four elements of the index (The geographic distribution of the 
governance environment index is depicted in A6.2). The results show that the level of 
governance environment of Shanghai is the highest among 31 provinces (9.62), indicating 
that Shanghai in general provides the most protective governance environment for listed 
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companies and shareholders. In contrast, Tibet suffers the lowest score of the governance 
environment index, only 2.32; it is much lower than the mean value across all provinces 
(6.08, provided in Table 6.7). This result suggests that enterprises in Tibet tend to be 
exposed to a highly risky operating environment, and investors are thus more inclined to 
bear the expropriation of private benefits of control by managers or insiders.  
 
Table 6.8 The governance environment index of individual provinces in China 
CODE PROVINCE GEVIRON GOVERN FINANCE INTERMEDIARY JUDICIARY 
AH Anhui 6.93 9.83 7.46 6.26 4.15 
BJ Beijing 7.33 9.25 7.01 7.84 5.22 
CQ Chongqing 6.47 8.89 9.70 4.84 2.45 
FJ Fujian 7.37 10.09 8.54 5.79 5.05 
GS Gansu 4.43 6.91 5.33 4.21 1.28 
GD Guangdong 8.26 10.64 9.88 6.87 5.66 
GX Guangxi 5.33 8.94 6.76 3.62 2.01 
GZ Guizhou 4.09 6.68 6.01 3.46 0.21 
HAN Hainan 4.79 8.54 6.04 2.28 2.32 
HEB Hebei 6.63 8.69 7.93 5.97 3.91 
HLJ Heilongjiang 5.04 7.81 4.70 5.33 2.33 
HEN Henan 6.04 8.46 8.35 5.48 1.87 
HUB Hubei 6.24 9.06 7.18 5.57 3.15 
HUN Hunan 5.26 7.64 7.32 4.27 1.82 
IM Inner Mongolia 5.05 6.89 6.34 4.28 2.71 
JS Jiangsu 8.35 10.49 9.69 6.70 6.51 
JX Jiangxi 5.32 8.03 6.93 4.53 1.77 
JL Jilin 5.54 7.91 5.12 5.86 3.25 
LN Liaoning 6.81 8.53 9.25 5.64 3.80 
NX Ningxia 5.41 6.82 8.78 4.49 1.55 
QH Qinghai 4.07 5.49 4.96 2.81 3.01 
SD Shandong 6.94 8.76 9.74 4.66 4.61 
SH Shanghai 9.62 10.03 10.19 10.00 8.25 
SX Shanxi 5.46 6.94 7.74 5.95 1.20 
SAX Shanxi2 5.41 7.35 7.43 5.25 1.60 
SC Sichuan 6.73 9.47 7.69 5.12 4.65 
TJ Tianjin 7.07 8.83 7.45 7.32 4.70 
TB Tibet 2.32 0.00 3.56 2.59 3.15 
XJ Xinjiang 5.03 6.42 4.98 5.22 3.48 
YN Yunan 6.10 7.72 8.19 5.25 3.25 
ZJ Zhejiang 8.96 10.00 11.49 7.66 6.70 
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Figure 6.5 Provincial distribution of the governance environment indices in China 
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Further, drawing on the classification of the World Bank (2007), this study groups 
31 provinces into six regions in China. They are: (1) Southeast (Jiangsu, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong); (2) Bohai Rim Region (Shandong, Beijing, Tianjin and 
Hebei); (3) Central Region (Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi); (4) Northeast 
(Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning); (5) Southwest (Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, 
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Sichuan, Chongqing and Hainan); 15 and (6) Northwest (Shanxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang).  
Table 6.9 and Figure 6.6 present the results of regional distribution of the 
governance environment index and its four constituents. Table 6.9 shows that Southeast 
Region, including Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong, has the highest 
value of the governance environment index, 8.51 on average, which sizably outperforms 
other regions: the difference in the governance environment index value between Southeast 
and Bohai Rim region (with the second highest value of the governance environment 
index ) is 1.52. Moreover, in Southeast Region, indices of GOVERN, FINANCE, 
INTERMEDIARY, and JUDICIARY exhibit the highest value among all regions, being 
10.25, 9.96, 7.40 and 6.43, respectively. This finding suggests that Southern Region 
outperforms other regions not only in terms of the overall level of governance 
environment, but also in terms of individual aspects of the enforcement of investor 
protection. In contrast, the average extent of governance environment in Northwest Region 
(including Shanxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang) is 
4.98, the lowest amongst all regions. These findings complement the results of other 
geographic distribution of the governance environment index in China. In effect, Gao and 
Kling (2008) state that with the highest economic development in China, the eastern costal 
area obtains a higher degree of marketization compared to the west and central part of 
China. Since the market development is a key indicator for evaluating the extent of 
corporate governance (Gao & Kling, 2008), regional variances in China’s governance 
environment may also suggest that Southeast Region exhibits more advanced corporate 
governance mechanisms than other regions.   
Figure 6.6 graphically shows that among the four dimensions of the governance 
environment index, the government corruption index (GOVERN) stands at the outermost 
circle, while the innermost circle is captured by the efficiency of judiciary index 
(JUDICIARY). This outcome indicates that despite significant regional variances, equal 
attention has not been devoted to the development of each component of the governance 
environment index in China. On one hand, the effectiveness of local governments has been 
extensively enhanced, especially in terms of the improvement of relationship between local 
governments and markets, as well as the notable reduced extent of corruption of local 
governments. On the other hand, the value of the efficiency of judicial system is relatively 
                                               
15
 The survey conducted by the World Bank does not include Tibet. In the thesis, Tibet is included in the 
Southwest Region based on its geographic location.  
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lower as opposed to three other aspects, suggesting that the judicial system appears to be 
greatly disregarded on the path of the evolution of legal reform in China.  
 
Table 6.9 Regional distribution of the governance environment index and the constituents 
 GENIRONMENT GOVERN FINANCE INTERMEDIARY JUDICIARY 
Southeast 8.51 10.25 9.96 7.40 6.43 
Bohai Rim  6.99 8.88 8.03 6.45 4.61 
Central 5.96 8.61 7.45 5.22 2.55 
Northeast  5.80 8.08 6.36 5.61 3.13 
Southwest  5.12 7.18 6.85 3.88 2.57 
Northwest 4.98 6.69 6.51 4.60 2.12 
 
Figure 6.6 Regional distribution of the level of governance environment in China 
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6.4 Conclusion  
Recent accounts have shifted attention to how the conflict of large and small shareholders 
is tackled by the quality and effectiveness of investor protection in a particular country. 
However, this stand of literature is prone to overlook the legal effects on the owner-
manager conflict in family firms, and might create estimate biases because of using cross-
country samples. Therefore, to fill this gap, this thesis aims to investigate the within-
country legal effects both over time and across different regions on the twin agency 
conflicts in family firms. Following the literature, this chapter first conducts a 
comprehensive assessment of investor protection both on paper and in practice in China, 
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one of the largest and fastest emerging economies in the world. The assessment underpins 
the empirical analysis carried out through Chapter 7 to 9 of the thesis.  
In this Chapter, the thesis first builds a time series index of formal investor 
protection for the period 1991-2009 in China, including seven specific dimensions, namely, 
VOICE, EXIT, SMINTEGR, ANTIBLOCK, ANTIDIRECT, ANTIMANAGE and 
ANTINONTRADABLE. The construction of this index is based on the extended notion of 
investor protection emphasised in Chapter 3 of the thesis, which refers to legal protection 
of minority shareholders against large shareholders, and also of all shareholders against 
managers. The indicators of this index are expected to be more comprehensive than those 
adopted in the previous studies. 
As only the changes of written legal rules are not sufficient in providing investor 
protection, strong effectiveness in legal enforcement is assumed to substitute for weak 
rules. The thesis therefore constructs a cross-sectional index of governance environment, 
indicating provincial variations in the quality of investor protection in practice across 
China. Specifically, the governance environment index consists of the corruption of the 
local government, the development of financial market and market intermediaries, and the 
efficiency of the judicial system. 
The measurement of the two indices of investor protection show that despite the 
need for further improvements, China’s legal protection for investors has experienced 
significant progress in terms of written legal rules, especially pertaining to the regulations 
in giving rise to the integrity and effectiveness of capital market.  
On the other hand, the analysis reveals that the overall quality of governance 
environment in China is much lower relative to the world average, especially in the 
efficiency of local governments and the reliability of the legal system and the business 
infrastructure. In addition, the assessment of governance environment shows that the 
government corruption index makes up the largest proportion among all four constituents 
of the governance environment index and has been paid the greatest attention in the 
process of legal reform in China. The judicial system index, however, accounts for the 
smallest proportion and the judiciary reform so far has not taken essential effect across 
provinces in China.  
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Chapter 7 
IMPACT OF INVESTOR PROTECTION ON AGENCY 
COSTS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
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7.1 Introduction  
Family firms, due to the usual concentrated form of ownership, are often considered to be 
prone to the significant twin agency problems: the conflict between managers and 
shareholders, and the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders (Burkart et 
al., 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). While most studies assume that the latter conflict 
overshadows the former (Faccio et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the owner-manager conflict is not a resolved issue in the 
context of family-controlled governance (Castillo & Skaperdas, 2005; Zhou et al., 2010). 
As suggested by Burkart et al. (2003), the controlling shareholder, even with significant 
ownership, is still exposed to the risk of being expropriated by the manager who runs the 
company in practice. Thus, the nature of corporate governance in family firms is about the 
mitigation of the expropriation of minority shareholders by the insiders, as well as the 
expropriation of all shareholders by the manager.  
The law and finance literature gives new insights to explore agency issues by 
highlighting the role of legal protection of minority shareholders in the financial markets. It 
suggests that strong investor protection is associated with better financial outcomes both at 
the firm and aggregate levels in individual countries (Allen et al., 2005; Djankov et al., 
2008; La Porta et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000b, 2002). However, due to the 
emphasis on legal protection of minority shareholders, this strand of literature tends to 
overlook the legal effects on the owner-manager conflict in family firms. Further, the 
country-based comparisons often adopted in conventional studies are also likely to create 
omitted-variables and aggregation biases (Wu et al., 2009). Therefore, investigating the 
within-country legal effects on the twin agency conflicts in family firms will contribute to 
our understanding of the intriguing issue of corporate governance in the literature. 
Emerging economies are typically characterised by the absence of effective formal 
institutions for investor protection, resulting in weak governance environment (Allen et al., 
2005; Mitton, 2002). The legal protection effects on organizational behaviours, such as 
corporate governance, are presumed to differ significantly from those found in developed 
countries in the West. The central objective of this chapter is thus to investigate whether 
the twin agency issues in family firms are associated with a potential mismatch between 
the concentrated ownership structure and the effectiveness of investor protection provided 
by the country’s legal and regulatory systems in China, one of the largest and fastest 
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growing economies in the world. This objective is also to test the first hypothesis derived 
from the models presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis.  
The study assembles a unique and detailed family-firm data set from China’s stock markets 
for the period 2000-2009 to address this question. Investor protection is measured by two 
indices developed in Chapter 6 of the thesis. One is a time series index evaluating the 
changes of written legal rules as an indicator for investor protection on paper, and the other 
is a cross-provincial index for the quality of governance environment measuring investor 
protection in practice. The reasons why China provides a good case to undertake such an 
examination, and the analysis in Chapter 8 and 9, are illustrated in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1 
of the thesis. 
This chapter makes a methodological innovation to this growing literature. Unlike 
conventional studies addressing issues only at the aggregate national level and disregarding 
the owner-manager conflict in family firms, the study explores changes and relationships 
within a country over time and across different provinces in the twin agency problems in 
family firms. This new approach is expected to mitigate estimate biases that plague the 
literature and enrich our understanding of the nature of corporate governance in family 
firms.  
Utilising the above methodological innovation, this chapter contributes to the 
literature by showing that in emerging countries with legal enforcement deficiencies, the 
evolution of written legal rules has a significant effect on relieving agency conflicts in 
family firms, thereby supporting their growth in the economy. Specifically, the thesis 
firstly finds that legal protection for investors at the national level has improved greatly for 
the period 1991-2009 in China. This dynamic legal evolution is potentially conducive to 
Chinese family firms by enhancing their financial performance, although these benefits 
might not accrue to nonfamily shareholders.  
Second, the analysis reveals that among seven dimensions of the legal investor 
protection index developed in this thesis, indices regarding shareholder rights on 
liquidation of their stakes and against managers tend to play the most important roles in 
investor protection. This finding indicates that shareholders prefer to vote with their feet 
rather than to vote against managerial decisions when they do not agree with the way the 
company is operated. In addition, the owner-manager conflict deserves greater attention in 
the analysis of agency issues in family businesses. 
Third, the thesis finds that the overall quality of governance environment in China 
is relatively inferior compared to the world average, especially in the efficiency of the 
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government and the reliability of the legal system and the business infrastructure. Such an 
inefficient institutional environment, despite provincial discrepancies, is found to have 
negligible effects on family firms. Instead, other informal mechanisms, for instance, family 
governance or network-based strategy, may help family firms to survive in the 
discriminatory political and economic environment.      
The literature review for this chapter is provided in Chapter 2 of the thesis. The 
methodology and data are given in Chapter 4 and 5, respectively. The remainder of this 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents the statistic summary for the variables 
included in the regression models. Section 7.3 reports the main results and discussion of 
the findings, and is followed by the robustness check in Section 7.4. Conclusion is 
provided in Section 7.5.  
 
7.2 Statistics summary 
Table 7.1 presents two panels of descriptive statistics of the full sample of companies. 
Panel A shows the means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values for the 
main variables of the full sample. Panel B provides the summary statistics of variables of 
family- and nonfamily-subsets, and shows the results of Independent-Sample T test of 
mean differences between the two groups of companies.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 7.1, companies in the full sample on average have a 
return on assets, based on EBIT, of 4.69 per cent, with a minimum and maximum value of 
-298.6 per cent and 247.1 per cent, respectively. The ratio of annual sales to total assets is 
used to indicate firm growth opportunities. On average, annual sales are found to represent 
64.3 per cent of total assets in all listed companies. The average firm in the full sample is 
nearly 8 years old since its initial offering public (IPO), suggesting that China’s stock 
markets have been going through the developing phase and the listed companies are 
relatively young.    
In the analysis of Panel B, the thesis finds that the accounting performance does not 
exhibit significant disparity between family firms and nonfamily firms. Yet, in other 
aspects, these two subsamples present substantial variations. For instance, family firms are 
found to have less growth opportunities, smaller firm size and go public later, as opposed 
to their nonfamily counterparts, while the ratio of liabilities to assets is significantly lower 
than nonfamily firms.  
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Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Panel A: Summary statistics of variables     
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA  0.047 0.141 -2.986 2.471 
     
CLAW 86.400 25.200 55.500 118.500 
VOICE 23.600 7.800 14.000 32.500 
EXIT 8.800 3.600 5.5000 14.000 
SMINTEGR 54.000 14.000 36.000 72.000 
ANTIBLOCK 27.800 9.000 17.500 39.500 
ANTIDIRECTOR 28.800 10.500 16.500 41.000 
ANTIMANAGER 17.100 5.600 11.000 23.500 
ANTINONTRADE 1.700 1.800 0.000 3.500 
     
GENVIORN 6.080 1.540 2.320 9.620 
GOVERN 8.100 1.980 0.000 10.640 
FINANCE 7.480 1.860 3.560 11.490 
INTERMEDIARY 5.330 1.630 2.280 10.000 
JUDICIARY 3.410 1.830 0.210 8.250 
     
SALE 0.643 0.552 -0.016 9.706 
SIZE 21.247 1.133 14.108 28.003 
LEVERAGE 0.582 1.497 0.000 96.959 
AGE 7.723 4.123 1.000 20.000 
Panel B: Summary statistics by ownership    
 Family firms Nonfamily firms Differ. of means t-statistic 
Number of firms 2920 10440   
ROA  0.049 0.046 0.003 0.612 
SALE 0.002 0.019 -0.048 -4.394*** 
SIZE 0.605 0.653 -0.538 -24.833*** 
LEVERAGE 20.827 21.365 0.152 3.166*** 
AGE 0.701 0.549 -0.390 -4.320*** 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of CLAW and its constituents are computed on a time series sample from 2000 
to 2009, and descriptive statistics of GENVIORN and its constituents are computed on a cross-sectional 
sample of 31 provinces in China. Descriptive statistics of other variables are computed on the full sample of 
listed companies which comprises 13,360 observations after filtering five outliers. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
     
7.3 Results and discussion 
7.3.1 Correlation analysis 
Table 7.2 provide the Pearson correlation coefficients among main variables of family-firm 
subsample. The analysis shows that there are positive correlations between firm 
performance and investor protection both on paper and in practice, which gives credence to 
findings of La Porta et al. (2002), suggesting that companies with strong investor 
protection have higher valuations. In addition, the correlation between performance and the 
legal investor protection index (CLAW) is recorded higher than that between performance 
and the governance environment index (GENVIORN): 11.4 per cent versus 4.8 per cent. 
This finding implies that the role of the evolution of formal legal protection pertaining to 
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the rights of investors is more important than that of the enforcement of investor protection 
in Chinese family firms.  
 
Table 7.2 Correlations of main variables 
 ROA CLAW GENVIRON SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVERAGE AGE 
ROA 1.000        
CLAW 0.114 1.000       
GENVIRON 0.048 0.086 1.000      
SYSTEM -0.013 -0.027 -0.013 1.000     
SALE 0.120 0.155 0.163 0.022 1.000    
SIZE 0.181 0.105 0.081 0.177 0.144 1.000   
LEVERAGE -0.271 0.018 0.016 -0.018 -0.051 -0.229 1.000  
AGE -0.108 0.175 -0.112 0.124 -0.102 0.008 0.127 1.000 
 
7.3.2 Diagnostic test 
To examine the legal effects of investor protection on Chinese family firms, the study 
starts by undertaking the diagnostic test to determine the appropriateness of the two-stage 
least squares estimation of the fixed-effects panel-data models (FE2SLS) in the 
multivariate regression  analysis. 
   
Multicollinearity test 
To test for multicollinearity among predictors, the study uses the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF). Panel A of Table 7.3 presents the VIF value for each regressor. In general, a 
variable with a VIF value greater than 10 may be considered to be highly correlated with 
other variables, and makes multicollinearity a concern. By using this criterion, there is no 
evidence showing the existence of multicollinearity among regressors in both models.  
 
Heteroskedasticity test 
In the heteroskedasticity test, the thesis first obtains maximum-likelihood parameter 
estimates by applying Iterated GLS models with heteroskedastic assumption. It then 
conducts the feasible general least squares (FGLS) models under the assumption of 
homoskedasticity. By comparing whether there are significant differences between the log 
likelihood of both regressions, the value of chi-squared from Likelihood-ratio test (LR) 
could tell the presence or absence of heteroskedasticity. Panel B of Table 7.3 shows that 
the regression has a relatively large chi-squared value that is significantly different from 
zero, suggesting that the panel-data set is exposed to the substantial presence of 
heteroskedasticity.      
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Autocorrelation test 
The examination adopts the simple test for autocorrelation in linear panel-data models 
derived by Wooldridge (2002). The simulation results of this method are considered to 
have good size and power properties in appropriately sized samples (Drukker, 2003). Panel 
C of Table 7.3 shows the F-statistics and corresponding significant level in the panel-data 
model. The result rejects the null hypothesis, which indicates the significant presence of 
autocorrelation in the multivariate panel-data regression.  
 
Endogeneity test 
Finally, tests for endogeneity are conducted by IV/GMM estimation of the fixed-effects 
panel-data models by assuming the specified endogenous regressors as exogenous 
variables. The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of regressors tested. Based on existing literature, the legal investor protection 
index and its constituents are considered to be the probable endogenous variables in the 
analysis. The thesis thus tests the endogeneity of the variables of CLAW and seven indices, 
respectively. All results reject the null hypothesis, implying that CLAW and all seven 
individual indices of investor protection should be treated as endogeneous variables and 
therefore the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation is needed in the multivariate 
regression analysis (Table 7.3: Panel D).   
 
Table 7.3 Diagnostic test 
Panel A: Multicollinearity test  
 ROA 
CLAW 1.09 
GENVIRON 1.05 
SYSTEM 1.05 
SALE 1.08 
SIZE 1.13 
LEVERAGE 1.08 
AGE 1.11 
Panel B: Heteroskedasticity test  
 ROA 
LR (Chi-sq) 3287.65*** 
Panel C: Autocorrelation test  
 ROA 
F-Statistics 4.25** 
Panel D: Endogeneity test  
 ROA 
Chi-sq (1)     CLAW 14.17*** 
                     TVOICE 16.07*** 
                     TEXIT 15.56*** 
                     TSIMNTEGR 13.44*** 
                     TANTIBLOCK 15.57*** 
                     TANTIDIRECT 15.43*** 
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                     TANTIMANAGE 14.31*** 
                     TANTINONTRAGE 22.66*** 
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
7.3.3 FE2SLS estimation of panel-data models 
The study examines the impact of investor protection on paper and in practice on agency 
costs in Chinese family firms to the use of the following regression. The description of 
variables is provided in Chapter 4 of the thesis.  
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Suggested by the diagnostic test showing that the panel data set of the thesis has the 
significant presence of heteorskedasticity, serial correlation, and endogeneity disturbances, 
the study thus implements the 2SLS estimation of the fixed-effects panel-data models 
(FE2SLS) in the multivariate regression analysis. The standard errors clustered by firm are 
used to control for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-group dependence of errors due 
to the unobserved firm effects in the data set. The reason for using single clustering rather 
than double clustering is to mitigate the distortions that the noise caused by the double-
clustered standard errors bring to the results (Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2009).  
Table 7.4 reports the FE2SLS estimation of the legal effects on family firms. The 
analysis shows that the coefficient of CLAW is 1.73 in the ROA regression; it is 
statistically significant at 1 per cent, indicating that the distinct evolution of written legal 
rules protective of shareholder rights is beneficial to minimize the agency costs in family 
firms by improving operating performance. It is consistent with the mainstream view in the 
literature, suggesting that firms with stronger investor protection should have higher 
corporate valuation (La Porta et al., 2002), lower control premium (Djankov et al., 2008; 
Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al., 2006; Nenova, 2003) and less earnings 
manipulation (Leuz et al., 2003). Further, the results find that the coefficient of 
GENVIRON is much smaller relative to that of CLAW, only 0.11 in the ROA regression; 
it is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that governance environment for 
investors appears to be ineffectual and its impact on family firms is negligible.  
The above findings can in part be explained as follows. As suggested in the 
analysis provided in Chapter 6 of the thesis, investor protection on paper has experienced a 
progressive improvement for the period 1991-2009 in China. By the end of 2009, China 
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has transplanted a series of legal regulations pertaining to investor protection from 
developed countries, especially in terms of the considerable amendments made to the 
Company Law and the Securities Law in 2006, and the introduction of the reform of the 
split share structure launched in 2005. With the dynamic legal evolution, the extent of 
formal investor protection significantly rises from 55.5 in 2000 to 118.5 in 2009, implying 
substantive effects of investor protection on China’s stock markets.  
Unlike the distinct evolution of written legal rules, the overall effectiveness of 
governance environment is relatively inferior in China (reported in Chapter 6). It is also 
noted that on the decentralized path towards a market-based economy, local governments 
in China have built up their de facto control over local enterprises by either granting them 
preferential treatments or impose on them additional fees and penalties (Chen et al., 2005; 
Jia & Tomasic, 2010). Compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), local family firms are 
under considerable discrimination in resource allocation and are thus more inclined to be 
arbitrarily harassed by local governments (Li et al., 2006). For instance, the Chinese stock 
exchanges are initially developed to serve state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Jia & Tomasic, 
2010), resulting in a sizable bias in equity issuance against private enterprises.  
Hence, to survive in the adverse political and institutional environment, family 
firms located in different provinces tend to seek new ways to safeguard their interest 
instead of relying on formal institutional protection. Likewise, La Porta et al.(2002) and 
Lins (2003) show that concentrated ownership may be especially beneficial to fill 
institutional governance void. Farrar (2005) emphasizes the role of self-regulation and 
business ethics beyond legal restraints in corporate governance. Peng and Heath (1996) 
suggest that firms in transition economies follow from a network-based strategy of growth. 
Such network-based strategy is characterised by reputation and relationships in private 
sector development in Japanese corporations (Farrar, 2005) and China’s context (Allen et 
al., 2005; Tomasic & Fu, 1999). Chen et al.(2005) and Li et al.(2006) further demonstrate 
that most of private entrepreneurs have actively participated in politics in China and such 
political connections or participation of entrepreneurs can serve as a response to the formal 
institutional failure, especially in provinces with lower investor protection. Pistor and Xu 
(2005b) also state that an administrative governance structure featured by a quota system 
has substituted for formal legal enforcement at the early stage of China’s stock markets 
development. This finding sheds some light on studies concerning the impact of alternative 
mechanisms on family firms, which will be further investigated in the subsequent chapters 
of the thesis.  
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Table 7.4 FE2SLS estimation of the effects of investor protection on family firms 
 Dependent variable: ROA 
CLAW 1.714*** 
(3.82) 
GENVIRON 0.658 
(0.12) 
SYSTEM -0.039 
(-1.46) 
SALE -0.000 
(-0.00) 
SIZE -0.022 
(-0.76) 
LEVERAGE -0.077*** 
(-7.40) 
AGE -0.137*** 
(-3.62) 
Observations 2194 
Number of clusters (firm) 466 
Notes: The family-firm sample comprises 2,194 observations from 466 groups, as singleton groups with 84 
observations are deleted from the estimation. t-statistics from the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
Table 7.5 provides further quantification of the individual effects of formal investor 
protection on family firms. The analysis finds that the coefficients of seven legal investor 
protection indices are positive and statistically significant in all regressions. Among them, 
the highest coefficients are recorded by EXIT and ANTIMANAGE, indicating that both 
EXIT and ANTIMANAGE rights appear to be the most critical components of institutional 
frameworks in enhancing performance of Chinese family firms. Simultaneously, it may 
imply that shareholders prefer to liquidate their stakes rather than to vote against the 
decision when they are unsatisfied with the way the company is operated. This finding also 
suggests that the divergence of interest between owners and managers might not be 
ignored in family firms, as the legal efforts to constrain expropriation by managers can 
make the firms significantly more profitable.  
 
Table 7.5 FE2SLS estimation of the effects of formal investor protection on family firms 
Dependent variable:  ROA  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VOICE 0.064*** 
(3.97) 
      
EXIT  0.099*** 
(4.07) 
     
SMINTEGR   0.017*** 
(3.98) 
    
ANTIBLOCK    0.062*** 
(3.97) 
   
ANTIDIRECT     0.041*** 
(4.01) 
  
ANTIMANA      0.098***  
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GE (3.72) 
ANTINONTR
ADE 
      0.072*** 
(4.08) 
SYSTEM -0.030 
(-1.01) 
-0.027 
(-0.93) 
-0.049* 
(-1.92) 
-0.020 
(-0.63) 
-0.032 
(-1.12) 
-0.023 
(-0.73) 
-0.059** 
(-2.18) 
SALE -0.018 
(-0.49) 
0.017 
(0.57) 
0.018 
(0.77) 
-0.010 
(-0.27) 
-0.011 
(-0.31) 
-0.022 
(-0.54) 
0.017 
(0.79) 
SIZE -0.024 
(-0.81) 
-0.022 
(-0.77) 
-0.017 
(-0.61) 
-0.027 
(-0.91) 
-0.024 
(-0.83) 
-0.032 
(1.04) 
-0.006 
(-0.23) 
LEVERAGE -0.077*** 
(-7.60) 
-0.075*** 
(-7.64) 
-0.076*** 
(-7.19) 
-0.076*** 
(-7.82) 
-0.077*** 
(-7.57) 
-0.078*** 
(-7.64) 
-0.076*** 
(-7.12) 
AGE -0.152*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.128*** 
(-3.90) 
-0.072*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.189*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.134*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.171*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.12) 
Observations 2194 2194 2194 2194 2194 2194 2194 
Number of 
clusters  
466 466 466 466 466 466 466 
Notes: The family-firm sample comprises 2,194 observations from 466 groups. t-statistics from the clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% 
(***) level, respectively. 
 
The thesis also applies the FE2SLS models to the estimates of the individual effects 
of the enforcement of investor protection on agency conflicts in family firms. Although no 
endogenous variable is identified in the panel-data models, the FE2SLS estimation 
calculates the heteroskedastic OLS (HOLS) estimator that is more efficient than the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
(Davidson et al., 1993). Table 7.6 reports the results, showing that all coefficients of the 
governance environment indices are mixed and none of them is statistically significant. 
This finding confirms the results presented in Table 7.4, implying that the formal 
institutional environment does little to mitigate agency issues in family firms, and the 
growth of Chinese family firms are more likely to be supported by some alternative 
mechanisms, such as family control and net-work based strategy. 
 
Table 7.6 FE2SLS estimation of the effects of investor protection in practice on family firms 
Dependent variable: ROA    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GOVERN 0.030 
(0.67 
   
FINANCE  0.024 
(1.16) 
  
INTERMEDIARY   0.042 
(0.96) 
 
JUDICIARY    0.010 
(0.44) 
SYSTEM 0.046 
(0.49 
0.045 
(0.49) 
0.045 
(0.49) 
0.046 
(0.50) 
SALE 0.235* 
(1.78) 
0.235* 
(1.78) 
0.235* 
(1.78) 
0.236* 
(1.78) 
SIZE 0.299* 
(1.76) 
0.300* 
(1.76) 
0.299* 
(1.76) 
0.299* 
(1.76) 
LEVERAGE -0.324** -0.324** -0.324** -0.324** 
                                                                                                                                                 123 
(-2.18) (-2.18) (-2.18) (-2.18) 
AGE -0.041* 
(-1.69) 
-0.041* 
(-1.69) 
-0.041* 
(-1.69) 
-0.041* 
(-1.69) 
Number of observations 2848 2848 2848 2848 
Number of clusters 550 550 550 550 
Notes: The family-firm sample comprises 2,848 observations from 550 groups, as singleton groups with 71 
observations are deleted from the estimation. t-statistics from the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
7.4 Robustness check  
Table 7.7 applies four alternative econometric techniques to test whether the previous 
findings are robust. These techniques include the FE2SLS estimation with the 
heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation- robust (HAC) standard errors, the fixed effects (FE) 
and random effects (RE) panel-data models with the standard errors clustered by firm. 
Time dummies are not included in all to avoid the unknown form of time effect distorting 
the estimation (Petersen, 2009). For brevity, only the results of CLAW and GENVIRON 
are reported here.  
First, given the strong rejection of the null hypoloythesis of the absence of 
heteroskdasticity and autocorrelation, this study reestimates Model (7.1) to the use of the 
FE2SLS estimation with HAC standard errors, choosing a bandwidth of 2 [roughly T1/3, as 
suggested by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007)]. Row 1 of Table 7.7 provides the results 
of this estimation, which are the closest to those provided in Table 7.4.  
The thesis then employs the simple FE estimation in Row 2 and the RE estimation 
in Row 3 and 4. Allowing for the industry effects in the RE models, Row 3 uses industry 
dummies, while Row 4 uses industry-adjusted ROA as the dependent variable. As Row 2, 
3 and 4 fail to control for the endogeneity of CLAW, the coefficient of CLAW in all three 
models presents a substantial reduction from that of the FE2SLS estimation. However, the 
sign and significance of main variables are qualitatively unchanged. 
 
Table 7.7 Robustness test of the effects of investor protection on family firms 
 
 Dependent variable: ROA 
CLAW 1.73*** 
(3.76) 
1. FE2SLS with HAC 
GENVIRON 0.11 
(0.02) 
CLAW 0.18*** 
(3.63) 
2. FE with the standard errors  clustered 
by firm 
GENVIRON -0.76 
(-0.44) 
CLAW 0.11*** 
(5.48) 
3. RE with the standard errors clustered 
by firm and industry dummies 
GENVIRON 0.28 
(1.44) 
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CLAW 0.10*** 
(5.49) 
4. RE industry-adjusted 
ROA/TUNNEL with the standard 
errors clustered by firm GENVIRON 0.06 
(0.30) 
Notes: t-statistics from the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
The thesis also analyses the sensitivity of individual impact of investor protection 
indices on family firms to the use of the four models specified above. Table 7.8 shows that 
Column 1 applying the FE2SLS estimation with the HAC standard errors produces almost 
identical estimators to those estimated by the FE2SLS estimation with the clustered 
standard errors. Yet, without controlling for endogeneity, the results from three other 
models (Column 2, 3, and 4) are mixed. For instance, the coefficients of investor protection 
indices are much smaller in Column 2 than those of Column 1. 
A more notable result is that the coefficient of ANTINONTRADABLE in Column 
2 exhibits the sign opposite to the expectation as reported in other columns (Column 1, 3 
and 4). The inconsistence of this estimate may indicate that the reform of the spilt structure 
has not entirely taken effect in China’s stock markets. In effect, this reform has been 
implemented by stages from 2005 to 2009. Family firms, although ultimately controlled by 
individuals and families, on average have still retained 45 per cent of issued shares as non-
tradable shares till 2008. In this regard, the divergence of interest between tradable and 
non-tradable shareholders is also a considerable agency issue in Chinese family firms, and 
thus calls for more efforts to enhance the process of the reform.      
In Column 3 and 4 of Table 7.8, the analysis finds that the coefficient of GOVERN 
is 0.4 per cent in both; it is statistically significant at 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, 
respectively. This finding shows that the government appears to play a more important role 
in governance environment than other elements and thus might be effective to alleviate 
agency conflicts in Chinese family firms. As suggested before, while China has gone 
through a remarkable economic transition from a central planning regime to a market-
based structure, the government both at the central and local levels still controls most 
decision making authorities over enterprises, especially non-state enterprises (Chen et al., 
2005; Li et al., 2006). To this extent, the level of corruption and efficiency of the 
government bureaucracy dominate China’s governance environment and the increasing 
government quality may be relatively conducive to the growth of family firms in the 
economy.  
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Table 7.8 Robustness test of the individual effects of investor protection on family firms 
 
1. FE2SLS with 
HAC 
2. FE with the 
standard errors  
clustered by firm 
3. RE with the 
standard errors 
clustered by firm 
and industry 
dummies  
4. RE industry-
adjusted ROA 
with the standard 
errors clustered 
by firm 
VOICE 0.064*** 
(3.56) 
0.004*** 
(3.47) 
0.003*** 
(5.51) 
0.003*** 
(5.57) 
EXIT 0.100*** 
(3.85) 
0.009*** 
(3.62) 
0.007*** 
(5.76) 
0.006*** 
(5.83) 
SMINTEGR 0.017*** 
(4.26) 
0.004*** 
(3.39) 
0.002*** 
(5.43) 
0.002*** 
(5.48) 
ANTIBLOCK 0.063*** 
(3.53) 
0.004*** 
(3.80) 
0.003***  
(5.67) 
0.003*** 
(5.73) 
ANTIDIRECT 0.041*** 
(3.66) 
0.003*** 
(3.81) 
0.003*** 
(5.67) 
0.002*** 
(5.73) 
ANTIMANAGE 0.099*** 
(3.10) 
0.007*** 
(4.30) 
0.006*** 
(5.86) 
0.005*** 
(5.94) 
ANTINONTRADE 0.074*** 
(4.03) 
-0.004 
(-0.87) 
0.010*** 
(3.62) 
0.009*** 
(3.52) 
GOVERN -0.026 
(-0.98) 
-0.026 
(-1.01) 
0.004** 
(1.98) 
0.004* 
(1.94) 
FINANCE 0.000 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(1.30) 
0.002 
(1.24) 
INTERMEDIARY -0.016 
(-0.61) 
-0.016 
(-0.63) 
0.001 
(0.43) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
JUDICIARY -0.012 
(-0.81) 
-0.012 
(-0.83) 
0.002 
(0.84) 
0.002 
(0.96) 
Notes: t-statistics from the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Due to the high ownership concentration in family firms, the coexistence of agency 
conflicts between owners and managers, and between large and small shareholders 
presents significant governance issues in emerging economies, especially those with weak 
governance environment. The law and finance literature highlights the role of legal 
protection of shareholders in addressing this problem. Yet, studies in this strand often 
overlook the owner-manager conflict, while adopting cross-country samples that tend to 
create estimate biases. 
Using two indices of China’s investor protection developed in Chapter 6 of the 
thesis, this chapter explores the effects of investor protection in the context of the twin 
agency conflicts based on a finer-grained family-firm data set from China for the period 
2000-2009. The analysis finds that since the 1990s, the extent of investor protection on 
paper has markedly improved in China due to the promulgation of a series of legal rules 
pertaining to investor protection. Such legal development provides significant and positive 
effects on minimizing the agency costs in family firms, thereby supporting their growth in 
the economy. Further, among seven investor protection indices developed in the thesis, 
                                                                                                                                                 126 
EXIT and ANMANAGE rights are the most prominent in protecting shareholder rights, 
indicating that shareholders prefer to “vote by foot” when facing unsatisfying decision 
made by the company, and the owner-manager conflict deserves much attention in the 
analysis of agency issues in Chinese family firms.  
On the other hand, the findings show that China’s governance environment is 
relatively inferior to the world average, especially in the efficiency of the government 
bureaucracy and the reliability and integrity of the legal system. Despite provincial 
variations, such an inefficiency governance environment is found in this thesis to have 
negligible effects against agency conflicts in family firms. The results imply that some 
alternative mechanisms, such as family governance and network-based strategy, may serve 
as a response to the formal enforcement of investor protection deficiencies in China. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing a within-country analysis that 
mitigates estimate biases often pronounced in country-based studies in the literature. Based 
on this methodological innovation, this chapter sheds new light on the role of legal 
protection for investors in family firms in emerging countries, notably in countries sharing 
similar characteristics with China in terms of family-controlled governance and legal 
evolution. It suggests that the absence of effective investor protection prevailing in the 
emerging markets can in part be explained by the relatively weak institutional environment, 
while the formal legal rules do to some extent contribute to the growth of family firms in 
the economy. Polices to enhance legal enforcement are therefore needed in these countries. 
Yet, as suggested in the findings of this study, some local cultural and political reasons 
may play an important role in influencing the adaptability of corporations in their legal 
systems (Tomasic, 1999). Future research may further investigate the effects of informal 
mechanisms to enrich our understanding of this important governance issue in the 
literature. 
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Chapter 8 
IMPACT OF INVESTOR PROTECTION ON FAMILY 
GOVERNANCE MACHANISMS 
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8.1 Introduction  
As noted by Chapter 7 of the thesis, the notable dynamic evolution of formal investor 
protection can significantly mitigate agency conflicts in Chinese family firms, while 
investor protection in practice appears to have negligible effects on this issue. Unlike the 
distinct progress in the development of written legal rules, the overall effectiveness of the 
enforcement of investor protection is relatively inferior in China, especially in the 
efficiency of the government bureaucracy and the reliability of the legal system. 
Meanwhile, on the decentralized path towards a market-based economy, local governments 
have built up their control over local enterprises by either granting them preferential 
treatments or impose on them additional fees and penalties (Chen et al., 2005; Jia & 
Tomasic, 2010). Compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), family firms in individual 
provinces are under considerable discrimination in resource allocation and are thus more 
vulnerable to be arbitrarily harassed by local governments (Li et al., 2006).  
Local family firms therefore tend to seek alternative ways to safeguard their interest 
in the absence of formal institutional protection, one of which is presumed to be family 
governance (Burkart et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003). It is because such a 
governance arrangement featured by a concentrated ownership structure creates incentives 
for close monitoring and consequently impairs managerial entrenchments (Tirole, 2006). 
Pistor and Xu (2005a) also note that an effective alternative strategy for the absence of 
formal law enforcement is corporate governance instruments that are implemented by 
those who have control rights in hands of companies.  
The law and finance literature has provided evidence that legal protection can help 
shape internal governance mechanisms in family firms, such as ownership concentration 
and management preservation. The widely-held view shows that the concentrated 
ownership structure is negatively associated with the quality of legal protection for 
investors, suggesting that ownership concentration and investor protection are substitutes 
(Burkart et al., 2003; Himmelberg et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1999, 2002; Shleifer & 
Wolfenzon, 2002; Wu et al., 2009). However, some studies still find an opposite result. 
They propose that ownership concentration and legal protection are not necessarily 
substitutes, but are complements in some circumstances (Aganin & Volpin, 2003; Burkart 
& Panunzi, 2006; Castillo & Skaperdas, 2005; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; 
Stepanov, 2003). 
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Recent literature shows that family dominance in ownership, control, and 
management structure is usually considered to be the attribute of corporate governance in 
family firms (Mroczkowski & Tanewski, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The central 
objective of this chapter is therefore to explore how the controlling family’s decisions on 
the three fundamental elements of internal governance mechanisms are determined by the 
quality of legal protection for investors in emerging economies.  
This chapter attempts to address this question by testing the hypotheses developed 
in Chapter 3 of the thesis against data on companies from China’s stock exchanges for the 
period 2000-2009. This chapter makes a methodological innovation by using an upper 
quartile score as a breakpoint of the level of investor protection. This new threshold is to 
will obtain a more accurate indicator of the higher quality of legal protection of 
shareholder rights than the median score often used in conventional studies. This will 
mitigate the risk that the relatively crude criterion for investor protection might distort the 
results.  
Based on this methodological innovation, the thesis finds empirical evidence 
supportive to the predictions of the models presented in Chapter 3, suggesting that family 
governance arrangements are to some extent shaped by legal protection for shareholders 
within different local jurisdictions in China. To illustrate, the study shows that family firms 
operating under a more protective governance environment for investors will have more 
concentrated ownership rights and more management positions occupied by family 
members, with less use of control-enhancing instruments such as pyramids. The positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and the quality of investor protection 
supports the argument that ownership concentration and legal protection are not 
necessarily substitutes in all circumstances.   
The thesis also investigates the interaction effects of family managers with investor 
protection on family governance mechanisms. The results show that companies having a 
family CEO in place have more significant ownership rights and higher level of family 
management, with less use of control-enhancing mechanisms than those led by a hired 
CEO. However, the relations between investor protection and family governance 
mechanisms are more significant in family firms with an outsider-CEO. One possible 
explanation is that due to the less intense conflicts between family shareholders and family 
managers, the family is more inclined to count on internal corporate governance 
arrangements rather than external investor protection to make strategic and operating 
decisions in family firms.  
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The findings in this chapter add new evidence to the growing literature by showing 
that concentrated ownership rights and the preservation of family management can serve as 
complements rather than substitutes for weak investor protection in China’s context. The 
analysis also sheds some light on the relevant issues in other emerging economies, 
especially those sharing similar characteristics with China in terms of family governance 
and legal development. 
The literature review for this chapter is provided in Chapter 2 of the thesis. The 
methodology and data are given in Chapter 4 and 5. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 8.2 presents the statistic summary for the variables included 
in the regression models. Section 8.3 reports the main results and discussion of the 
findings, and is followed by the robustness check in Section 8.4. Conclusion is provided in 
Section 8.5.  
 
8.2 Statistics summary 
Table 8.1 reports the descriptive statistics of main variables used in this chapter. Panel A 
shows the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values of variables of the 
family-firm sample except dummy variables. Panel B provides the number and percentage 
of family firms in which ultimate control involves the presence of pyramids or systems. 
Panel C further divides the family-firm sample into two subsamples of family firms having 
a family CEO and family firms hiring an outsider as CEO, and presents the results of 
Independent-Sample T test of mean differences between the two groups.  
Panel A shows that the controlling family in the family-firm sample on average 
holds cash-flow rights of 25.52 per cent with a minimum value of 0.50 per cent and a 
maximum value of 87.10 per cent. This mean value is higher than in most of East Asian 
corporations, such as corporations in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Taiwan (Claessens et al., 2000),16 and also higher than in U.S. companies (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003).17 The excess of control rights over cash-flow rights has a mean value of 10.1 
per cent. The number of family directors or managers divided by the total number of senior 
management is 8.26 per cent on average and 46.20 per cent at the maximum, which 
indicates the prevalence of family management in Chinese family firms. 
                                               
16
 Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) explore the ownership structure of corporations in nine East Asian 
countries. They find that the controlling shareholders hold the smallest cash-flow rights in Japanese 
companies, only 6.90 per cent on average, while Thai companies display the most concentrated cash-flow 
rights with 32.84 per cent among the nine countries.      
17
 Anderson and Reeb (2003) observe that families own 18 per cent of the companies’ equity in the S&P500 
companies from 1992 to 1999..  
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As shown in Panel B, for 69.59 per cent of companies in the family-firm sample, 
ultimate control involves the use of a pyramidal structure, suggesting that pyramiding is 
widespread among Chinese listed companies ultimately controlled by a family or an 
individual. This proportion is the highest among all nine East Asian companies reported by 
Claessens et al. (2000). However, only 14.59 per cent of the sampled family firms are 
under the control of the same family or individual, implying that Chinese companies 
exhibit a relatively lower incidence of systeming than pyramiding, and the “system” so far 
has not been built up on China’s stock markets. 
Panel C takes a closer look at the descriptive statistics of family-CEO firms and 
outsider-CEO firms. The analysis shows that family firms having a family CEO in place 
retain more concentrated cash-flow rights, 33.55 per cent on average, significantly higher 
than firms hiring a professional CEO with 22.79 per cent on average. In terms of control-
enhancing mechanisms, family-CEO firms have less control in the excess of ownership 
rights and also a lower incidence of pyramiding as opposed to outsider-CEO firms: 7.17 
per cent versus 11.05 per cent, and 54.67 per cent versus 74.64 per cent, respectively. 
Further, the mean difference in the excess of control rights over cash-flow rights is 
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. For family management, the mean percentage of 
family directors or managers in firm management is 14.08 per cent in companies managed 
by a family CEO. This mean proportion is 7.79 per cent larger than in comparable firms, 
and the mean difference is statistically significant at 1 per cent level.  
To recapitulate, family firms with a family CEO and family firms with a hired CEO 
differ significantly in ownership concentration, the separation of ownership and control, 
the use of pyramids in ultimate control, and the involvement of family members in 
management. These differences reflect a distinct role played by a family or a hired CEO. It 
is therefore important to distinguish between the two groups of family firms in the 
analysis.  
 
Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Panel A: Summary statistics of variables     
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GENVIORN 6.08 1.54 2.32 9.62 
GOVERN 8.10 1.98 0.00 10.64 
FINANCE 7.48 1.86 3.56 11.49 
INTERMEDIARY 5.33 1.63 2.28 10.00 
JUDICIARY 3.41 1.83 0.21 8.25 
     
CASHFLOW (%) 25.52 16.61 0.50 87.10 
EXCESSCONTROL (%) 10.07 9.35 0.00 47.50 
FAMILYRATIO (%) 8.26 7.25 0.00 46.20 
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SALE (%) 60.52 50.38 0.00 571.00 
SIZE 20.83 1.00 16.12 24.46 
LEVERAGE (%) 70.13 254.08 0.00 9696.00 
AGE 7.45 4.45 1.00 20.00 
Panel B: Summary statistics of dummies     
 0   1  
 Number  Per cent Number  Per cent  
PYRAMIDS  888 30.41 2032 69.59 
SYSTEM  2494 85.41 426 14.59 
Panel C: Summary statistics by family/outsider 
CEO family firms 
   
 Family CEO  Outsider CEO Differ. of means t-statistic 
Number of observations 739 2181   
CASHFLOW (%) 33.55 22.79 10.76 14.638*** 
EXCESSCONTROL (%) 7.17 11.05 -3.88 9.917*** 
PYRAMIDS (%) 54.67 74.64 -19.97  
FAMILYRATIO (%) 14.08 6.29 7.79 24.129*** 
SYSTEM (%) 3.79 18.25 -14.46  
SALE (%) 63.35 59.56 3.79 -2.029** 
SIZE 20.91 20.80 0.11 -2.862*** 
LEVERAGE (%) 52.39 76.11 -23.72 3.087*** 
AGE 5.69 8.04 -2.35 12.544*** 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the governance environment index are computed on a cross-sectional sample 
of 31 provinces in China. Descriptive statistics of other variables are computed on the family-firm subsample 
which comprises 2,920 observations after filtering four outliers. Dummies in Panel B are computed by the 
number and percentage of observations equalling the column heading to the observations of the family-firm 
sample. Dummies in Panel C are computed by the percentage of observations equalling one to the 
observations of family/outsider CEO subsample. Due to the meaningless calculation of means of dummy 
variables, it is of no interest to adopt Independent-Sample T tests of mean differences for PYRAMIDS and 
SYSTEM between family- and outsider-CEO family firms in Panel C. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
8.3 Results and discussion 
8.3.1 Categorical analysis 
To examine the effects of investor protection on family ownership, control, and 
management, this part of the study firstly uses a dummy variable of investor protection to 
split the family-firm sample into two subsamples – family firms operating in regimes with 
inferior investor protection and family firms with superior investor protection. The level of 
local investor protection is denoted by the effectiveness of provincial governance 
environment in China that is measured in Chapter 6 of the thesis. Explanatory variables 
and control variables are then compared between the two groups of family firms, 
respectively. Panel A of Table 8.2 displays the results.  
Overall, the analysis of Panel A shows that family firms are predominantly located 
in regimes with a more protective governance environment: 58.12 per cent versus 41.88 
per cent of family firms within a less protective governance environment. The two groups 
of family firms are found to differ significantly in family ownership, control, and 
management. The analysis first shows that family firms with strong investor protection 
hold more concentrated cash-flow rights, 28.29 per cent on average, compared to family 
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firms with weak investor protection, in which the family retains 21.68 per cent of cash-
flow rights on average.  
Secondly, in terms of family control mechanisms, the analysis shows that for 74.16 
per cent of the latter group of companies, the ultimate control is characterised by the use of 
a pyramidal structure, while the number is lower in provinces with stronger investor 
protection (66.29 per cent on average). The excess of control rights over cash-flow rights is 
significantly lower in family firms which are better protected than comparable companies: 
9.59 per cent versus 10.74 per cent; the difference is significant at 1 per cent level. 
Moreover, 17.74 per cent of family firms located in less protective regimes are under the 
control by the same family or individual, while only 12.32 per cent in better-protected 
family firms. Lastly, for family management, better-protected family firms are deemed to 
have greater involvement of family members in firm management at 9.48 per cent, as 
opposed to comparable firms at 6.57 per cent.   
The above findings display on one hand, a negative relation between the quality of 
investor protection and the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. It is because for family 
firms within a less protective environment for investors, the expropriation by the 
controlling shareholder is less likely to be detected and constrained by laws (La Porta et al., 
2002). The family would in turn magnify both the incentive and power to expropriate at the 
expense of minority shareholders, as reflected by more exercise of control-enhancing 
mechanisms (Bebchuk et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1999). 
On the other hand, the analysis finds that both ownership concentration and the 
involvement of family management are positively linked to investor protection, which is 
inconsistent with the conventional prediction in the literature (Burkart et al., 2003; La 
Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002). Such relations can in part be explained as 
follows.  
Suggested by findings of Chapter 6, regimes with better investor protection are 
likely to have more efficient government, easier accesses to finance, more efficient courts 
and judiciary. Such a more protective governance environment for investors would predict 
both a reduction to the operating costs of family firms and an increase in the expropriation 
costs for the controlling shareholder. To this extent, the family would have greater 
incentives to make efforts to run the business well rather than to “tunnel” it. The family is 
thus expected to provide the company with more cash-flow investment and involvement of 
family management, and meanwhile limit the use of control-enhancing mechanisms such 
as pyramids. As such, this finding provides credence in a new context to the positive 
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relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration in the literature (Aganin 
& Volpin, 2003; Burkart & Panunzi, 2006; Castillo & Skaperdas, 2005; Claessens et al., 
2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Stepanov, 2003).  
The phenomenon that better-protected family firms have higher degree of 
preservation of family management also indicates that to achieve the same extent of 
extraction, the family would opt for more covert mechanisms, such as delegating family 
managers, to replace the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. This is expected to be a 
response to the relatively high expropriation costs in regimes with better legal protection of 
shareholders. 
Panel B of Table 8.2 divides the family-firm sample into two subsamples – family 
firms having a family CEO and family firms with a hired CEO – to investigate the 
interaction effects of family managers and investor protection on family governance 
arrangements. As seen in this panel, both subsamples show that an increase in the quality 
of governance environment goes hand in hand with an increase in cash-flow rights and 
involvement of family management in family firms, as reported in Panel A of Table 8.2.  
The analysis further reveals that, although the mean values of cash-flow rights and 
family management ratio in family-CEO firms are on average higher than those in 
outsider-CEO group, the mean differences of ownership concentration and family 
management between regimes with stronger and weaker investor protection is more 
significant in outsider-CEO family firms. To illustrate, the analysis shows that, for 
ownership concentration, the mean difference between the two regimes is significant at 1 
per cent in outsider-CEO family firms, while at 5 per cent in those with a family CEO. The 
outsider-CEO group also has a much larger t-statistics of mean difference of family 
management: 7.314 versus 2.651 in family-CEO group. This finding suggests that the 
effects of investor protection on the arrangements of ownership concentration and 
management composition might not be uniformly distributed between family- and 
outsider-CEO firms.  
Another notable result from Panel B of Table 8.2 is that the positive mean 
difference in the separation of ownership and control between regimes with weak and 
strong investor protection only survives in family firms hiring an outsider CEO: the mean 
difference is 0.90 per cent and significant at 5 per cent level in outsider-CEO firms; it is 
only -0.74 per cent and insignificant in family-CEO firms. This finding suggests that, for 
family firms having a hired CEO in place, the controlling shareholder would adjust his/her 
preference for extraction of private benefits of control through the form of pyramidal 
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structures depending on the effectiveness of investor protection. Alternatively stated, in 
outsider-CEO family firms, the controlling family would intensify the extraction at the 
expense of minority shareholders when legal protection of shareholders is relatively weak. 
In contrast, the incidence of the use of control-enhancing mechanisms is of no difference in 
family-CEO firms regardless of the quality of shareholder protection.  
 
Table 8.2 Impact of investor protection on family ownership, control, and management 
Panel A: Family-firm sample     
 Governance environment   
Variable Low (75%) High (25%) Diff. of means t-statistic 
Number of observations 1223 1697   
CASHFLOW (%) 21.68 28.29 -6.61 -11.044*** 
EXCESSCONTROL (%) 10.74 9.59 1.15 3.328*** 
PYRAMIDS (%) 74.16 66.29 7.87  
FAMILYRATIO (%) 6.57 9.48 -2.91 -11.313*** 
SYSTEM (%) 17.74 12.32 5.42  
SALE (%) 52.64 66.20 -13.56 -7.446*** 
SIZE 20.72 20.90 -0.18 -4.828*** 
LEVERAGE (%) 66.76 72.55 -5.79 0.688 
AGE 8.30 6.83 1.47 9.174*** 
Panel B: Family/outsider CEO subsample  
 
Family CEO Outsider CEO 
 Governance 
environment 
Governance 
environment 
Variable Low 
(75%) 
High 
(25%) 
Diff. of 
means 
Low 
(75%) 
High 
(25%) 
Diff. of 
means 
Number of observations 198 541  1025 1156  
CASHFLOW (%) 31.23 34.39 -3.16 
(2.132)** 
19.83 25.43 -5.60 
(8.791)*** 
EXCESSCONTROL (%) 6.63 7.37 -0.74 
(-1.087) 
11.53 10.63 0.90** 
(2.279) 
PYRAMIDS (%) 53.54 55.08 -1.54 78.15 71.54 6.61 
FAMILYRATIO (%) 12.84 14.54 -1.70 
(-2.651)*** 
5.36 7.11 -1.75 
(-7.314)*** 
SYSTEM (%) 5.56 3.14 2.42 20.10 16.61 3.49 
SALE (%) 57.03 65.65 -8.62 
(-2.595)*** 
51.79 66.46 -14.67 
(6.563)*** 
SIZE 20.73 20.98 -0.25 
(3.567)*** 
20.72 20.87 -0.15 
(-3.213)*** 
LEVERAGE (%) 45.51 54.89 -9.38 
(-0.881) 
70.85 80.82 -9.97 
(-0.858) 
AGE 6.57 5.37 1.20 
(3.260)*** 
8.63 7.52 1.11 
(6.193)*** 
Notes: Dummies are computed by the percentage of observations equalling one to the observations equalling 
the column heading. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, 
respectively. 
 
8.3.2 Correlation analysis 
To further investigate the relations between investor protection and family governance 
mechanisms, the study starts with an examination of the correlation matrix to understand 
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the approximate relations among main variables, and then explores these relations to the 
use of panel-data models in the subsequent section. 
Table 8.3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among main variables in the 
family-firm sample. CASHFLOW, EXCESSCONTROL, PYRAMIDS, and 
FAMILYRATIO are individually included in Panel A, B, C, and D. Panel A comprising 
CASHFLOW and other explanatory and control variables shows that the correlation 
between ownership concentration and investor protection is recorded at 0.188, indicating a 
positive relation between the two variables. This is consistent with the categorical analysis 
reported in the previous section. Panel B and C display the correlation among family 
control variables (the separation of ownership and control rights, and the use of pyramids) 
and other variables. Both analyses find that family control variables are negatively 
correlated with the extent of investor protection: -0.096 in Panel B and -0.084 in Panel C. 
In the last panel, the analysis shows that the ratio of family managers or directors to the 
total management is positively correlated with the quality of investor protection at 0.171.  
Table 8.4 analyses the Pearson correlation among main variables in family-CEO 
and outsider-CEO subsamples. This analysis finds that both the correlation coefficient 
between ownership concentration and investor protection, as well as the coefficient 
between family management and investor protection are positive in family-CEO and 
outsider-CEO firms. Such coefficients recorded in outsider-CEO group are much higher 
than in family-CEO group (0.189 versus 0.040, and 0.125 versus 0.074, respectively). The 
correlation coefficients between family control variables and investor protection are mixed 
in both groups. But in general, the absolute values of the coefficients in outsider-CEO 
firms are much higher than in comparable companies. These differences reflect the 
noticeable existence of the uneven effects of investor protection on family governance 
mechanisms between companies having a family CEO and companies having a hired CEO 
in place. 
 
Table 8.3 Correlations of main variables for full sample 
Panel A: CASHFLOW      
 CASHFLOW GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE 
CASHFLOW 1.000       
GENVIRON 0.188 1.000      
SYSTEM -0.090 -0.013 1.000     
SALE 0.117 0.164 0.022 1.000    
SIZE 0.084 0.081 0.177 0.144 1.000   
LEVERAGE -0.011 0.016 -0.018 -0.051 -0.229 1.000  
AGE -0.304 -0.112 0.124 -0.102 0.008 0.127 1.000 
Panel B: EXCESSCONTROL      
 EXCESSCONT GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER AGE 
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ROL AGE 
EXCESSCONT
ROL 
1.000       
GENVIRON -0.096 1.000      
SYSTEM 0.126 -0.012 1.000     
SALE -0.030 0.164 0.022 1.000    
SIZE 0.123 0.081 0.177 0.144 1.000   
LEVERAGE 0.017 0.016 -0.018 -0.051 -0.229 1.000  
AGE 0.018 -0.112 0.124 -0.102 0.008 0.127 1.000 
Panel C: PYRAMIDS      
 PYRAMIDS GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE 
PYRAMIDS 1.000       
GENVIRON -0.084 1.000      
SYSTEM 0.047 -0.013 1.000     
SALE -0.076 0.164 0.022 1.000    
SIZE -0.045 0.081 0.177 0.144 1.000   
LEVERAGE 0.024 0.016 -0.018 -0.051 -0.229 1.000  
AGE 0.047 -0.112 0.124 -0.102 0.008 0.127 1.000 
Panel D: FAMILYRAIO      
 FAMILYRAIO GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE 
FAMILYRAIO 1.000       
GENVIRON 0.171 1.000      
SYSTEM -0.212 -0.013 1.000     
SALE 0.081 0.164 0.022 1.000    
SIZE 0.105 0.081 0.177 0.144 1.000   
LEVERAGE -0.068 0.016 -0.018 -0.051 -0.229 1.000  
AGE -0.237 -0.112 0.124 -0.102 0.008 0.127 1.000 
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Table 8.4 Correlations of main variables for family/outsider CEO subsample 
Family CEO      Outsider-CEO     
Panel A: CASHFLOW      Panel A: CASHFLOW     
 CASHF
LOW 
GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE CASHF
LOW 
GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE 
CASHFL
OW 
1.000       1.000       
GENVIR
ON 
0.040 1.000      0.189 1.000      
SYSTE
M 
-0.031 -0.061 1.000     -0.047 0.028 1.000     
SALE 0.144 0.161 -0.119 1.000    0.106 0.160 0.047 1.000    
SIZE 0.005 0.049 0.101 0.119 1.000   0.096 0.080 0.204 0.147 1.000   
LEVER
AGE 
-0.075 0.073 0.001 -0.044 -0.114 1.000  0.014 0.017 -0.028 -0.051 -0.246 1.000  
AGE -0.388 -0.028 0.191 -0.139 0.129 0.192 1.000 -0.202 -0.092 0.073 -0.086 -0.011 0.116 1.000 
Panel B: EXCESSCONTROL      Panel B: EXCESSCONTROL     
 EXCES
SCONT
ROL 
GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE EXCES
SCONT
ROL 
GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE 
EXCESS
CONTR
OL 
1.000       1.000       
GENVIR
ON 
0.017 1.000      -0.092 1.000      
SYSTE
M 
0.101 -0.061 1.000     0.113 0.028 1.000     
SALE -0.025 0.161 -0.119 1.000    -0.024 0.160 0.047 1.000    
SIZE 0.089 0.049 0.101 0.119 1.000   0.146 0.080 0.204 0.147 1.000   
LEVER
AGE 
0.006 0.073 0.001 -0.044 -0.114 1.000  0.011 0.017 -0.028 -0.051 -0.246 1.000  
AGE 0.051 -0.028 0.191 -0.139 0.129 0.192 1.000 -0.050 -0.092 0.073 -0.086 -0.011 0.116 1.000 
Panel C: PYRAMIDS      Panel C: PYRAMIDS     
 PYRA
MIDS 
GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE PYRA
MIDS 
GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE 
PYRAMI
DS 
1.000       1.000       
GENVIR -0.010 1.000      -0.069 1.000      
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ON 
SYSTE
M 
-0.026 -0.061 1.000     0.022 0.028 1.000     
SALE -0.016 0.161 -0.119 1.000    -0.088 0.160 0.047 1.000    
SIZE 0.042 0.049 0.101 0.119 1.000   -0.062 0.080 0.204 0.147 1.000   
LEVER
AGE 
0.008 0.073 0.001 -0.044 -0.114 1.000  0.019 0.017 -0.028 -0.051 -0.246 1.000  
AGE 0.085 -0.028 0.191 -0.139 0.129 0.192 1.000 -0.030 -0.092 0.073 -0.086 -0.011 0.116 1.000 
Panel D: FAMILYRATIO      Panel D: FAMILYRATIO     
 FAMIL
YRAIO 
GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE FAMIL
YRAIO 
GENVION SYSTEM SALE SIZE LEVER
AGE 
AGE 
FAMILY
RAIO 
1.000       1.000       
GENVIR
ON 
0.074 1.000      0.125 1.000      
SYSTE
M 
-0.027 -0.061 1.000     -0.192 0.028 1.000     
SALE 0.049 0.161 -0.119 1.000    0.087 0.160 0.047 1.000    
SIZE 0.127 0.049 0.101 0.119 1.000   0.084 0.080 0.204 0.147 1.000   
LEVER
AGE 
0.009 0.073 0.001 -0.044 -0.114 1.000  -0.077 0.017 -0.028 -0.051 -0.246 1.000  
AGE -0.030 -0.028 0.191 -0.139 0.129 0.192 1.000 -0.212 -0.092 0.073 -0.086 -0.011 0.116 1.000 
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8.3.3 Random effects estimation 
The study applies the following regression models as outlined in Chapter 4 of the thesis to 
investigate the impact of investor protection on family ownership, control, and 
management. The description of variables is given in Chapter 4. 
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The random effects (RE) models are implemented for the estimate of the 
governance environment variable which is time-invariant in the data set. The RE models 
include industry dummies to control for industry effects. Since the precise form of the time 
effect is generally unknown (Petersen, 2009), time dummies are not included in the RE 
models here in order to mitigate the distortion that the unfixed time effect brings to the 
estimates (Petersen, 2009). Time dummies are however included in regressions in the 
robustness test. Table 8.5 displays three panels of the RE estimation for the above-
presented equations. The sample of Panel A, B and C comprises all family firms, family- 
and outsider- CEO family firms, respectively.   
Column 1 and 4 of Panel A estimate the effects of investor protection on family 
ownership and management, while Column 2 and 3 show the legal effects on the excess of 
family control over cash-flow rights and the use of pyramids. Column 1 and 4 show that 
the coefficient of investor protection is 1.951 in the cash-flow rights regression and 0.776 
in the family management regression; it is both statistically significant at 1 per cent level. 
This finding suggests that both the ownership concentration of the family and the 
preservation of family management are positively associated with local legal protection of 
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shareholders, which confirms the findings of the categorical analysis reported in the 
preceding section of this chapter. The analysis also finds that investor protection has a 
negative and significant effect on pyramidal structures (-0.113 in Column 3) and the 
separation of ownership and control rights (-0.833 in Column2). This result supports the 
argument that pyramiding is the principal instrument to enhance the family’s control rights, 
and the use of pyramids would be limited by legal protection for investors.  
Panel B and C of Table 8.5 provide further quantification of the interaction effects 
(of family managers with investor protection) on family governance arrangements. Panel B 
presents the results for family firms having a family CEO, while Panel C for family firms 
hiring a professional CEO. In Panel B, the coefficient of investor protection is recorded at 
1.064, -0.349, -0.023 and 0.249 in the ownership rights, the separation of ownership and 
control, the pyramids, and the family management regression, respectively; the absolute 
values of the coefficients are relatively smaller than those recorded in Panel C (1.717, -
0.902, -0.103 and 0.599, respectively). Notably, none of these coefficients is statistically 
significant in Panel B, while all are statistically significant in Panel C. This finding 
suggests that the effects of investor protection on family ownership, control, and 
management that the thesis has identified before become more pronounced in family firms 
hiring a professional CEO, as opposed to family firms having a family CEO. It also helps 
to interpret similar results reported in the categorical analysis, which shows that family-
CEO firms have smaller significant mean difference of ownership concentration and 
family management, and nonsignificant mean difference of the excess of family control 
over ownership rights between the regimes with strong and weak investor protection.     
The differences between Panel B and C can be explained by the high trust and 
mutual affection among family managers who are more likely to stay with the controlling 
family in the innermost circle (Fei, 1992). Family-CEO firms therefore have a smaller 
conflict of interest between family shareholders and the manager. In this regard, whether 
the choice is to run the business well or to tunnel it, the family tends to count on internal 
governance mechanisms, such as retaining concentrated ownership rights and preserving 
more managerial power in the family, rather than relying on external investor protection. In 
contrast, with a hired CEO in place, family firms are exposed to a more intense divergence 
of interest between the controlling family and a professional CEO, and also a conflict 
between the professional and other family managers. Therefore, to mitigate the costs 
associated with both conflicts, the family would adjust its choice of family governance 
arrangements depending on the strength of external protection of shareholders.  
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Table 8.5 RE estimation of impact of investor protection on family governance mechanisms 
Panel A: Full family-firm sample   
 CASHFLOW EXCESSCONTROL PYRAMIDS FAMILYRATIO 
GENVIRON 1.951*** 
(4.43) 
-0.833*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.113** 
(-2.54) 
0.776*** 
(5.12) 
SYSTEM 1.053 
(0.64) 
0.859 
(0.99) 
0.329* 
(1.87) 
-1.267*** 
(-2.80) 
SALE 0.012* 
(1.71) 
-0.003 
(-0.53) 
-0.003** 
(-2.44) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
SIZE 2.522*** 
(3.25) 
0.780** 
(2.16) 
-0.145** 
(-2.17) 
0.371 
(1.54) 
LEVERAGE 0.002** 
(2.29) 
0.001* 
(1.86) 
0.000 
(0.57) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
AGE -0.582*** 
(-5.49) 
-0.364*** 
(-5.49) 
-0.046*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.173*** 
(-3.35) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Intercept  -29.854* 
(-1.89) 
0.212 
(0.03) 
5.060*** 
(3.45) 
-1.491 
(-0.31) 
Observations 2919 2919 2919 2919 
Number of clusters 
(firm) 
621 621 621 621 
R-squared 0.097 0.020  0.111 
Panel B: Family-CEO subsample   
 CASHFLOW EXCESSCONTROL PYRAMIDS FAMILYRATIO 
GENVIRON 1.064 
(1.03) 
-0.349 
(-0.74) 
-0.023 
(-0.28) 
0.249 
(0.78) 
SYSTEM 3.579* 
(1.66) 
3.232 
(1.47) 
-0.551 
(-1.04) 
1.395 
(0.74) 
SALE 0.042*** 
(2.62) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
0.010 
(1.14) 
SIZE 2.280 
(1.23) 
0.756 
(1.19) 
0.116 
(0.95) 
0.396 
(0.60) 
LEVERAGE 0.006*** 
(2.94) 
-0.000 
(-0.45) 
-0.001 
(-0.86) 
0.003*** 
(2.73) 
AGE -1.350*** 
(-6.54) 
-0.370*** 
(-2.77) 
0.016 
(0.64) 
-0.232 
(-1.51) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Intercept  -15.402 
(-0.42) 
-8.669 
(-0.64) 
-2.447 
(-0.92) 
2.830 
(0.20) 
Observations 738 738 738 738 
Number of clusters 
(firm) 
245 245 245 245 
R-squared 0.148 0.002  0.035 
Panel C: Outsider-CEO subsample   
 CASHFLOW EXCESSCONTROL PYRAMIDS FAMILYRATIO 
GENVIRON 1.717*** 
(4.31) 
-0.902*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.103* 
(-1.95) 
0.599*** 
(3.86) 
SYSTEM 1.025 
(0.60) 
0.797 
(0.87) 
0.265 
(1.35) 
-0.971** 
(-2.20) 
SALE 0.007 
(0.93) 
-0.003 
(-0.49) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.81) 
0.002 
(0.48) 
SIZE 2.560*** 
(3.16) 
0.972** 
(2.32) 
-0.208*** 
(-2.60) 
0.325 
(1.32) 
LEVERAGE 0.002** 
(2.20) 
0.002** 
(2.47) 
0.000 
(0.62) 
-0.000 
(-1.25) 
AGE -0.325*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.402*** 
(-5.35) 
-0.095*** 
(-4.70) 
-0.176*** 
(-3.45) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Intercept  -33.122** 
(-1.98) 
-0.918 
(-0.11) 
8.030*** 
(4.40) 
-1.070 
(-0.22) 
Observations 2181 2181 2181 2181 
Number of clusters 
(firm) 
480 480 480 480 
R-squared 0.067 0.039  0.088 
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
8.4 Robustness test 
Table 8.6 examines the robustness of the main results reported in the categorical analysis 
to the use of alternative specification of the cut-off point for the level of investor 
protection. Following conventional studies, the cut-off point for the degree of investor 
protection for the robustness test is set at the median score of investor protection index. 
That is, for high level of legal investor protection, a dummy variable equals one if the 
value of governance environment of a particular province is above the median score of the 
governance environment index across 31 provinces in China, and zero otherwise. In Panel 
A of Table 8.6, the study reinvestigates the mean differences of family ownership, control, 
and management between the regimes with strong and weak protection of shareholders. 
Panel B further explores the mean differences in family firms managed by a family or a 
hired CEO. The main results of Table 8.6 remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
Table 8.6 Robustness of the impact of investor protection on family governance mechanisms 
Panel A: Full family-firm sample     
 Governance environment   
Variable Low (0) High (1) Diff. of means t-statistic 
Number of observations 668 2252   
CASHFLOW (%) 20.73 26.94 -6.21 -9.589*** 
EXCESSCONTROL (%) 11.56 9.63 1.93 4.786*** 
PYRAMIDS (%) 76.35 67.58 8.77  
FAMILYRATIO (%) 6.75 8.71 -1.96 -6.983*** 
SYSTEM (%) 16.17 14.12 2.05  
SALE (%) 48.36 64.13 -15.77 -8.240*** 
SIZE 20.77 20.84 -0.07 -1.645* 
LEVERAGE (%) 61.87 72.58 -10.71 -1.639 
AGE 8.32 7.19 1.13 6.444*** 
Panel B: Family/outsider CEO  
 
Family CEO Outsider CEO 
 Governance 
environment 
Governance 
environment 
Variable Low (0) High (1) 
Diff. of 
means 
Low (0) High (1) 
Diff. of 
means 
Number of observations 100 639  568 1613  
CASHFLOW (%) 27.97 34.42 -6.45 
(-3.377)** 
19.46 23.97 -4.51 
(-6.751)*** 
EXCESSCONTROL (%) 8.04 7.04 1.00 
(1.059) 
12.18 10.66 1.52 
(3.413)*** 
PYRAMIDS (%) 60.00 53.83 6.17 79.23 73.03 6.20 
FAMILYRATIO (%) 12.24 14.37 -2.13 
(-2.453)** 
5.78 6.47 -0.69 
(-2.664)*** 
SYSTEM (%) 7.00 3.29 3.71 17.78 18.41 -0.63 
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SALE (%) 49.97 65.45 -15.48 
(-3.619)*** 
48.07 63.61 -15.54 
(-6.955)*** 
SIZE 20.88 20.91 -0.03 
(-0.428) 
20.76 20.81 -0.05 
(-1.226) 
LEVERAGE (%) 50.43 52.70 -2.27 
(-0.165) 
63.88 80.45 -16.57 
(-1.916)* 
AGE 6.75 5.52 1.23 
(2.573)*** 
8.60 7.85 0.75 
(3.969)*** 
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
Table 8.7 then adds time dummies to the use of the RE estimation to control for the 
potential time effect. The analysis finds that after allowing for the time effect, the main 
results hardly change. Panel A of Table 8.7 shows that for the family-firm sample, the 
coefficient of investor protection is significantly positive in the cash-flow rights and the 
family management regression: 1.239 and 0.587, respectively. In terms of family control 
vairables, the coefficient of investor protection is negative at -0.505 and significant at 5 per 
cent level in the separation of ownership and control regression, and also negative at -0.053 
in the pyramids regression, although not statistically significant in the latter. In Panel B of 
Table 8.7 that comprises family firms managed by a family member, none of the 
coefficients of investor protection is statistically significant in all four models. In outsider-
CEO family firms, this coefficient is however significant in the ownership rights, the 
separation of ownership and control, and the family management regression (see Panel C 
of Table 8.7). This finding confirms that the effects of investor protection on family 
governance arrangements is mainly driven by professional managers.    
 
Table 8.7 Robustness of RE estimation of the impact of investor protection on family governance 
Panel A: Full family-firm sample   
 CASHFLOW EXCESSCONTROL PYRAMIDS FAMILYRATIO 
GENVIRON 1.239*** 
(2.92) 
-0.505** 
(-2.27) 
-0.053 
(-1.09) 
0.587*** 
(3.75) 
SYSTEM 1.190 
(0.73) 
0.653 
(0.77) 
0.094 
(0.49) 
-1.132** 
(-2.49) 
SALE 0.007 
(0.98) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.003** 
(-2.06) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
SIZE 1.962*** 
(2.60) 
1.112 *** 
(3.05) 
0.076 
(1.06) 
0.211 
(0.87) 
LEVERAGE 0.002** 
(2.14) 
0.001** 
(2.14) 
0.000 
(0.69) 
-0.000 
(-0.20) 
AGE -1.743*** 
(-12.77) 
0.158** 
(2.32) 
0.049*** 
(3.01) 
-0.470*** 
(-8.39) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  -14.778 
(-0.98) 
-9.078 
(-1.22) 
1.096 
(0.69) 
3.651 
(0.75) 
Observations 2919 2919 2919 2919 
Number of clusters 
(firm) 
621 621 621 621 
R-squared 0.172 0.073  0.118 
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Panel B: Family CEO sample   
 CASHFLOW EXCESSCONTROL PYRAMIDS FAMILYRATIO 
GENVIRON 0.595 
(0.54) 
-0.091 
(-0.19) 
-0.004 
(-0.04) 
0.356 
(1.08) 
SYSTEM 3.964* 
(1.65) 
2.742 
(1.10) 
-0.717 
(-1.31) 
1.838 
(1.05) 
SALE 0.038** 
(2.25) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.84) 
0.012 
(1.40) 
SIZE 1.376 
(0.76) 
1.296** 
(1.97) 
0.229* 
(1.77) 
0.476 
(0.67) 
LEVERAGE 0.005** 
(2.14) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
-0.000 
(-0.53) 
0.003*** 
(2.69) 
AGE -2.151*** 
(-7.58) 
0.036 
(0.33) 
0.034 
(1.28) 
-0.182 
(-1.57) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  3.118 
(0.09) 
-19.672 
(-1.46) 
-4.247 
(-1.49) 
4.126 
(0.29) 
Observations 738 738 738 738 
Number of clusters 
(firm) 
245 245 245 245 
R-squared 0.195 0.017  0.040 
Panel C: Outsider CEO sample   
 CASHFLOW EXCESSCONTROL PYRAMIDS FAMILYRATIO 
GENVIRON 1.279*** 
(3.29) 
-0.665*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.047 
(-0.78) 
0.495*** 
(3.17) 
SYSTEM 1.143 
(0.67) 
0.629 
(0.71) 
0.110 
(0.48) 
-0.890** 
(-2.01) 
SALE 0.002 
(0.27) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.003* 
(-1.84) 
0.000 
(0.12) 
SIZE 2.153*** 
(2.71) 
1.256*** 
(3.00) 
0.006 
(0.07) 
0.223 
(0.89) 
LEVERAGE 0.002** 
(2.01) 
0.002** 
(2.19) 
0.000 
(0.59) 
-0.000 
(-1.17) 
AGE -1.286*** 
(-8.68) 
0.103 
(1.27) 
0.048** 
(2.17) 
-0.394*** 
(-6.77) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  -21.511 
(-1.33) 
-9.375 
(-1.09) 
4.09** 
(1.98) 
2.178 
(0.44) 
Observations 2181 2181 2181 2181 
Number of clusters 
(firm) 
480 480 480 480 
R-squared 0.117 0.083  0.096 
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Given the results from Chapter 7 of the thesis, the overall inferior governance environment 
is found to have negligible effects on agency conflicts in family firms across provinces in 
China. Family firms operating in different regions are therefore inclined to seek alternative 
ways to safeguard their property rights. This raises the question of whether legal protection 
of shareholders can influence family governance arrangements in Chinese family firms, as 
family governance is expected to be one of the alternative mechanisms often adopted in 
emerging economies.  
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To address this question, this chapter tests the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3 of 
the thesis. It investigates the impact of provincial investor protection on family governance 
arrangements including family ownership, control, and management of family firms listed 
in China’s stock exchanges. The analysis finds that Chinese family firms in general have 
more concentrated ownership rights and involve more use of pyramids in ultimate control 
than U.S. and other Asian corporations, and family management appears to be prevalent in 
Chinese family firms.  
Second, the categorical and multivariate analyses of this study find that an increase 
in the effectiveness of the enforcement of investor protection goes hand in hand with an 
increase in ownership concentration and the participation of family members in firm 
management, but with a reduction in the use of control-enhancing mechanisms such as 
pyramids. The choice of governance arrangements can be explained by the lower operating 
costs and higher expropriation costs in regimes with better protection of shareholder rights. 
In this regard, the family would prefer to exert efforts to run the business well by retaining 
more cash-flow investment and appointing more family managers to mitigate the owner-
manager conflict, rather than to tunnel private benefits of control by the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms. The finding of a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and investor protection shows that the concentrated ownership structure is a 
complement rather than a substitute for inferior investor protection in China. 
Meanwhile, the finding also shows that family firms operating under superior legal 
protection maintain relatively high preservation of managerial power in the family. Such 
great family involvement in management suggests that if the family in a worse-protected 
firm has a tendency to appropriate private benefits of control, the family is inclined to take 
some convert mechanisms, such as appointing more family managers or directors, rather 
than pyramiding in the ultimate control of family firms.  
Finally, the study finds that family-CEO firms have more concentrated ownership 
rights and greater participation of family management, with less use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms than comparable firms. The analysis also reveals that the general relations 
between investor protection and family governance mechanisms identified before are more 
pronounced in family firms with a hired CEO. These findings suggest that due to the 
higher trust among family members, family firms in which a family member acts as CEO 
have a smaller conflict between the controlling family and the manager. The family would 
thus run the business by counting on internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
exercising more concentrated cash-flow rights and more involvement of family 
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management, irrespective of the effectiveness of external investor protection. However, 
outsider-CEO companies suffer from a more intense conflict between the family and the 
manager, and also a conflict between the manager and other family managers. The family 
therefore tends to adjust internal governance arrangements in the light of the quality of 
investor protection.  
This chapter contributes to the growing literature in several ways. First, the study 
makes a methodological innovation by introducing a significant improvement to the 
commonly used measures for designating levels of investor protection. This approach will 
mitigate the risk that the relatively crude criteria of notions distort the results in 
conventional studies. Based on such methodological innovation, the study adds new 
evidence to the extant literature. Consistent with the theoretical findings by Burkart and 
Panunzi (2006), this chapter shows that ownership concentration is not necessarily a 
substitute for legal protection of shareholders in China’s settings. This result sheds new 
light on an important governance issue that can be relevant in other emerging economies, 
many sharing similar characteristics with China in terms of family governance and legal 
development.    
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Chapter 9 
IMPACT OF FAMILY GOVERNANCE ON AGENCY 
COSTS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
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9.1 Introduction  
The existing literature on family businesses shows mixed results on whether family-
controlled firms can outperform nonfamily firms around the world. The law and finance 
literature provides new insights to explain this economic phenomenon by demonstrating 
that the relationship between family-controlled mechanisms and firm performance depends 
on how these mechanisms interact with the quality of investor protection within a 
particular country (Peng & Jiang, 2010). Some scholars argue that when the ability of firm 
outsiders is well protected and strengthened, likewise in the U.S., Continental European 
and Singaporean markets, family ownership with active control are deemed to alleviate 
agency conflicts and thus generate performance benefits (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 
2008; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Gomez-Mejia & Gutierrez, 2001; Maury, 2006; Peng & 
Jiang, 2010; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Faccio et al. (2001), Claessens et al.,(2002) and 
Peng and Jiang (2010) however show that in poorly-regulated markets, such as many East 
Asian economies, failures in corporate governance and transparency may diminish the 
desirability of family control and management from the perspective of all shareholders, 
and will exacerbate expropriation of minority shareholders instead.  
This chapter therefore incorporates the two strands of studies in China’s context 
that is characterised by its provincial variations in the enforcement of investor protection. 
The objective of this chapter is to test the third hypothesis derived in Chapter 3. It aims to 
address the question of how family governance mechanisms involving a combination of 
family ownership, control, and management tackle agency problems of family firms. The 
findings are expected to provide evidence of whether family governance arrangements 
could serve as a response to the formal legal and institutional failures prevailing in most 
emerging economies (Burkart et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003).  
This chapter attempts to investigate the above issue on the basis of a more precise 
and innovative definition of family firms that are listed in China’s stock exchanges for the 
period 2000-2009. It then explores the interaction effects of family governance 
mechanisms and investor protection on firm performance.  
Overall, the study finds strong evidence of differential influences of family 
ownership, control, and management on the dual-triple agency problems in Chinese 
family firms. It shows that the profitability of family firms is to a large extent subjected to 
how the three elements of family governance combine, and especially interact with 
provincial protection of shareholders in China.   
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The analysis, on one hand, shows that the concentrated ownership structure with 
active family management generates performance benefits when the level of legal 
protection for investors is relatively high. This finding is consistent with prior studies 
suggesting the superiority of family firms to nonfamily firms in well-regulated regimes, 
such as U.S and Continental Europe. One likely explanation for this result is that high level 
of transparency and regulation in these markets is conducive to the desirability of family 
ownership and management from the perspective of nonfamily shareholders, which tends 
to mitigate the owner-manager conflict and thus improve performance.  
The analysis further finds that the above positive effects are mainly driven by 
founder-CEOs or stem from the founder occupying the positions of Chairman and CEO or 
remaining as Chairman succeeded by a relative CEO. When a relative acts as Chairman, 
the performance of a relative-CEO is not distinguishable from a professional CEO. The 
total absence of the family from monitoring and management leads to a substantial decline 
in firm performance. It is partly because the founder’s value facilitates the alignment of the 
interest of family members and thus minimizes the conflicts that might otherwise arise 
between a relative-CEO and other family members acting as managers or directors.  
On the other hand, the findings also reveal that in family firms located in regimes 
with inferior investor protection, the use of control-enhancing mechanisms reduce firm 
performance, with the reduction in performance proportional to the excess of control over 
ownership rights, consistent with the findings on East Asian corporations by Faccio et al. 
(2001). In particular, in founder-CEO family firms, the greatest family control as reflected 
in dominant ownership rights with the use of control-enhancing mechanisms are 
detrimental to firm performance. It is because under the relative’s leadership, greater 
family control may be perceived as a defensive move to counter the dilution of family 
ownership with firm or family growth, rather than a proactive indication of the desire to 
expropriate minority shareholders in founder-led firms.  
This Chapter contributes to the growing literature in the following ways. First, it 
redresses the neglect of the owner-manager conflict in conventional studies on agency 
issues in family firms. It also represents a first in sharpening the analysis of family firms 
by analytically distinguishing professional and family managers, thereby devising a dual-
triple agency framework for analysing family-firm issues. In applying this new analytical 
framework, the study provides strong evidence that is also consistent with findings from 
studies on U.S. and Continental European corporations, suggesting that the conflict of 
interest between owners and professional managers is more costly than the conflict 
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between owners and their relatives (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Ang et al., 
2000; Gomez-Mejia & Gutierrez, 2001; Maury, 2006). 
However, the significant difference with respect to the existing literature is that this 
study shows that a relative-CEO does not necessarily have insignificant or detrimental 
impact on firm performance. The analysis finds that a relative-CEO tends to improve 
performance if and only if the founder remains as Chairman in the firm. This evidence 
extends the analysis of Villalonga and Amit (2006) by demonstrating that in the Chinese 
setting founders not only need to be inspiring leaders through the position of Chairman, but 
they or their relatives must also at the same time be good managers. 
Lastly, the role of family governance mechanisms in family firms is often 
explained by the distinct institutional and regulation development in individual markets. 
This chapter reinforces this interpretation by incorporating a within-country analysis with 
provincial variations in the enforcement of investor protection. It reconciles the contrasting 
debate of the superior or inferior performance of family firms in the literature, and helps 
better understand the nature of the relationship between family governance arrangements 
and performance of family firms within different institutional contexts. 
The literature review for this chapter is provided in Chapter 2 of the thesis. The 
methodology and data are discussed in Chapter 4 and 5. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 9.2 presents the main results and discussion of the individual 
effects of family governance on agency costs in family firms, and is followed by the results 
and discussion of the interaction effects of family governance and investor protection in 
Section 9.3. Conclusion is provided in Section 9.4.  
 
9.2 Impact of family ownership, control, and management 
9.2.1 Main impact of family ownership, control, and management on performance 
To examine the differential effects between founder- and relative-led family firms, the 
study creates two other subsamples by dividing family firms having a family CEO into 
founder- and relative-CEO family firms. The analysis will be conducted in the family-firm 
sample and two subsamples: the founder- and relative-CEO subsamples. Specifically, the 
founder-CEO subset comprises family firms in which the founder severs as CEO and 
family firms with a hired CEO, while the relative-CEO subset comprises family firms in 
which one of the founder’s relative acts as CEO and family firms with a hired CEO.  
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Heteroskedasticity test 
Following the previous chapters, the heteroskedasticity test first obtains maximum-
likelihood parameter estimates by applying Iterated GLS models with heteroskedastic 
assumption. It then conducts Feasible GLS models by assuming homoskedasticity. By 
comparing whether there are significant differences between the log likelihood of both 
regressions, the value of chi-squared from Likelihood-ratio test (LR) could tell the 
presence or absence of heteroskedasticity. In Panel A of Table 9.1, the result shows 
relatively large chi-squared values in the three regressions, which are significantly different 
from zero. This indicates the substantial presence of heteroskedasticity in the three panel-
data models.      
 
Autocorrelation test 
Following previous chapters using the simple test for autocorrelation in linear panel-data 
models derived by Wooldridge (2002), Panel B of Table 9.1 reports the autocorrelation test 
of the panel data sets. The analysis shows that the F-statistics is 4.931, 5.128 and 4.159 in 
the family-firm, the founder- and the relative-CEO subsample, respectively; it is all 
statistically significant at 5 per cent level, suggesting the panel-data models are exposed to 
the significant presence of autocorrelation.  
 
Endogeneity test 
Finally, tests for endogeneity are conducted by IV/GMM estimation of the fixed-effects 
panel data models by assuming the specified endogenous regressors as exogenous 
variables. The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of regressors tested. By examining the endogeneity of each regressor 
individually, CASHFLOW, EXCESSCONTROL, SALE and SIZE are detected as 
endogenous variables in the three regressions (see Table 9.1: Panel C).   
 
Table 9.1 Diagnostic test 
Panel A: Heteroskedasticity test   
 All family firms Founder-CEO Relative-CEO 
LR (Chi-sq) 6320.92*** 6019.78*** 5044.72*** 
Panel B: Autocorrelation test   
 All family firms Founder-CEO Relative-CEO 
F-Statistics 4.931** 5.128** 4.159** 
Panel C: Endogeneity test   
 All family firms Founder-CEO Relative-CEO 
CASHFLOW 4.454** 5.398** 4.048** 
EXCESSCONTROL 5.296** 4.508** 3.975** 
SALE  4.150** 4.659** 4.221** 
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SIZE 13.349*** 16.770*** 8.580*** 
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
FE2SLS estimation  
The study applies the following regression model as outlined in Chapter 4 of the thesis to 
investigate the main impact of family ownership, control, and management on agency costs 
in family firms. Detailed description of variables is given in Chapter 4. 
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As the panel data set has significant presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation 
and endogeneity, 18 this study implements the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of 
the fixed effects panel-data models (FE2SLS) estimation with the standard errors clustered 
by firm to account for the disturbances of arbitrary heteroskedasticity, within-panel 
autocorrelation and endogeneity. Alternatively, the double-clustered standard errors and 
time dummies will be used to correct the potential time effect in the robustness test.   
Table 9.2 reports the results of the FE2SLS estimation in three samples: the family-
firm sample, the founder- and relative-CEO subsample. For each of the endogenous 
variables identified in Panel C of Table 9.1, its one-year lag is used as the corresponding 
instrumental variable (IV) in the FE2SLS estimation accordingly.  
Column 1 of Table 9.2 displays the results of the family-firm sample. After 
controlling for endogeneity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation, the analysis first 
reveals a nonlinear relationship between cash-flow rights and firm performance: the 
coefficient of CASHFLOW squared is negative (-0.019) and the coefficient of 
CASHFLOW is positive (1.655); both of the estimated coefficients are significant at 5 per 
cent level. Such nonmonotonic relation shows that performance rises with increasing 
family ownership rights to the threshold at 43.55 per cent, and then tapers off. This finding 
is consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003), who find the nonlinear relationship with an 
inflection point at 30.8 per cent in U.S. large corporations. 
Secondly, the results of Column 1 show that the estimate of EXCESSCONTROL is 
-0.549 in the family-firm sample; it is statistically significant at 10 per cent level. This 
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 As CASHFLOW squared is the interaction term of CASHFLOW, the regression model would somewhat 
suffer from the multicollinearity between the two variables. Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), this 
muticollinearity is not taken as a main concern in this examination.   
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result favours the idea outlined in previous studies, suggesting that the separation of family 
ownership and control rights intensified by control-enhancing devices would strengthen the 
family’s incentive and ability to impose expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens 
et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders is thus exacerbated, thereby leading to a discount in 
firm performance.  
Column 1 also finds a positive and significant coefficient of FAMILYRATIO, 
0.299, indicating that the appointment of family managers or directors is conducive to firm 
performance. It is because family members are better able in minimizing the conflict of 
interest between owners and managers by monitoring performance diligently and applying 
qualified industry skills and knowledge gained through a long family history into 
management (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Young et al., 2008).  
Column 2 and 3 report the regression results of the founder- and the relative-CEO 
subset, respectively. This comparison traces a contrasting picture. First, Column 2 exhibits 
the nonmonotonic relationship between family shareholdings and operating performance 
with an inflection point at 41.92 per cent. The inflection point in the nonmontonic 
relationship is recorded at 43.10 per cent in Column 3, which is slightly higher but less 
effective than the former: the coefficient of CASHFLOW squared is statistically significant 
at 5 per cent level in the founder-CEO regression, but just significant at 10 per cent level in 
the relative-CEO regression. Further, Column 2 finds a positive and significant effect of 
family management (0.473), while the estimated coefficient of FAMILYRATIO is only 
0.095 and not significant in Column 3.  
The differences between the two regressions suggest that the effects of family 
ownership and family management on firm performance are mainly driven by founder-
CEOs. One likely interpretation is that the founder’s value, for example his/her reputation 
in the family and its business, would help to align the interest of family members, and thus 
alleviate the conflicts that might otherwise arise between a relative-CEO and other family 
members. Family firms led by founder-CEOs would therefore benefit in accounting 
performance from moderate family control, such as holding less than absolute control 
ownership and preserving management in the family.  
To recapitulate, family firms tend to be more profitable when the family retains 
great ownership and control in the firm. However, it is noted that such superior 
performance is offset by the existence of a high level of dominance of ownership rights by 
the family, especially coupled with the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. Further, 
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founder- and relative-CEO family firms differ significantly in the effects of family 
ownership, control, and management on firm performance, suggesting that it is important 
to distinguish the contribution of the three effects to the agency problems between the two 
groups of family firms.  
 
Table 9.2 FE2SLS estimation of ROA on family ownership, control, and management 
 All family firms (1) Founder-CEO (2) Relative-CEO (3) 
CASHFLOW 1.655** (2.38) 
2.096*** 
(2.73) 
1.724** 
(2.10) 
CASHFLOW2 -0.019** (-2.09) 
-0.025** 
(-2.57) 
-0.020* 
(-1.85) 
EXCESSCONTROL -0.549* (-1.89) 
-0.531 
(-1.61) 
-0.531 
(-1.62) 
PYRAMIDS 0.999 (0.90) 
0.252 
(0.20) 
1.784 
(1.39) 
FAMILYRATIO 0.299* (1.78) 
0.473** 
(2.07) 
0.095 
(0.62) 
SYSTEM -2.603 (-1.04) 
-1.107 
(-0.42) 
-2.275 
(-0.71) 
SALE 0.145* (1.94) 
0.150* 
(1.84) 
0.159** 
(2.19) 
SIZE -12.646*** (-3.49) 
-14.507*** 
(-4.18) 
-10.202** 
(-2.53) 
LEVERAGE -0.085*** (-5.71) 
-0.082*** 
(-4.80) 
-0.082*** 
(-6.00) 
AGE 1.300*** (2.68) 
1.265*** 
(2.67) 
1.023** 
(2.04) 
Number of observations 2192 1937 1834 
Number of groups 465 415 391 
Notes: As singleton groups are detected in the FE2SLS estimation, the family-firm sample, the founder- and 
the relative-CEO subsample comprises 2,192, 1,937 and 1,834 observations, respectively. t-statistics from the 
standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 
5% (**) or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
9.2.2 Interaction impact of family ownership, control, and management on 
performance 
It is suggested that, except for the exploration of a certain corporate governance device, the 
investigation of the interactions with other governance mechanisms also calls for more 
attention (Brown et al., 2011; Ward et al., 2009). Following Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
this study presents a partition of family firms into four types by using pyramids and family 
CEO dummies, and depict the presence or absence of the dual-triple agency problems in 
Figure 9.1. This partition helps to explore the interactions among family ownership, 
control, and management in different types of family firms. 
• Type I: Family firms with pyramids and a family CEO. These firms might have 
Agency Problem IB and Agency Problem II. 
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• Type II: Family firms with pyramids but no family CEO. These firms might have 
Agency Problem IA and Agency Problem II. 
• Type III: Family firms with a family CEO but no pyramids. These firms might have 
Agency Problem IB. 
• Type IV: Family firms with neither pyramids nor a family CEO. These firms might 
have Agency Problem IA. Unlike Villalonga and Amit (2006), nonfamily firms are 
not grouped together into Type IV firms. Family firms with neither pyramids nor a 
family CEO still maintain distinct characteristics from nonfamily firms, which can 
also be reflected in a significant difference of mean ROAs between the two types of 
firms (8.05 per cent in ROA of Type IV firms versus 4.69 per cent of nonfamily 
firms, t-statistic of 4.485).. 
 
Figure 9.1 Presence or absence of the dual-triple agency problems in family firms 
 
                        
 
Table 9.3 reports the results of this test. In the top cells, the study compares the 
ROAs of each type of family firms. In the middle, industry effects are controlled by 
replacing ROA with industry-adjusted ROA. The analysis finds that family firms managed 
by a family CEO and having no pyramidal structure (Type III firms) exhibit the highest 
accounting performance among the four groups of family firms, 8.77 per cent in ROA 
(1.64 per cent in industry-adjusted ROA), 19 and this value is 2.21 per cent (2.93 per cent) 
higher than that of family-CEO firms with pyramids in place (Type I firms), although the 
mean difference is nonsignificant. Relatedly, Type II firms having professional CEOs and 
pyramids also relatively underperform the same firms without pyramids (Type IV firms). 
These findings reinforce the negative impact of Agency Problem II on firm performance 
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 Hereafter, if not noted, the figure in bracket is calculated on the mean of industry-adjusted ROA. 
Family-CEO (1) 
Pyramids (1) 
0 
Type I 
 
(IB, II) 
Type II 
 
(IA, II) 
Type IV 
 
(IA) 
Type III 
 
(IB) 
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reported in Table 9.2, and further specify that the presence of pyramids is one of the most 
important instruments to magnify family control in excess of ownership rights in Chinese 
family firms. 
The comparisons between Type I and Type II firms as well as Type III and Type IV 
firms present substantial differences in accounting performance, although the mean ROA 
difference in the latter is not significant. Both Type I and Type III firms having a family 
CEO are exposed to Agency Problem IB, while Type II and Type IV firms (surrendering 
management to a professional) with Agency Problem IA. As the presence of agency 
conflicts is not associated with one another in the two comparisons, this finding directly 
shows that at the present stage of Chinese family firms the conflict of interest between 
owners and professionals appears to be more harmful to operating performance than that 
between owners and their heirs.  
 
Table 9.3 Interaction impact of family ownership, control, and management on performance 
Conflict of interest between owners and professional managers 
(Agency problem IA) or owners and family managers (Agency 
Problem IB) 
Differences 
 (t-stats) 
Conflict of interest 
between large and 
minority 
shareholders 
(Agency Problem II) IB IA 
 
Yes Type  I family firms Type II family firms (I)-(II) 
 6.56 2.55 4.01*** (5.426) 
 -0.29 -4.10 3.81***  (5.215) 
 [403] [1626]  
No  Type  III family firms Type IV nonfamily firms (III)-(IV) 
 8.77 8.05 0.72  (0.516)  
 1.64 1.38 0.26 
 (0.186) 
 [336] [555]  
Differences (t-stats) (I)-(III) (II)-(IV)  
 
-2.21 
(-1.559) 
-5.50***  
(-6.143) 
 
 
-2.93 
 (-1.463) 
-5.48*** 
 (-6.121) 
 
Notes: The top number in each cell is the mean ROA, the middle number is industry-adjusted ROA, and the 
bottom number in square brackets is the number of firms of each type. t-statistics is computed by 
Independent Sample T Test. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) 
level, respectively. 
 
To identify whether there are significant distinction of the effects of family control 
and management between founder- versus relative-led family firms, the study re-examines 
the results of Table 9.3 by subdividing Type I and Type III firms into founder-CEO and 
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relative-CEO categories. Panel A and B of Table 9.4 display a contrasting picture from the 
two comparisons. The difference in mean ROA between Type I and Type III firms is still 
significant in founder-CEO category, while such significant difference dose not survive in 
relative-CEO category. This finding supports the nonsignificant estimate of the excess of 
family ownership and control in the relative-CEO regression reported in Table 9.2, 
suggesting that the control discount caused by the use of control-enhancing mechanisms is 
mainly driven by the founder-CEO effect (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) explain that under the relative’s leadership, control-enhancing devices may be 
perceived as a defensive move to counter the dilution of family ownership with firm or 
family growth, rather than a proactive indication of the desire to expropriate minority 
shareholders in founder-CEO firms. Another possibility is that the family controller might 
limit his/her private benefits extraction by pyramids through generations in order to 
maintain a good reputation to ensure longer survival of the firm and the benefit of his/her 
offspring (Bebchuk et al., 1999). 
Taken together, the above results predict the possible dual effects of a family CEO 
on firm performance. On one hand, a family CEO tends to more readily align their own 
interest with those of the family than a hired CEO, alleviating the classic owner-manager 
agency problem, thereby benefiting firm performance. On the other hand, a family CEO 
and the controlling family are more inclined to collude at the expense of minority 
shareholders by taking the form of pyramids in family firms. Family firms would in turn be 
penalized in performance losses, and the losses tend to be especially pronounced in family 
firms where the founder still takes the helm as CEO.    
 
Table 9.4 Mean performance in founder- and relative-led family firms 
 N Mean ROA Diff. in ROA 
with Type II 
firms 
Mean 
industry-
adjusted 
ROA 
Diff. in industry-
adjusted ROA with 
Type II firms 
Panel A: Founder CEO      
Type I firms 265 6.05 3.51*** 
(4.260) 
-0.59 3.51*** 
(4.287) 
Type III firms 178 9.59  2.54  
Diff. in Means Type I - Type III   -3.54*** 
(-3.280) 
 -3.13*** 
(-2.915) 
 
Panel B: Relative CEO      
Type I firms 138 7.54 4.99*** 
(4.618) 
0.28 4.39*** 
(4.201) 
Type III firms 158 7.85  0.62  
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Diff. in Means  Type I -Type III  -0.31 
(-0.109) 
 -0.34 
(-0.117) 
 
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
9.2.3 Founder effects on performance 
Recalling the classification of family firms shown in Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5, the study 
computes the ROA and industry-adjusted ROA of each category of family firms. The 
analysis finds that outsider-managed family firms in which no family members are in the 
roles of directors or managers endure the lowest performance (0.74 per cent and -6.42 per 
cent in ROA and industry-adjusted ROA, respectively) across all categories. This result is 
consistent with Barontini and Caprio (2006), who state that the total absence of the family 
from management and monitoring hurts operating performance of family firms. On the 
other hand, the general superior performance of family-managed firms gives credence to 
the profitability gains from the great involvement of family management in family firms 
reported in Table 9.2.  
This study further examines the effects that founders and their relatives might have 
on performance when they are in the role of Chairman or CEO (detailed classification is 
given in Table 9.5). Table 9.6 presents the mean accounting performance for each group of 
family firms and the necessary Independent-sample T tests between groups of family 
firms. 
Panel A of Table 9.6 shows that firms in which the founder remains as Chairman 
but is succeeded by a family member as CEO (Group 2 firms) have the highest average 
ROA, 10.58 per cent (3.01 per cent). This performance outcome is significantly higher 
than that of Group 1 firms with a founder-CEO, but shows nonsignificant difference 
between the two groups when controlling for industry effects: the mean difference of ROA 
between Group 1 and 2 firms has a t-statistic at -2.31, while t-statistic of the mean 
difference of industry-adjusted ROA between the two groups is -1.60 (see Panel C of Table 
9.6).  
Panel D exhibits the mean difference tests between Group 1 (2) and other groups of 
family firms. The analysis shows that the mean ROA of Group 1 or 2 family firms is 
significantly higher than that of family firms with a hired CEO, regardless of whether the 
position of Chairman is occupied by the founder (Group 3 firms), a relative (Group 6 
firms) or an outsider (Group 9 firms). Similar results are presented in Panel B of Table 9.6, 
which shows that the mean difference between founder-CEO and outsider-CEO firms is 
1.97 per cent (1.88 per cent) and the mean difference between relative-CEO and outsider-
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CEO firms is 2.20 per cent (1.68 per cent); both are statistically significant. These results 
reinforce the substantive advantage of family CEOs outlined in the previous sections of 
this chapter, suggesting that the preservation of control and management in the family is 
more favourable to firm performance than surrendering of the baton to professionals.  
A further examination on relative-led family firms reveals a more intriguing 
finding. Panel E of Table 9.6 reveals that the mean ROA (industry-adjusted ROA) of 
Group 5 firms in which the founder’s relatives take the helm as Chairman and CEO is 1.33 
per cent (-5.13 per cent), not significantly higher than Group 6 firms having a relative-
Chairman but hiring an unrelated CEO (t-statistic of -1.446 and -1.419 in ROA and 
industry-adjusted ROA, respectively) and Group 9 firms completely led by outsiders (t-
statistic of -0.648 and -0.570 in ROA and industry-adjusted ROA, respectively). This 
finding indicates that when a relative acts as Chairman, the performance of a relative-CEO 
is indistinguishable from that of a hired CEO. A relative-CEO is thus likely to generate 
performance benefits if and only if the founder is still active in the position of Chairman 
(Group 2 firms). The disappearance in management premium of a relative-CEO helps to 
interpret the nonsignificance of the estimate of family management ratio in the relative-
CEO regression reported in Table 9.2. Moreover, this finding also lends support to 
measuring agency costs between family shareholders and family CEOs in the dual-triple 
agency framework for analysing family-firm issues proposed in the thesis. 
Taken as a whole, the above findings are consistent with the view that the founder 
brings valuable skills to his/her firm (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988; Morck, Stangeland 
& Yeung 2000; Villalonga & Amit 2006). However, unlike Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
who claim that the arrangement in which the founder occupies the position of Chairman 
and hires a professional CEO adds firm value, the analysis finds contrasting evidence that 
the founder’s skills are only profitable in firms within the family’s control and 
management. In other words, these skills can be only exclusively passed on to family 
members rather than outsiders. One likely explanation is that at the starting stage of 
Chinese family firms, the shared trust and mutual affinity between the founder and family 
members engaged in running the business outweigh the trust between the family and 
outside managers. It is thus more difficult and costly for a hired manager to acquire the 
skills and knowledge from the founder and act in the founder’s best interest. In effect, the 
trust is well documented to be an important determinant in the choice of employees and 
business partners among family firms (Eddleston et al., 2010) and Asian businesses in 
particular. For example, Kiong (1996) finds that relatives, clansmen, and people from the 
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same village are more likely to occupy management positions in Chinese firms. Kao 
(1996) claims that, when choosing business partners, trust is the major concern of 
Taiwanese firms. Chami (2001) also proposes that trust can be a distinctive feature in 
giving rise to successful family firms. Therefore, our results shows that in China “founders 
may be inspiring leaders, great visionaries, or exceptionally talented scientists” (Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006 : 404), but in addition they or their relatives are and need to be good 
managers as well.  
 
Table 9.5 Groups of family firms led by founders, relatives or outsiders 
 
Table 9.6 Mean performance with founders, relatives, or outsiders as Chairman or CEO 
Panel A: Mean performance of groups of family firms  
 Founder-CEO  Relative-CEO  Outsider-CEO  Total 
8.27  10.58  5.73  6.93 
1.41  3.01  -0.97  0.08 
Founder-Chairman 
[407]  [204]  [1076]  [1687] 
-  1.33  7.24  5.17 
-  -5.13  0.64  -1.41 
Relative-Chairman 
[9]  [75]  [128]  [212] 
-  -  4.18  3.46 
-  -  -2.65  -3.30 
Outsider-Chairman 
[27]  [17]  [352]  [396] 
7.47  7.71  5.50  6.17 
0.67  0.46  -1.22  -0.64 
Total 
[443]  [296]  [1556]  [2295] 
Panel B: Mean difference among family firms with a founder-, 
relative-, or outsider- CEO  
 
Diff. between Founder-CEO and 
Outsider-CEO firms 
 Diff. between Relative-CEO and 
Outsider-CEO firms 
ROA 1.97**(2.570)  2.20**(2.043) 
Industry-adjusted 
ROA 1.88**(2.457) 
 1.68 (1.566) 
Panel C: Mean difference between Group 1 and Group 2 firms  
 Group 1 Group 2 Mean differences 
ROA 8.27 10.58 -2.31**(-1.972) 
Industry-adjusted 
ROA 1.41 3.01 -1.60 (-1.382) 
Panel D: Mean difference between Group 1 (2) and other groups  
  Differences in ROA with  
  Group 3 Group 5 Group 6 Group 9 
Group 1     ROA 8.27 2.53***(3.405) 6.93 (1.599) 1.02 (0.535) 4.09***(4.234) 
 Industry-adjusted 1.41 2.38***(3.189) 6.54 (1.519) 0.77 (0.401) 4.06***(4.195) 
 Founder-CEO Relative-CEO Outsider-CEO 
Founder-Chairman Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Relative-Chairman Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
Outsider-Chairman Group 7 Group 8 Group 9 
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ROA 
Group 2      ROA 10.58 4.85***(4.282) 9.25***(2.691) 3.34 (1.479) 6.40***(4.237) 
 Industry-adjusted 
ROA 3.01 3.98***(3.529) 8.14**(2.400) 2.37  (1.063) 5.66***(3.778) 
Panel E: Mean difference between Group 5 and other groups  
  Differences in ROA with   
  Group 6 Group 9 
Group 5    ROA 1.33 -5.91(-1.446) -2.84 (-0.648) 
Industry-adjusted 
ROA -5.13 -5.77(-1.419) -2.49 (-0.570) 
Notes: Due to inferior statistical representation, three groups with less than 50 observations are excluded in 
the estimation of Panel A. The top number in each cell in Panel A is the mean ROA, the middle number is 
industry-adjusted ROA (in italics) and the bottom number in square brackets is the number of firms of each 
group. t-statistics is computed by Independent Sample T Test. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
9.2.4 Robustness test  
The multivariate regressions and categorical analyses both find different impacts of family 
ownership, control, and management on firm performance, and essential distinction 
between founder- and relative-led family firms. Table 9.7 and 9.8 applies alternative 
econometric models to test whether the previous findings are robust. For brevity, only the 
results of main explanatory variables are displayed. 
            As estimation in Table 9.2 only accounts for the unobserved firm effect in the data 
set, the analysis allows for the potential time effect by using either the double-clustered 
standard errors or time dummies in the robustness check (see Row 1 and 2 of Table 9.2). 
The endogenous variables and instrumental variables remain the same as specified in Table 
9.2. The results of the two examinations are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 
9.2: both estimates confirm the nonlinear relations between ownership holdings and firm 
performance is more pronounced in the founder-CEO regression than in the relative-CEO 
regression; the coefficient of excess control rights is negative in the three regressions; both 
Row 1 and 2 show a larger ratio of family management in the founder-CEO regression 
than in the relative-CEO regression, and the estimated coefficient of this ratio is only 
significant in the former.  
           Further, the data set is estimated by the simple fixed effects (FE) models in Row 3 
and 4, and the random effects (RE) models in Row 5 and 6. Particularly, allowing for 
industry effects in the RE estimation, Row 5 applies the industry-adjusted ROA as the 
dependent variable, while Row 6 includes industry dummies for 12 CSRC industries. Due 
to the failures in controlling for endogeneity in regressors, the estimates of family 
ownership variables are unreliable. The thesis therefore only presents the results of family 
control and management variables in the four examinations. Unsurprisingly, the FE and RE 
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estimation (through Row 3 to 6) show that the three regressions have a negative estimate of 
family control variable (EXCESSCONTROL or PYRAMIDS), and the positive coefficient 
of family management ratio is only significant in the first two regressions, rather than in 
the relative-CEO subset.  
In sum, the alternative econometric models confirm the robustness of our findings 
in Table 9.2, suggesting that the positive effects of greater family-holdings and family 
management on performance stem from family firms in which the founder remains as 
CEO. Yet, the superior performance would be counteracted by the greatest ownership 
rights and the use of control-enhancing mechanisms by the family. 
         
Table 9.7 Robustness tests of effects of family ownership, control, and management on performance 
  All family firms 
(1) 
Founder-CEO 
(2) 
Relative-CEO 
(3) 
CASHFLOW 1.655** 
(3.16) 
2.097*** 
(4.26) 
1.724** 
(2.74) 
CASHFLOW2 -0.019** 
(-2.76) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.020** 
(-2.43) 
EXCESSCONTROL -0.549** 
(-3.03) 
-0.531** 
(-2.45) 
-0.531** 
(-3.09) 
1. FE2SLS with the 
double-clustered 
standard errors 
FAMILYRATIO 0.299** 
(2.43) 
0.473** 
(2.74) 
0.095 
(0.79) 
CASHFLOW 2.173*** 
(3.05) 
2.638*** 
(3.39) 
2.180** 
(2.56) 
CASHFLOW2 -0.025*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.032*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.025** 
(-2.32) 
EXCESSCONTROL -0.405 
(-1.39) 
-0.387 
(-1.18) 
-0.370 
(-1.10) 
2. FE2SLS with time 
dummies 
FAMILYRATIO 0.232 
(1.37) 
0.425* 
(1.86) 
0.011 
(0.07) 
EXCESSCONTROL -0.263* 
(-2.18) 
-0.288** 
(-2.33) 
-0.292* 
(-2.16) 
3. FE with the double 
clustered standard errors 
FAMILYRATIO 0.312** 
(2.27) 
0.488** 
(2.47) 
0.171 
(1.54) 
EXCESSCONTROL -0.215** 
(-2.08) 
-0.238** 
(-2.20) 
-0.238** 
(-2.02) 
4. FE with time dummies 
FAMILYRATIO 0.267* 
(1.76) 
0.455** 
(2.17) 
0.124 
(0.81) 
PYRAMIDS -2.111** 
(-2.14) 
-2.672** 
(-2.38) 
-1.829 
(-1.50) 
5. RE with industry-
adjusted ROA and time 
dummies 
 
FAMILYRATIO 0.053 
(0.96) 
0.111** 
(2.13) 
0.045 
(0.67) 
PYRAMIDS -2.178** 
(-2.14) 
-2.740** 
(-2.37) 
-1.840 
(-1.45) 
6. RE with industry and 
time dummies 
 FAMILYRATIO 0.059 
(1.05) 
0.101* 
(1.92) 
0.056 
(0.79) 
Notes: All regressions include the following variables: CASHFLOW, CASHFLOW squared, 
EXCESSCONTROL, PYRAMIDS, SYSTEM, FAMILYRATIO, SALE, SIZE, LEVERAGE, and AGE. All 
regressions except the FE models with the double-clustered standard errors include time dummies. All 
regressions except the FE models and the industry-adjusted ROA also include industry dummies. The 
FE2SLS estimation with the double-clustered standard errors comprises 2,192, 1,937 and 1,834 observations 
in the family-firm sample, the founder- and the relative-CEO subsample, respectively. The FE and RE 
estimation with the double-clustered standard errors comprises 2,848, 2,545 and 2,413 observations in the 
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family-firm sample, the founder- and the relative-CEO subsample, respectively. t-statistics from the clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses (For the RE models, z-statistics are presented instead.). Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
        
             In the estimation of interaction effects on family ownership, control, and 
management, the categorical analysis reported in Table 9.3 shows that Type II firms with a 
hired CEO and pyramids in place suffer the lowest performance across all types of family 
firms, whereas the ROA of family firms managed by family members and without 
pyramidal structure (Type III firms) is the most profitable. In addition, there are distinct 
differences between founder- and relative-led family firms (see Table 9.4). As no 
endogenous variable is detected in the endogeneity test, Table 9.8 applies the simple FE 
and RE estimation to regression models. The results are qualitatively unchanged and thus 
support the robustness of the findings presented in Table 9.3 and 9.4.: the coefficient of 
Type II firms is negative and significant in all regressions; the coefficients of Type III 
firms between the founder- and the relative-CEO subset are contrasting.  
 
Table 9.8 Robustness tests of effects of family governance in different types of family firms 
 Type II family firms Type III family firms 
  Founder-CEO Relative-CEO 
1. FE with the standard errors 
clustered by firm 
-2.921** 
(-2.30) 
4.124 
(1.38) 
-2.619 
(-1.21) 
2. FE with the standard errors 
clustered by firm and time 
-2.921** 
(-2.56) 
3.541 
(1.63) 
-2.619 
(-1.79) 
3.  FE with time dummies -4.365*** 
(-2.88) 
3.612 
(1.64) 
-2.693 
(-1.25) 
4. RE industry-adjusted ROA 
with time dummies 
-3.623*** 
(-3.99) 
2.404* 
(1.73) 
-0.611 
(-0.28) 
5. RE with industry and time 
dummies 
-3.693*** 
(-3.99) 
2.747* 
(1.94) 
-0.076 
(-0.03) 
Notes: The dummies equal one when the firm is a family firm belonging to the type stated in each column 
heading. All regressions include the following control variables: SALE, SIZE, LEVERAGE and AGE. t-
statistics from the standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses (For RE models, z-statistics are 
presented instead.). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level, 
respectively. 
 
9.3 Interaction impact of family governance and investor protection on 
performance  
9.3.1 Main results 
In Table 9.9, the family-firm sample, the founder- and the relative-CEO subsample are 
split into family firms operating in provinces with strong investor protection (Panel A) and 
those with weak investor protection (Panel B). The criteria to define “strong” or “weak” 
investor protection remain the same as illustrated in Chapter 8. For each subset, the study 
examines Model (9.1) specified before to the use of the FE2SLS estimation. As suggested 
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by endogeneity test, SIZE is detected as an endogenous variable in all regressions in Panel 
A, while CASHFLOW, EXCESSCONTROL, SIZE and LEVERAGE are endogenous in 
all regressions in Panel B.  
Table 9.9 first shows that family firms with active family control (concentrated 
ownership rights and family members participating in management) in general have 
significantly better performance when the level of shareholder protection is relatively high 
(Panel A of Table 9.9), whereas these mechanisms are immunised against performance of 
family firms operating in provinces with weak shareholder protection (Panel B of Table 
9.9). It can be explained by the findings of Chapter 8 of the thesis that Chinese family 
firms operating in well-protected regions are found to have more concentrated ownership 
rights and more participation of family management. As more concentrated ownership 
rights (less than dominant) and higher preservation of family management are revealed to 
be intimately linked to better profitability (reported in Table 9.2), family firms with such 
governance mechanisms would be more profitable when operating in provinces with a 
stronger governance environment for investors. This finding is consistent with studies on 
U.S. and Continental European corporations, suggesting that high level of transparency and 
regulation may be conducive to the desirability of family ownership and management from 
the perspective of minority shareholders (Maury, 2006). As a result, the conflict between 
owners and managers is likely to be mitigated, thereby benefiting financial performance of 
these corporations (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006).  
The analysis also finds that, in Panel A of Table 9.9, the negative coefficient of 
CASHFLOW squared and positive coefficient of FAMILYRATIO are only significant in 
the founder-CEO regression, rather than in the relative-CEO regression. It gives credence 
to the findings reported in Table 9.2, showing that the effects of family ownership and 
management are more pronounced in family firms led by founder-CEOs.   
In Column 1 of Panel B of Table 9.9, the study reveals that the estimate of the 
separation of ownership and control rights is negative and statistically significant in low 
investor protection subset, and the absolute value of this coefficient is noticeably larger 
than in high protection subset: -1.225 versus -0.168 in Column 1 of Panel A of Table 9.9. 
This finding indicates that in family firms located in regimes with inferior investor 
protection, the use of control-enhancing mechanisms reduce firm performance, with the 
reduction in performance proportional to the excess of control over ownership rights. It 
favours the argument of Faccio et al. (2001) noted in East Asian corporations which are 
exposed to a relatively weak legal and institutional environment.  
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In particular, the results show that the nonlinear relationship between ownership 
and firm performance still only holds in the founder-CEO regression: the coefficient of 
CASHFLOW and CASHFLOW squared is 2.123 and -0.029, respectively; it is statistically 
significant at 10 per cent level (Column 2 of Panel B of Table 9.9). This finding suggests 
that in founder-CEO firms operating under inferior investor protection, the greatest family 
control as reflected in dominant ownership rights with the exercise of control-enhancing 
mechanisms by the family appears to lead to the greatest potential for poor performance. It 
confirms the findings reported in Table 9.4, suggesting that family control in excess of 
ownership rights impairs firm performance in founder-led firms rather than relative-led 
firms.  
 
Table 9.9 FE2SLS estimation of interaction effects of family governance and investor protection 
Panel A: High investor protection regions   
 
All family firms  
(1) 
Founder-CEO 
(2) 
Relative-CEO 
(3) 
CASHFLOW 0.780** (2.24) 
0.948** 
(2.47) 
0.813* 
(1.95) 
CASHFLOW2 -0.006 (-1.51) 
-0.010** 
(-2.07) 
-0.006 
(-1.24) 
EXCESSCONTROL -0.168 (-1.00) 
-0.191 
(-1.02) 
-0.100 
(-0.53) 
PYRAMIDS -0.451 (-0.40) 
-1.637 
(-1.31) 
0.447 
(0.37) 
FAMILYRATIO 0.411* (1.70) 
0.599* 
(1.78) 
0.063 
(0.27) 
SYSTEM -6.035 (-1.54) 
-5.157 
(-1.19) 
-4.670 
(-0.82) 
SALE 0.020 (0.57) 
-0.008 
(-0.28) 
0.033 
(0.85) 
SIZE -14.404** (-2.57) 
-18.023*** 
(-3.88) 
-12.544* 
(-1.87) 
LEVERAGE -0.085*** (-5.23) 
-0.075*** 
(-5.73) 
-0.083*** 
(-5.44) 
AGE 2.050*** (2.72) 
2.300*** 
(3.38) 
1.680* 
(1.95) 
Number of observations 1250 1064 998 
Number of groups 279 240 221 
Panel B: Low investor protection regions   
 
All family firms 
(1) 
Founder-CEO 
(2) 
Relative-CEO 
(3) 
CASHFLOW 1.744 (1.56) 
2.123* 
(1.75) 
1.873 
(1.34) 
CASHFLOW2 -0.025* (-1.68) 
-0.029* 
(-1.82) 
-0.027 
(-1.48) 
EXCESSCONTROL -1.225** (-2.51) 
-1.137** 
(-2.18) 
-1.351** 
(-2.47) 
PYRAMIDS 2.964 (1.18) 
3.144 
(1.11) 
3.561 
(1.21) 
FAMILYRATIO 0.001 (0.00) 
0.009 
(0.02) 
0.014 
(0.06) 
SYSTEM 3.169 3.681 2.554 
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(0.66) (0.72) (0.51) 
SALE 0.038 (1.00) 
0.035 
(0.88) 
0.060* 
(1.67) 
SIZE -1.155*** (-0.27) 
-0.356 
(-0.08) 
0.983 
(0.21) 
LEVERAGE 0.029*** (0.58) 
0.032 
(0.65) 
0.023 
(0.62) 
AGE -0.532** (-0.80) 
-0.518 
(-0.75) 
-0.795 
(-1.05) 
Number of observations 938 869 834 
Number of groups 186 175 170 
Notes: Panel A consists of family firms locating in provinces with high investor protection. The family-firm 
sample, the founder- and the relative-CEO subsample in Panel A comprises 1,250, 1,064, and 998 
observations, respectively. Panel B consists of family firms locating in provinces with low investor 
protection, which includes 938, 869 and 834 observations in the family-firm sample, the founder- and the 
relative-CEO subsample, respectively. t-statistics from the standard errors clustered by firm are in 
parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
In summary, the results of Table 9.9 show that family holdings and active 
management in general mitigate the classic owner-manager conflict and thus generate 
performance benefits when family firms are in provinces with a sound governance 
environment. However, the performance gains would be offset by the excess of family 
control rights over cash flow rights, especially when the local protection of shareholders is 
relatively poor. In addition, these effects differ significantly in founder- and relative-led 
family firms. 
 
9.3.2 Robustness test 
Table 9.10 re-examines the above test to the use of alternative specification of the cut-off 
point for the level of investor protection that has been used in Chapter 8. That is, the cut-
off point for the degree of investor protection by definition is the median score of the 
governance environment index. Panel A and B of Table 9.10 report the FE2SLS estimation 
of the impact of family ownership, control, and management on firm performance in the 
regimes with strong and weak legal protection of shareholders, respectively. The 
endogenous variables and instrument variables remain the same as specified in Table 9.9. 
The results appear robust to the findings reported in Table 9.9. Notably, Panel B of 
Table 9.10 shows that neither the coefficient of CASHFLOW nor CASHFLOW squared is 
significant in the family-firm regression and the relative-CEO regression, although the 
coefficient of CASHFLOW squared is significant in the founder-CEO regression. This 
finding affirms the negligible effects of family ownership on performance of family firms 
operating in provinces with inferior investor protection.  
 
 
  
168 
Table 9.10 Robustness tests of interaction effects of family governance and investor protection 
Panel A: High investor protection regions   
 
All family firms  
(1) 
Founder-CEO 
(2) 
Relative-CEO 
(3) 
CASHFLOW 0.838** (2.14) 
1.048** 
(2.38) 
0.932** 
(1.99) 
CASHFLOW2 -0.007 (-1.48) 
-1.010** 
(-1.99) 
-0.008 
(-1.41) 
EXCESSCONTROL -0.155 (-0.87) 
-0.185 
(-0.91) 
-0.077 
(-0.39) 
PYRAMIDS -0.208 (-0.17) 
-1.423 
(-1.02) 
0.858 
(0.66) 
FAMILYRATIO 0.454* (1.84) 
0.669* 
(1.92) 
0.115 
(0.50) 
SYSTEM -6.338 (-1.50) 
-4.862 
(-1.02) 
-5.227 
(-0.85) 
SALE 0.017 (0.47) 
-0.014 
(-0.46) 
0.031 
(0.78) 
SIZE -13.907** (-2.24) 
-18.042*** 
(-3.46) 
-11.431 
(-1.52) 
LEVERAGE -0.085*** (-5.21) 
-0.075*** 
(-5.72) 
-0.082*** 
(-5.45) 
AGE 2.150** (2.54) 
2.524*** 
(3.27) 
1.787* 
(1.80) 
Number of observations 1110 941 878 
Number of groups 245 211 191 
Panel B: Low investor protection regions   
 
All family firms 
(1) 
Founder-CEO 
(2) 
Relative-CEO 
(3) 
CASHFLOW 1.413 (1.41) 
1.728 
(1.59) 
1.512 
(1.25) 
CASHFLOW2 -0.021 (-1.54) 
-0.024* 
(-1.69) 
-0.022 
(-1.39) 
EXCESSCONTROL -1.249*** (-2.82) 
-1.191** 
(-2.53) 
-1.366*** 
(-2.75) 
PYRAMIDS 2.256 (1.07) 
2.425 
(1.01) 
2.710 
(1.10) 
FAMILYRATIO -0.038 (-0.17) 
-0.058 
(-0.17) 
-0.031 
(-0.13) 
SYSTEM 1.887 (0.44) 
2.373 
(0.53) 
1.589 
(0.37) 
SALE 0.042 (1.16) 
0.039 
(1.03) 
0.062* 
(1.79) 
SIZE -0.531 (-0.13) 
0.281 
(0.06) 
1.327 
(0.30) 
LEVERAGE 0.038 (0.72) 
0.042 
(0.78) 
0.032 
(0.30) 
AGE -0.838 (-1.42) 
-0.878 
(-1.44) 
-1.089 
(-1.65) 
Number of observations 1078 992 954 
Number of groups 220 204 200 
Notes: Panel A consists of family firms locating in provinces with high investor protection. The family-firm 
sample, the founder- and the relative-CEO subsample in Panel A comprises 1,250, 1,064, and 998 
observations, respectively. Panel B consists of family firms locating in provinces with low investor 
protection, which includes 938, 869 and 834 observations in the family-firm sample, the founder- and the 
relative-CEO subsample, respectively. t-statistics from the standard errors clustered by firm are in 
parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
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The extent of investor protection within different local regimes is measured by the 
governance environment index which remains unchanged through years. Although the FE 
models cannot obtain the estimators of time-constant variables, it is noted that these 
variables interacting with variables that change over time can be estimated by the FE 
models (Wooldridge, 2002). The study thus constructs explanatory variables-
CASHFLOW*GENVIRON, CASHFLOW2*GENVIRON, EXCESSCONTROL* 
GENVIRON, PYRAMIDS*GENVIRON, and FAMILYRATIO*GENVIRON- in the 
regression analysis to investigate the interaction effects of family governance and investor 
protection on firm performance. The regression model is presented as follows. 
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The endogeneity test shows that CASHFLOW*GENVIRON, 
EXCESSCONTROL* GENVIRON, SALE and SIZE are endogenous variables in the 
regression, and their one-year lags are used as instrument variables accordingly. Table 9.11 
reports the FE2SLS estimation of the regression analysis.  
In general, the analysis confirms the robustness of the results of the categorical 
findings given in Table 9.9. Firstly, Table 9.11 shows that the interaction of family 
ownership and investor protection is nonlinearly linked to firm performance, but it is more 
significant in the founder-CEO regression rather than in the relative-CEO regression. 
Secondly, the estimate of the interaction variable of family management and investor 
protection is 0.039 in the family-firm regression and 0.056 in the founder-CEO regression; 
it is significant at 10 per cent level in both. Yet, this estimate is not significant in the 
relative-CEO regression. Lastly, the analysis finds that the interaction of family control in 
excess of ownership rights and investor protection has a negative and significant 
coefficient in the first two regressions, rather than in the relative-CEO subset. This result 
suggests that the use of control-enhancing mechanisms would impair performance of 
family firms with inferior investor protection, especially for those in which the founder 
serves as CEO.  
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Table 9.11 Robustness test of interaction effects of family governance and investor protection 
 
All family firms 
(1) 
Founder-CEO 
(2) 
Relative-CEO 
(3) 
CASHFLOW*GENVIRON 0.226** (2.27) 
0.290** 
(2.54) 
0.244** 
(2.00) 
CASHFLOW2*GENVIRON -0.003** (-1.98) 
-0.004** 
(-2.41) 
-0.003* 
(-1.73) 
EXCESSCONTROL*GENVIRON -0.079** (-2.10) 
-0.083* 
(-1.89) 
-0.067 
(-1.58) 
PYRAMIDS* GENVIRON 0.076 (0.55) 
-0.048 
(-0.31) 
0.167 
(1.11) 
FAMILYRATIO* GENVIRON 0.039* (1.70) 
0.056* 
(1.88) 
0.006 
(0.30) 
SYSTEM -2.668 (-1.06) 
-1.179 
(-0.45) 
-2.500 
(-0.78) 
SALE 0.138* (1.88) 
0.146* 
(1.83) 
0.150** 
(2.13) 
SIZE -12.556*** (-3.53) 
-14.232*** 
(-4.17) 
-10.277*** 
(-2.60) 
LEVERAGE -0.086*** (-5.68) 
-0.082*** 
(-4.83) 
-0.082*** 
(-5.97) 
AGE 1.240*** (2.65) 
1.143** 
(2.51) 
0.990** 
(2.08) 
Number of observations 2192 1937 1834 
Number of groups 465 415 391 
Notes: As singleton groups are detected in the FE2SLS estimation, the family-firm sample, the founder- and 
the relative-CEO subsample comprises 2,192, 1,937 and 1,834 observations, respectively. t-statistics from the 
standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 
5% (**) or 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
9.4 Conclusion  
This chapter addresses the question of how family governance mechanisms involving a 
combination of family ownership, control, and management tackle agency problems of 
family firms. It tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 based on an analytically more 
accurate and innovative definition of family firms listed in China’s stock exchanges for the 
period 2000-2009. The study examines the impact of family ownership, control, and 
management on firm performance, both individually and jointly, and further investigates 
the interaction effects of the three elements of family governance with the extent of 
investor protection. The overall conclusion is that the profitability of family firms to a 
large extent depends on how family ownership, control, and management combine, and 
especially interact with external protection of shareholders.   
First, the analysis finds that the founder can bring valuable skills and knowledge to 
the firm and thus dramatically enhance the firm’s financial performance, although such 
enhancement might not accrue to nonfamily shareholders. The founder can either occupy 
the positions of Chairman and CEO or remain as Chairman but pass on the managerial 
power to a relative. Particularly, when the founder remains as CEO, greater involvement in 
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family management would deliver better firm performance; when a relative acts as 
Chairman, the performance of a relative-CEO is not distinguishable from a professional 
CEO; the total absence of the family from monitoring and management leads to a 
substantial decline in firm performance.  
Second, the findings show that the controlling family would be penalized in the 
form of a discount in firm performance by the use of control-enhancing mechanisms such 
as pyramids. Firm performance declines proportionally to the excess of family control over 
ownership rights. However, this “control discount” only holds for founder-CEO firms 
rather than relative-CEO firms.  
Third, the study reveals a more significant nonmonotonic relation between family-
holdings and performance in founder-led family firms rather than family firms with 
relative-CEOs, which can incorporate the two aspects of findings above. The result shows 
that firm performance rises with increasing family’s shareholdings to a threshold and then 
tapers off. This finding suggests that in founder-led firms, family members’ interest would 
be more readily aligned by the founder’s effect when the family retains great ownership 
and control of the firm. The preservation of management in the family would thus alleviate 
the conflicts that might otherwise arise between a relative-CEO and other family members, 
thereby benefiting firm performance. However, if the founder’s control is the greatest as 
reflected in the overwhelming ownership rights with the use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms, family members tend to collude at the expense of minority shareholders, and 
firm performance would in turn be impaired. 
Lastly, a further investigation on the interaction effects of family governance and 
investor protection on firm performance identifies more intriguing issues. The results show 
that the above-demonstrated effects of family ownership and management only survive in 
provinces with strong legal protection of shareholders. When shareholder protection is 
inferior, firm performance is immunised against family ownership and management 
arrangements. The use of control-enhancing mechanisms such as pyramids however tends 
to reduce firm performance with the reduction in performance proportional to the excess of 
control over ownership rights.   
This chapter adds to the literature in the following ways. First, the findings join the 
pre-existing studies on U.S. and Continental European family firms, showing that the 
preservation of management in the family is more favourable relative to surrendering the 
baton to outsiders, especially when the founder remains as CEO. In applying the dual-triple 
analytical framework for agency issues in family firms outlined in Chapter 3, this chapter 
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provides strong evidence that at the present development stage of Chinese family firms, the 
conflict of interest between owners and professional managers is more detrimental to firm 
performance than that between owners and family managers.  
Second, descendant-CEOs in many studies are considered to have either 
indistinguishable effects from professionals or even negative effects on firm performance. 
The findings of this chapter provide new evidence on this issue, suggesting that a 
descendant CEO does not necessarily have no benefit or inevitably hurt firm performance 
if the founder occupies the position of Chairman. In other words, if and only if the founder 
serves as Chairman, passing of the managerial baton to an heir can also improve 
performance in family firms. Such evidence extends the analysis of Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) by demonstrating that in Chinese family firms founders not only need to be 
inspiring leaders through the position of Chairman of the Board, but in addition they or 
their relatives are and need to be good managers as well. Founders are thus encouraged to 
provide motivation and incentives for family members to stay in the business and to train 
them to be qualified managers. These findings will contribute to governance strategies in 
family firms in key areas, such as succession decisions, executive development, and 
compensation policies.     
Finally, recent studies note that higher family ownership and the persistence of 
family management can increase firm performance in a well-regulated environment due to 
high level of transparency and regulation, such as the U.S. and Western European markets 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006), whereas others argue that failures of institutional 
environment lead to poor performance of family firms with great family ownership and 
control as for instance Faccio et al. (2001) demonstrate in East Asian corporations. This 
study reinforces both interpretations by incorporating an analysis within one country that is 
characterised by provincial variations in legal and governance settings. This approach 
reconciles the conflicting debate on the impact of family governance mechanisms on firm 
performance in the literature.  
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Chapter 10 
CONCLUSION 
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10.1 Introduction 
The important role played by family firms in China’s fledging capital market calls for a 
better understanding of how it works and is governed. Since the legal analytical approach 
is increasingly considered as a more meaningful way to undertand the nature of corporate 
governance, this study aims to explore how governance issues in family firms are tackled 
from the perspective of investor protection in China’s context. The thesis first presents 
mathematical models deriving the relations among investor protection, family governance, 
and agency costs in family firms. It then tests the predictions obtained from the models by 
using a unique and detailed family-firm data set. The thesis contributes new perspective 
insights, and adds several methodological innovations and new empirical evidence to the 
growing literature.  
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis and is structured as follows. Section 
10.2 outlines the research questions addressed in the thesis and summaries the main 
context of the study by chapters. This is followed by a review of key contributions in 
Section 10.3. Section 10.4 provides several limitations and future research directions.  
 
10.2 Summary of this thesis 
The central issue addressed in this thesis is to investigate how agency conflicts in Chinese 
family firms are tackled by the extent of investor protection. The study addresses this issue 
through both a theoretical and empirical analysis that comprises three empirical settings, 
each of which forms a focus on the links between investor protection and corporate 
governance in family firms. Briefly, the study attempts to shed some light on the following 
key research questions:    
• What are agency problems that family firms are exposed to? (Chapter 3) 
• Do the quality and effectiveness of investor protection provided by China’s legal 
and regulatory systems differ over time and cross regions (provinces)? (Chapter 6) 
• How does investor protection affect agency costs in Chinese family firms? (Chapter 
7) 
• How does investor protection affect the choice of family governance mechanisms 
involving a combination of family ownership, control, and management? (Chapter 
8) 
• How do family governance mechanisms, when interacting with investor protection, 
influence agency costs in Chinese family firms? (Chapter 9) 
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Chapter 2 presents the literature review for previous studies relevant to the thesis. It 
starts with the summary of agency theory and related empirical studies on corporate 
governance in family firms, followed by a brief review of the law and finance literature. 
This chapter provides a framework for analysis carried out in this study and identifies 
several research focuses emerging from the extant literature. From the survey, it is noted 
that the divergence of interest between owners and managers is often disregarded in the 
analysis of agency problems in family-firm issues, thus providing a primary motivation of 
uncovering the presence and nature of all key agency conflicts in family firms in the thesis.  
In the literature on corporate governance in family firms, many key issues remain 
controversial as there is no consensus and findings are mixed. It is partly because of 
inconsistent definitions of family firms and divergent research samples obtained from 
different institutional settings during different periods. Yet, not much attention so far has 
been devoted to emerging economies, especially China’s capital market, one of the largest 
and fastest growing economies in the world. Therefore, making significant improvements 
of the definitions of family firms, and taking an in-depth investigation on governance 
issues in Chinese family firms will contribute to the growing literature. 
On the other hand, the law and finance literature is seen to give new insights to 
exploit the expropriation of minority shareholders from the perspective of investor 
protection. Such extant studies however appear to overlook the owner-manager conflict in 
family firms and the potential interaction effects of legal protection with family 
governance mechanisms. In addition, while cross-country based comparisons are often 
adopted in the existing studies, the comprehensive within-country analysis of the legal 
effects towards family firms so far has been under studied. Hence, this thesis attempts to 
fill these gaps in the literature by applying the law-finance-growth nexus in the Chinese 
setting.  
Chapter 3 firstly develops a new framework for analysing agency problems in 
family firms, namely “dual-triple agency problems”. This analytical framework takes into 
account the coexistence of agency problems in family firms: the conflict between owners 
and managers, and also the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders. It further 
divides the first agency problem into two issues by distinguishing the manager between a 
professional and a family member. This theoretical approach is expected to complement 
the existing literature that often overlooks the presence and nature of agency problems in 
family firms. Secondly, the thesis extends the notion of investor protection that refers to 
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legal protection for all shareholders against managers, and also for minority shareholders 
against controlling shareholders. This new notion will mitigate the risk plaguing 
conventional studies in which only legal protection of minority shareholders is 
emphasized. Lastly, the thesis develops two theoretical models to show the relations 
among investor protection, family governance, and agency costs in family firms. The 
mathematical derivations from the models are formulated as key hypotheses to be tested in 
the empirical part of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 details the research methodology applied in the thesis. It presents the 
approaches of two panel data models, and then displays the specific regression models and 
variables employed in the empirical tests. To control for disturbances of heteroskedasticity, 
within-group correlation and endogeneity in the panel data set, the study uses the two-stage 
least squares estimation of the fixed effects (FE2SLS) panel data models with the clustered 
standard errors in the analysis in Chapter 7 and 9. Given that time-invariant variable would 
be swept away and thus cannot be estimated by the FE estimation, the random effects (RE) 
estimation is adopted to complement the analysis in Chapter 8 in which the explanatory 
variable remains constant over time.  
In general, the study comprises two main data sets, including data on corporate 
governance in Chinese listed firms, and data on the quality and effectiveness of China’s 
investor protection. The two data sets are discussed in Chapter 5 and 6 of the thesis, 
respectively. Chapter 5 summarizes the underlying data set of Chinese listed firms. It 
comprises a panel of 13,365 firm-year observations from 1,624 non-financial companies 
listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China for the period 2000-2009. 
Data on family ownership, control, and management are mainly sourced from GTA 
database, and double-checked against annual reports, prospectus, and interim 
announcements of listed companies. The publicly accessible reports or announcements are 
obtained from two official websites in China – the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE).  
Data on investor protection are presented in Chapter 6 of the thesis. As investor 
protection is generally considered to consist of the changes of formal legal rules and the 
effectiveness of legal enforcement, the thesis develops two indices in Chapter 6 to measure 
the quality and effectiveness of investor protection in China. Following the literature, the 
two indices provide basis for the analysis conducted in the empirical phase of the thesis.  
Specifically, as emphasised in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the notion of investor 
protection in this study is developed to be a new concept that covers the twin agency 
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problems in family firms. In Chapter 6, the thesis thus first explores all relevant formal 
legal rules issued in China for the period 1991-2009, which are protective of minority 
shareholders against the controlling shareholder and also of all shareholders against the 
manager. Based on the selected criteria, the thesis constructs a time series index evaluating 
the evolution of written legal rules pertaining to the rights of investors as an indicator for 
China’s investor protection on paper, including seven specific dimensions, namely, 
VOICE, EXIT, SMINTEGR, ANTIBLOCK, ANTIDIRECT, ANTIMANAGE and 
ANTINONTRADABLE. The analysis finds that the quality of written legal rules regarding 
investor protection has experienced significant improvements in China, especially 
pertaining to regulations giving rise to the integrity and effectiveness of capital market, 
although further efforts are desirable compared to the developed markets in the West. The 
amendments to the Company Law and the Securities Law in 2006 also noticeably enhance 
the extent of China’s investor protection on paper.  
The other index developed in Chapter 6 represents an attempt to assess the 
effectiveness of China’s investor protection in practice, which is constructed as a cross-
sectional index across 31 provinces in China. The enforcement of investor protection in the 
thesis is defined by a broader concept - the quality of governance environment in which a 
listed company has chosen to operate as its base - and is evaluated by four measures, 
including the efficiency of the local government, the development of financial market and 
market intermediaries, and the efficiency of the judiciary. The analysis finds that the 
overall quality of China’s enforcement of investor protection is relatively inferior 
compared to the world average, especially in terms of the efficiency of the government, 
and the reliability of the legal system and the business infrastructure. Furthermore, the 
analysis shows that among all four constituents of the governance environment index, the 
government corruption index accounts for the largest proportion and is identified as the 
most significant element in investor protection, whereas the judicial system index 
represents the smallest proportion and appears to be largely disregarded on the path of the 
evolution of legal reform in China.  
Following the literature, Chapter 7 explores within-country variations over time 
and across provinces in the effects of legal protection on Chinese family firms. Investor 
protection is measured by both a time series index of formal investor protection and a 
cross-sectional index of investor protection in practice developed in Chapter 6. The 
analysis finds that the dynamic improvement of written legal rules pertaining to investor 
protection is potentially conducive to Chinese family firms by mitigating agency problems 
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and thus enhancing firm performance. In addition, among seven legal investor protection 
indices, EXIT and ANTIMANAGE rights tend to play the most important role in the 
protection of shareholder rights. However, the analysis also shows that the overall inferior 
quality of governance environment in China, despite provincial discrepancies, appears to 
have negligible effects on reducing agency costs in Chinese family firms. Instead, other 
informal mechanisms, such as family governance and network-based strategies, are 
expected to help family firms to survive in the discriminatory political and economic 
environment.  
Chapter 8 attempts to find evidence of the role of family governance in family 
firms operating under the inadequate legal and institutional environment. The thesis 
addresses this issue by examining the impact of investor protection on the choice of family 
governance mechanisms involving a combination of family ownership, control, and 
management. The analysis finds that family governance arrangements are to some extent 
shaped by legal protection of shareholders in local regimes in China. Particularly, it shows 
that an increase in the effectiveness of the provincial enforcement of investor protection 
goes hand in hand with an increase in ownership concentration and the involvement of 
family managers in management, but a reduction in the use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms in Chinese family firms.  
The analysis further investigates the interaction effects of family managers and 
investor protection on family governance mechanisms. The analysis finds that companies 
having a family CEO in place have more concentrated ownership rights and more 
participation of family management, with less use of control-enhancing mechanisms 
relative to family firms led by a hired CEO. The study also reveals that the relations 
between investor protection and family governance mechanisms identified before are more 
significant in family firms having an unrelated CEO.  
In Chapter 9, the study extends the analysis of Chapter 8 and further addresses the 
question of how agency conflicts in family firms are tackled by the choice of family 
governance mechanisms which are to some extent shaped by the local legal and 
institutional environment. It starts with an investigation of the effects of family ownership, 
control, and management on firm performance both individually and jointly, followed by 
an examination of the interaction effects of the three elements of family governance with 
investor protection.  
Overall, the analysis finds strong evidence of differential influence of family 
ownership, control, and management on agency costs in Chinese family firms. It shows 
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that the profitability of family firms is to a large extent subjected to how these three 
elements combine and especially interact with the external protection of shareholders in a 
region.  
To illustrate, the analysis shows that concentrated ownership rights with active 
family management generates performance benefits when the level of legal protection for 
investors is relatively high. These positive effects are found to be mainly driven by 
founder-CEOs or stem from the founder occupying the positions of Chairman and CEO or 
remaining as Chairman succeeded by a relative CEO; when a relative acts as Chairman, the 
performance of a relative-CEO is not distinguishable from a professional CEO; the total 
absence of the family from monitoring and management leads to a substantial decline in 
firm performance.  
The findings also reveal that in family firms located in regimes with inferior 
investor protection, the use of control-enhancing mechanisms reduce firm performance, 
with the reduction in performance proportional to the excess of control over ownership 
rights. In particular, in founder-CEO family firms, the greatest family control as reflected 
in dominant ownership rights with the use of control-enhancing mechanisms are 
detrimental to firm performance.  
 
10.3 Key contributions  
This study provides an in-depth investigation on how agency issues in Chinese family 
firms are tackled by investor protection in a country’s legal and regulatory systems. In 
brief, the findings enrich the growing literature and our understanding pertaining to the 
importance subjects in corporate governance as well as law and finance fields. Some of the 
major contributions made in the thesis are summarized as follows:  
 
Methodology  
• The thesis links different strands of approaches and studies on family firms in the 
current literature: studies on investor protection and family governance 
mechanisms, and studies on family governance and agency costs. It develops 
theoretical models illustrating how the twin agency problems in family firms are 
shaped and tackled by legal investor protection. The interconnectedness among 
investor protection, family governance, and agency costs are therefore presented 
with theoretical coherence and rigour for the first time.  
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• The study pioneers a synthesis of more systematic and comprehensive analysis of 
characteristics of family ownership, control, and management to more accurately 
distinguish different types of family firms in terms of the governance structure and 
impacts. Chinese family firms are usually defined as consisting of a crude 
classification of the non-state-owned firms (e.g. Chen et al., 2005). Moreover, the 
conventional approach often does not take account of the multiple circumstances in 
which the company is controlled by more than one individual or family (e.g. Su and 
Zhu, 2003). The approach in this thesis provides finer-grained criteria for the 
definition of family firms, and thus lowers the risk of having nonfamily firm 
features distorting the results.  
 
• The study develops a dual-triple framework for analysing all key agency conflicts 
in family firms. “Dual” refers to the conflict between shareholders and managers 
(Agency Problem I) and the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders 
(Agency Problem II). “Triple” refers to Agency Problem II and the conflict 
between family shareholders and professional mangers (Agency Problem IA), as 
well as the conflict between family shareholders and family managers (Agency 
Problem IB). This analytical framework remedies a gap in the literature by 
incorporating the analysis of the often neglected issue of the owner-manager 
conflict among studies of family firms. It also represents a more comprehensive 
and coherent analysis in studies of this kind. 
 
• The study extends the conventional notion of investor protection in the literature to 
include not only legal mechanisms protecting minority shareholders against large 
shareholders, but also protecting all shareholders against managers. This conceptual 
perspective allows a refocus on the twin agency problems in family firms.  
 
• Using this concept of investor protection, the study constructs two indices to more 
comprehensively and accurately measure the quality and effectiveness of China’s 
investor protection. A time series index evaluates changes of legal rules protective 
of investor rights as an indicator for formal investor protection, and a cross-
provincial index for the effectiveness of governance environment measures investor 
protection in practice. Both indices are adopted through out the empirical analysis 
of the thesis. As current studies on family-firm governance usually address issues at 
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the aggregate national level, the approach to investigate within-country changes 
over time and across different regions opens a new perspective and mitigates 
estimate biases that plague the literature. 
 
• The study uses an upper quartile score as a breakpoint of the level of investor 
protection to obtain a more accurate indicator of the higher quality of legal 
protection of shareholder rights than the median score often used in conventional 
studies. This approach is expected to mitigate the risk that the relatively crude 
criterion might distort the results.  
 
• The role of family governance mechanisms in family firms is often explained by 
the distinct institutional and regulation development in individual markets. The 
study reinforces this interpretation by incorporating an analysis within one country 
that is characterised by its provincial variations in legal and governance settings. It 
reconciles the contrasting debate of the superior or inferior performance of family 
firms in the literature and helps better understand the nature of the relationship 
between family governance arrangements and performance within different 
institutional contexts. 
 
Findings  
• The study suggests that the absence of effective investor protection prevailing in 
the emerging markets can in part be explained by the relatively weak institutional 
environment, while the distinct evolution of legal rules pertaining to the rights of 
shareholders does have significant impact ton the growth of family firms in these 
countries. There is a need to implement more polices to enhance legal enforcement 
in these countries. 
 
• The study reveals that an increase in investor protection goes hand in hand with an 
increase in ownership concentration and the involvement of family management. 
This result adds new evidence to the growing literature by showing that 
concentrated ownership rights and the preservation of family management can 
serve as complements rather than substitutes for weak investor protection in 
China’s context.  
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• Consistent with findings in studies on U.S. and Continental European family firms, 
this study shows that the preservation of management in the family is more 
favourable relative to surrendering the baton to outsiders, especially when the 
founder remains as CEO. In applying the analytical framework of dual-triple 
agency problems in family firms developed in the study, the thesis provides strong 
evidence that at the present stage of Chinese family firms, the conflict of interest 
between owners and professional managers is more detrimental to firm 
performance than that between owners and family managers.  
 
• Unlike the existing literature showing that descendant-CEOs have either 
indistinguishable effects from professionals or even pose negative effects on firm 
performance, the study provides new evidence that a descendant CEO does not 
necessarily have no benefit or inevitably hurt firm performance if the founder 
occupies the position of Chairman. This finding extends the analysis of Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) by demonstrating that in Chinese family firms, founders not only 
need to be inspiring leaders through the position of Chairman of the Board, but in 
addition they or their relatives are and need to be good managers as well. These 
findings will contribute to the formulation of governance strategies in family firms 
in key areas, such as succession decisions, executive development, and 
compensation polices. 
 
10.4 Limitations and directions for future research 
First, there are many patterns of mechanisms in which the controlling family maintains a 
significant control over a company with less cash-flow rights associated with its shares, 
such as dual-class shares, pyramids, cross-shareholdings and management participation 
(Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). To test the effects 
of these control-enhancing mechanisms on agency problems in Chinese family firms, the 
thesis only adopts the presence of pyramids in the ultimate control structure as a proxy for 
the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. It is because the dual-class share structure is 
formally prohibited by the law, and the incidence of cross-shareholding is much rarer than 
pyramiding among Chinese family firms. Different mechanisms are expected to have a 
different effect on corporations, as some mechanisms can serve purposes rather than pure 
control entrenchment (Villalonga & Amit, 2009). As legal setting and the complexity of 
ownership structures in China’s stock markets continues to evolve, future research will 
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need to investigate the effects of more control-enhancing mechanisms that have been 
extensively exercised in developed countries, such as dual-class shares, cross-shareholding, 
disproportionate board representation and voting agreements, etc.  
Second, the thesis reveals that Chinese family firms are relatively young. In effect, 
the impact of descendants on firm value can vary from generations (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006), and the second and third generations are considered to assume greater significance 
on the issue of minority shareholders (Farrar, 2005, 2008). It is of interest and importance 
to exploit how agency issues are addressed by the family’s lengthy tenure along with the 
development of the firm through more generations.   
Third, existing literature has shown that some alternative mechanisms will exert 
some extent of impact on organizations in response to formal institutional protection 
failures, such as family governance (La Porta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003), network-based 
strategy (Peng & Heath, 1996), reputation and relationships (Allen et al., 2005), political 
connections (Chen et al., 2005; Li et al., 2006). Chapter 8 and 9 of the study shows 
supportive evidence of family governance to be an effective alternative device in this 
regard. Hence, future research has distinct needs in the respect of the impacts of other 
alternative mechanisms in family firms. 
Finally, it is noted that the estimates of the thesis are based on data of companies in 
one country. While the development of Chinese corporate governance has been dominated 
by the issues associated with state owned enterprises and the development of the country’s 
financial system (Tam & Yu, 2011), the importance of family firm corporate governance 
will present new challenges and old problems in new organisational settings. There are 
considerable opportunities for future work on comparative analysis on the effects of family 
ownership, control, and management across various emerging countries (or regions) to 
enrich the literature and our understanding on this importance subject.  
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APPENDICES 
A3.1 Proof of expression (3.13) 
Expression (3.13) is proved by the reductio ad absurdum. First, setting 21 ee ≺ , the mean 
value theorem indicates that if )(' eg and )(' ef  are continuous on the closed interval ],[ 21 ee , 
and differentiable on the open interval ),( 21 ee , there exists a point 3e  in ),( 21 ee such that 
   
21
21
'
3
''
)](')([)(
ee
egeg
eg
−
−
= ,                                                     (A3.1) 
and a point 4e in ),( 21 ee  such that 
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−
= .                                                   (A3.2) 
By letting equation (A3.1) and (A3.2) into condition (3.12), the study obtains 
0))(())(( 214''213'' ≻eeefpp
BReeeg
u
L
u
H
−
−
+− ,                                 (A3.3) 
which can be rearranged as 
0)]()()[( 4''3''21 ≻efpp
B
eRgee
u
L
u
H −
+− .                                   (A3.4) 
Recalling assumptions 21 ee ≺ , 0)('' ≺eg  and 0)('' ≺ef , two inequalities 
21 ee ≺  ,                                                            (A3.5)  
and  
0)()( 4''3'' ≺efpp
B
eRg
u
L
u
H −
+                                           (A3.6) 
apparently hold, which infer condition (A3.4) and condition (3.12) are therefore true.  
       Similarly, if setting 21 ee =  or 21 ee ≻ ,  based on the same derivation, expression (3.12) 
is evident to be false. In conclusion, 21 ee ≺  has to be true. Proof of expression (3.26) 
follows the same derivation as the proof of expression (3.13). 
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A4.1: Calculations of cash-flow and control rights 
Drawing on Faccio and Lang (2002), the family’s cash-flow rights are measured by the 
product of its ownership stakes along the control chain of a listed company, while control 
rights are measured by the weakest link in its control chain. When a company is controlled 
through a multitude of control chains, cash-flow and control rights are measured by the 
sum of cash-flow rights and control rights of each control chain, respectively. The control 
diagram of Guangdong Midea Co., Ltd. (Midea, ticker 000527) is documented for 
instance. 
 
 
 
Xiangjian He is identified as the ultimate controller of Midea. His cash-flow rights 
of Midea are 43.74%, the sum of the following products: 
(1)100%*21%*46.74%=9.82% 
(2) 90%*75%*46.74%=31.55% 
(3) 90%*30%*4.17%=1.13% 
(4) 30%*4.17%=1.25% 
Xiangjian He retains 50.91% of control rights of Midea, which is calculated as the 
sum of the following shareholdings: 
(1) min (90%, 75%, 46.74%) = 46.74% 
(2) min (100%, 21%, 0%) = 0% 
(3) min (90%, 30%, 4.17%) = 4.17% 
            (4) min (30%, 0%) = 0% 
Note that Midea Group retains 46.74% of stakes of Midea; this fraction of 
shareholdings has been computed in the first control chain (expression 1), so 0% is used in 
Xiangjian He 
Foshan Shunde Lixun Investment Co., Foshan Shunde Tiantuo Investment Co., 
Midea Group Co., Ltd Foshan Shunde Kailian Industrial Development Co., 
100% 
90% 
21% 75% 30% 30% 
Guangdong Midea Electric Co., Ltd 
46.74
% 
4.17% 
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expression (2) to denote the control stakes of Midea Group to Midea. Expression (3) and 
(4) are applied with the same rule. 
 
A5.1 Examples of control chains of listed companies 
Special cases of control chains among dominant shareholders are presented as follows: 
 
Case 1:  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
In this case, Lian Song holds smaller ownership rights (2.66%=48%*23%*24.07%) 
of the bottom company than Yonghong Cao (3.37%=14%*24.07%), but his control rights 
are 23%, almost twice than Yonghong Cao’s control rights (14%). Lian Song is expected 
to have the material influence over the bottom company and is thus realised as its ultimate 
controller. 
 
Case 2: 
Lian Song Yonghong Cao 
48% 
Beijing Jinbohong Tech & Trade Co., Ltd. 
23% 
Shenzhen Huarunfeng Industrial Development Co., Ltd.  
14% 
24.07% 
Shenzhen Huaxin Co., Ltd. 
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           Each individual retains the same control stakes (10.31%) of the bottom company, 
while Zili Xu has 3.07% of ownership rights, the largest among all major shareholders. He 
is thus considered as the ultimate owner of the bottom company. 
 
Case 3:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
Jianjun Chen 
64% 
Dongcheng Xinye Investment Co., Ltd. 
81.5% 
Shanghai Siping Development GroupCo., Ltd. 
70% 
Shanghai Siping Development GroupCo., Ltd. Zili Xu 
16.57% 15.89% 
Hainan Luoniushan Holding Group Co., Ltd. 
25.32% 
Huibing Shao Zili Xu 
50% 50% 
Hainan Huijia Trade Co., Ltd. 
Hainan Liqin Investment Co., Ltd. 
Yaowu Ma 
56.45% 
Dianlin Hu 
14.29% 
10.31% 
14.29% 
Haikou Agricultural Industry & Trade Co., Ltd. 
Wu Liu                  20% 
Wei Feng              20% 
Xuesong Li           20% 
Sujun Zhang         18% 
Yonghe Huang     10% 
Fangyang               6% 
Shijin Su                 6% 
100% 
Sichuan Yihe Group Co., Ltd. 
100% 
Chengdu Maite Industry Investment Co., Ltd. 
38.7% 
Sichuan Zhonghui Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. 
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The first three shareholders have the equal control rights and ownership of the 
bottom company in Case 3, but Wei Feng occupies the position of Chairman of the Board 
in that company, while neither Wu Liu nor Xuesong Li with his family participants in firm 
management. Therefore, Wei Feng is considered to have the material control rights over 
the bottom company. 
 
Case 4:  
 
 
               
 
          
           
Banghui Zhang and Tianxing Wu hold almost equal control rights and cash-flow 
rights (the disparity of shareholdings is no more than 5%) of the listed company in which 
Banghui Zhang acts as Chairman, while Tianxing Wu serves as CEO. This listed company 
is thus deemed to be half-controlled by the two individuals and is not labelled as a family 
firm in the analysis of the thesis. 
 
Banghui Zhang 
24.09% 22.63% 
Ningbo Tianbang Co., Ltd. 
Tianxing Wu 
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A5.2 Scatter graphs of main variables 
47 7 7 7 7 78 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 810 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 102 2 23 30 333 33 33 3 33 34 446 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 68 8 8 8 8 8 855 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 5578 78 78 7 0 0 06 6 6 6 6 69 9 9 9 9 93 3 38 8 8 8 8 809 9 9 9 1516 16 16 1 1 1 1 130 30 30 0 0 098 9 9 92 2 2 2 2 2 2 23 3 3506
506
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 3 2 2 2 2 227 27 27 27 7 27 7 7 7 74 4 4 440 4 4 4 4 4 4 45 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 58 77 7 7 7 7 778 78 7 4 4 492 92 9 5929 9 966 6 6 6 66 6 6 63
688
6883 3 7328 8056 863
892
99 9 9 99 9 9 9259 9 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 62 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 24 4 4 4 4 45 5 5 5 5 57 7 7 7 7 78 8 8 8 8 89 9 9 9 9 90 0 0 0 0 03 3 3 3 3 3031 31 31 31 31 31 31052 052 052 52 52 52 52 52 52 526567 67 67 67 7 67 67 6774 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 746 68 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 89 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 980 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 803 3 3 36 6 69 9 9 9 9 9 9 93 3 3 3 3 93 9 5 5 57 7 10 0105 5 5 05 0 0 0 01 1 11 1 12 2 2 2 26001374 4 4 4 4 441 15 56 6 6 6 620 20 2 21 111 11 12 2 22 2 46 6 3 333 333 44 45 55 6005566 600629 6 0629 6006567037 7 7 74 4 45763 78 88 8 600817
-
10
0
-
50
0
50
10
0
ro
a
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
 
 
4
7 7 7 7 7
7
8
8 8
8 8 8 8 8 8
10
10 10 10
10
10 10 10 10
20 20
20
30
30
30
33 33 33 33 33 33
34 34
46
46 46
46 46 46
46 46
46 46
48 48 48 48 48 48 48
55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 5578
78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
150 150 1501 6
156 156 156
156 156
159 159 1 9 1 9 159
159403 03 40308 08 408 08 408 408
409 4 9 409
409
15
416 416 416
416 416 416 416 416 416
18 18 418 418
430 430 430
430 4 0 430
498 498 498 498
502 502
502 502 502 502
502 5 2
503 503 503 5 503 503
50
506
506
506 506
5 9
510 510
11 511 511
511 511 511 511 511 511
11
3 3 3 513 3
513 13 5 3
5
516 516 16
5162
526 526 526 526
527 527 527 527
527 527 527
527 527
527
3 33
34 534
34 34540 540 40 40 40 540 40
40
4
540
545 545 45 545 545 545 545 545 545 545
4 46 54
7 7 7 7 547 7 547
47
47 47
555 555
555
555 555
558
558 558 8
5 558 8
8
559 559
559 559
559 559 559 559 559 59
6 60
60 6
6
566 66 566
66 66 6 6
66 566
571
72 572 72
72
572 72 572
7 7 73 73 7
578 578 578
78 7 578 7 78584
4 4
84 84
4 84
85 85 5 85 58 8 58 86 586 86
5 7 587 587 7 7 87 7
587
592 92 92 9
92
592 592 592
593 93 93 593 93
94 9
94
6 2
603 603 603 603 603 603
6 5 605 6 5
6 605 6 60
607
611
613 1 613 613 613 613
615
6 5
615616
616 6 616
616 616 616
616
620 620
620
622 622 622 2 2 22 22 622 622 622
23 623
62 62 62 627 627
627 2
31
33
633 633 633
3 637
637
6 637 637 637638
639 639 3 639 639 39
639 39 39 39
50 50
650
6
6 662 66
2 62 662 6626 6
667
667 667
668 68
669 669
669 6 669 69 669 669 69670 70 70671
671 71
71 71
6 1 67
76 76 676
676 67 676 676
679
81
81 81 81
68
683 683
688 688
688 688 688
8
8
688
688
688
6 0 690
690 90 9
691 6 1 691 91 91
691693
693 693 693 93 93 693
693 693 693
99700 700
70 700 7 0
7 700 700
7 0 0
703 7 3 70 70711 711
71 711 711 711 11 711
7
12 12 712 7 2 71 712 7
716 71 1
718
8 718
718 718
722 7 2
23 2 72
723 2 723
726 72 26 726
732 32
732
735 35 735 7 5
52 75 752 575
57 757 7
5 57
7 7 0 7 0 60
760
776 76 76
782 8 82 82 2 82 782 782
87 7
87 8 7 7
787
787 787 787
9 9 99
803 803 8 3 803 803 8 3 8 3805 805 8 805 805 05 805 805 805 05
806 806
806 80 806
806 80 806 8 806
809 8 9 9 0
81 81 812 8 2
8 6 8 8 6 816
816 8 6
821
826 82
826
82 82
826 82
3
5 835 835 8 5 8 5
836
3 3 8 6
836
8 8 4 4 4
861 61 861 861 861
1 861
863
863 863 8 3 8 86
6 863 863 86
876 876
7 876
876 876 876
876 87 8 6
8 88 8 2 8 2 887 8 7
87
8889 89 9 889 889 889 889 89
892
3 93
893
9
9 0
910 910
910 9 09 1 921
9 1
921
925
925 9 5
929 929 929 929 929
9 9 9 9 9 9 9
55 5 55 9 5 9 5 95 9 95
961
7 9 7
67 967 96797 977
75 97
9 9 97
979 979
980 0 0
8 9 0 9 08 9 298 9 89
9 5 9 5 9 599 99 996
99 6
9999 97 97 99
9 9 9 997 9 979
9 8 998 99 99 9 8
16 6
1 96 1696
1696 6
1 96
1 6 1696 6 620 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
20 1 2001
20 2 2 2 2 02 20 2 2 20024 2004
20 4 2 4
2 4 2 405 2 05 2005
20 5 20 5 2 05
20 2006
2 6 6 2 6 2 06
7 20 7 7
2 07 7
7
2 8 8
20 8
8
8 8
9 9
9
9 9 2 9
0 0 2 10
010 0
0
1 0 1
2011 20 1 20 1
2 1
2 2 2
2 12 2 2 2 2
012
5 5 2015
2015
5 0 5
2016 2016 20 6 2 16
2016 20 6
2 8 8
8 18
8 8
2 19
9
9 2 19 920 0 0 0 20202 21
2 21 1
2 21 1 1
3 3 3 23 3
3
20 4
2024
2024
2024 2024
2024
6 6 6 2026 2026
2 27
7 20 7 20 7 7 728
8
2 20 9
9 9 9
31 31 1
2031 1 120 2 2032 2 2
20 4 4 0 4
4
35 2 5
5
36 36 2036
4 1 41
41
42
43 3 43
2 43 4
2044
45 45
5 45 452 7 7 4 7 78
48 048 2 8 2 8
49 2 49
2049 49 90
5 5
0 0 0
2
2 2
52
54 54
5 5
55
2 8 2 58 2 58 2 8
62
2062 20 2
63 63 63
2063
4
64 4 6
6 65
57
2 7 67 7
0 0 0
1 1 2071 71
3 73
3 73
2 76 6 76 76
2078 2078 2078 20 8
79 9 9 9
8 8
1
8 82 2
2083 2083
20 3 83
5 8 8
86 6
2 6 6
89 8
8 89
9 9
9 994 4 4
5 95 5 95
97
7 97
8 8 89 99 992 0
2 1 23 3
1 4 1 4 104
05 2
107
07 07
2 8 8
08
1 1
15
1
7
1 1
1180 2
1
2122 2 22 12
3
1 3
6 67
1 0 0 301 3 31
1 132
33 33
1
5 5 2 35
3
8 83 13 21341 44 4 1
46 46
2146
147 7 78 2148 485 5021 1 1
13
4
5456 5 6
78 5
6 1
6
2 23 34 65 65
66 6 667
71
7 071
2 2 72
3 3
74 74 1747 75
767
7
80 80 80
8
1 8
3
8
88 8
2 91 19 91
2 2
2
94 4 4
1 5 2195 2 5
97 97
9
2 8 1 1
9 9
2 20201 2 2
2 3 2 3
6
2 2 79
210
2
213 213
2 21
2 2
8 1
219 2
2 0
2
222 2 22
8423
37
2 9 9
0
1 2
2244 2244
448
9 9
51
5 356
01
2 3 6
6 4
2 9 2269
72 72
67
2 0
8
85
88
934
2 8
33 1
333
93
3 6
78
3
280031
600031 6 0031
6 031
600031 600031 600031
600052 600052
600052 600052 600052 0 52
6 0052 52 6 052 052
6 065
00067
600067 00067 6 0067
60 067 6 0067 600067
600067
60 074 600074
600074 00074 600074
6 0074 6 0074 0 074 6 074 074
00076 076
6 077
077 77 6 0776 0078
078 078 6 078
078
0 78 0078
8 0 078 6 0078
00079
0 9 00079
9 9 0 079 079 079
0 079 9
80 6 0080 80 00 80
80 00080 6 0080 080 0 80 80
600083
6 0083
600083
6 0083
6 86
0086 6 86 86
86
89
600089 600089 600089
6 0089 600089
89 600089
90 00090
0090
00090 6 0090 6 90 90 902 6 092600093 093
6 93 3 0093 6 093 93 93 6 93 93
095 0095 95 95
097
600097 60 097 6 0097 97 97 0 9 0 97
101 101
105 5 6 0105
00105 0 105
6 0105 6 0 05 05
10
1
10
6 12 12 6 12 12
0 12 12
6 122 6 0122 122 122
122
130 130 30
3 3
6 0136 6 0136 6001360137 0 7
0 3
9 139
0139
6 43 43
43
6 0143 0143 0 143
0145 45 45
450146 146 46 46 146
149 49 49
52 52 52
155 55157 7
162
0 62 62 62 6 62
162 6
0 67 67 6 6
67172 0 172
72 17 0 72 723 3
3
175 0175
6 0 5 0 5 5
5177 177
600177 600177
600177 600177
600177
600177 600177 600177
182 8 82 6 0 82 0 82 6 82183 3
185 185 185
0 185 85
85 18600190
600190 1 90 90
90 9 90
600193 93 0193 6 193 6 93 6 93
00196 600196
600196 196
196 6 0196 0196 196 196
196
2 8 2 8
208
208 208
600208
6 0209 20 600209 209
09 09 209 09 209 09
600210 600210
600210 210 0 10 6 210 210 210
211 600211 211 600211 211
11 11 11 6 2 1 11
13 213
216 216 216
6 216 6 16220 600220
220 0 2 0 2 0
220 220 20223 223 3 223
25 225 225
25 25 225
6 225 6 0 25 0 25
34
34
234 6 0234
6 34
237 6 37 237
40
6 0242
600242
0243
0 4 4 6 0246
0247 0 247 47 4 47 2 7
52 52 2
52
55 600255
5 55 5
55 255 255
256
25 25
2 56 56 56 56 56
25 7 257 7 7 7 576 60 0 6
60 260 60
6 6 0 6 260
1 61 61
61 0 1 1
61 61
6 5 2657 273 73
2 3 73 73 6 73
275 5 0 2 5 75 5
2 6 76 0 76 76
6 76
67 7 7
600277 600277
80 0 2 80
80
600282 600282 6 0282
82 82
0 86 86 86 286
2 8 8 8 88 88 8
00289 2 9 2 2 9 9
8 6 89
0
90
95 295
600295 600295 600295
95
2 7 9 9 7
9 0 73 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3
3 3 0 303
06
308 308 00308
308
6 1 11 11 118 8
83 1 3 1 321 321 321 32 21
2 323 7 327
327 27 7
6 330 330
3 30
33 330
33 30 3
6 331 31
3 33
3 1 3
331 331
337 337 33 3 33 33
3 337 3
00338
338 38 38 38340 40 6 340 3 0 3 0 0340 0
600 52 5 352 352
52
52
35 500 5
3 355 55 5 6 5 55 35
6 60
65 65
6 6 6
366
6 63 0 70
371 3 7 7
37 70 373 3 3 373 7
73 73
38 3
380 38 8 380 8 0 80 8
8
0 81 0381 81 81
82 3 2
8 82 2 82
600385 0385 600385
0385
600385 600385 3 5 600385
3 3 8 8
38 3
3 8 88 0 88
6 0 88
9 93
9 39 393 9340
4 4 40
4 4 4
401 40
0 01
401 0 1
40 0 405
0 05 05
408
6 0408 408 40
40 40 408
21 42 21
6 421
600421
4 2 422 2 2 2 228 438
4 438
3 43
600439 439 439
43 39
6 4 9
466 466 4 6 46 6 66 66 66 66
46 6477 4 7
7 77 77 4 7 4 7
4 8
7481
4 1 81
1 1 1
87
6 48 8 8
491
4 1 4
4 491 491
3
9 34
9 9
96 9
00499 9 9
9 9
99503
5 3
5 5 5
05 05
5 7
5 2 512 512
12 51
51
51 5 1 1 5 5
5 5
516
0517 0517 517
17
51 1 17
00518 518 5 8
518 5 8
8
1 51
1
21 215 2
5 2
2
2 2
52
6 0527
527
2 23
535 53
53 5 5 535 3
5
7 37 3 37 537
38 5 8 38 3 8
55 55 5 5 5
56 5 556
556 56 56
56
600556
5 5 7 57
565 65 565
5
5
6 6
8
6 6 8 6
0571 57
1 7 1 571
57 7
7 0 7 57
0 77 6
7 7 7
80 80 8
80
80 584 84
5 4 4
58 584 5 4
8
6
58 5 8 5 8 8
8 8
589 89 9
9 9
9 9 5
4 94 4 4 4
4
9 96
59
599 599 599
90 05 0608 608
608
6 6 6
13 6 13 13 613 613
614 614 4 4
61
6 0 17 7
0 617
600617
617
0 6 6
00620 6 6 0 6 20 2 2
00 29 00629 600629
600629 600629
623 3 6 3 6006334
64 641 41 64 641600655 600655 6 5 655 655 55
655 655
655 6 5
56
65
660 66
66
6
660 66 66
660 660 60
00670
600671 671 71 671 671 0 71 0 7 7 067
600672
3 673
3
3 6 3
6 78 78
8
6 1 681
81 681
68 6 6 2
68 6
87 8 687 8 687
7 87 8 68 8
691 91 0 91 1
0 691 00691
6 0691
3 36 6956 6 6 9
696 9 6
9 6
03
70 70 7 6 706
7
6
00706600711
0711 0711
7 7
711 600711
1 7 1 6 07 1
71 715 0715 7 5 71 15 715 715
72 7 7 2
28 8 0 28 28 728
73 3 2 34 45 35
737
600737
600737
737
38 3 8 7
00743 6 0743 43 743 743 7 3 74 7430745
600745
745 74
600749 9
9 6 749 49
9
752
752 2 52
5
075 753 5 5 5
75 600759
59 759 75
5
762 762 762 7 2
00763
600763 600763 600763 763
6 6 76 6
0 6 7 766 7 6
7 6 766 66 6
7 7
7 6 7
7 0 7
0
71
1
77 771 7 1 7 1 7 1 72
00773
600773
77 777
0 81
81 1 81
5 785
60079 79 7 0
79 79 0 7
94
79 9 99 9
600799
80 0 0 8 03
804 60 804 8 4
04 8 4
04 804 04
0 80
600811 600811 8 1 600811 8 1 8 1
1 8 11
81
8 7 817
8
81 8 7
817
817 600817
81 8 1 8 8 8 8
823
82 82
6 823
823 82 82 823 8
823
8 828 2 8 8 0
8 8 83
8 8
8 684 40
4 0 4 84
600847 84 4
847
6 56 856 85 56
62 6 6 58 7 867
867 67 6 6 7
68 8 86
69 869 69 86 86 86 869 869
600878
600878
6 883
6 8 3 883 3 8 3
4 8 4
8 4
885 8 5 5
8 8 8 8
8 8 888
1 1965 965 9 6 5
9 6 9 6 966
9 6
9 6 9769 9
9
78 9 9
8
8
988 600988 6009 8
99
100 1 0 0
10
15
20
25
si
ze
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
 
47 7 7 7 7 78 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 810 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 102 2 2
30
30
30
33 33 33 33 33 3334 446 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 68 8 8 8 8 8 855 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 5578 78 78 7 0 0 06 6 6 6 6 69 9 9 9 9 93 3 38 8 8 8 8 809 9 9 9 1516 16 16 1 1 1 1 130 30 30 0 0 098 9 9 92 2 2 2 2 2 2 23 3 3
506
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 3 2 2 2 2 227 27 27 27 7 27 7 7 7 74 4 4 440 4 4 4 4 4 4 45 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 548 77 7 7 7 7 778 78 7 4 4 492 92 9 9 9 966 6 6 6 66 6 6 63
688
688 6883 38 6
892
99 9 9 99 9 99 9 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 62 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 24 4 4 4 4 45 5 5 5 5 57 7 7 7 7 78 8 8 8 8 89 9 9 9 9 90 0 0 0 0 03 3 3 3 3 3031 31 31 31 31 31 31052 052 052 52 52 52 52 52 52 526567 67 67 67 7 67 67 6774 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 746 68 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 89 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 980 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 803 3 3 36 6 69 9 9 9 9 9 9 93 3 3 3 3 93 9 5 5 57 7 10 0105 5 5 05 0 0 0 01 1 11 1 12 2 2 2 24 4 4 4 4 441 15 56 6 6 6 620 20 2 21 111 11 12 2 22 2 46 6 3 333 333 44 45 556 600629 60062972 067 7 7 74 4 600745798 88 8 00817
600817600878 6008780
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
le
ve
ra
ge
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
          
Suggested by the scatter graphs of main variables adopted in this study, 
observations: 600763 (year 2000), 600762 (year 2003), 00506 (year 2006), 000688 (year 
2007) and 000892 (year 2009) are excluded from the sample. Numbers outside the brackets 
indicate company codes.  
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A6.1 Legal investor protection index for the period 1991-2009 
 VOICE   
Year  Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 T TT 
1991 3.03 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 T TT 
1992 5.15                                   0.0 0.0 
 10.00 1.0 1.0               -1.0     1.0   1.0 -1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 
1993 4.22                                   0.0 3.0 
 6.12                                   0.0 3.0 
 9.02                                   0.0 3.0 
 12.17                                   0.0 3.0 
1994 1.01                                   0.0 3.0 
 1.10                                   0.0 3.0 
 6.25                                   0.0 3.0 
 7.01                                   0.0 3.0 
 9.28 1.0 1.0         2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0     1.0 -2.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 8.0 11.0 
 10.27                                   0.0 11.0 
 11.03                                   0.0 11.0 
  11.03                                   0.0 11.0 
1995 12.21                                   0.0 11.0 
1996 1.24                                   0.0 11.0 
  2.10                                   0.0 11.0 
 4.22                                   0.0 11.0 
 6.29                                   0.0 11.0 
 7.24                                   0.0 11.0 
 8.01                                   0.0 11.0 
 12.20                                   0.0 11.0 
1997 1.10                                   0.0 11.0 
 1.06                                   0.0 11.0 
 3.03                                   0.0 11.0 
 4.01                                   0.0 11.0 
 10.01                                   0.0 11.0 
 12.16                                   0.0 11.0 
1998 2.20   0.5       1.0 0.5 0.5   0.5         0.5   -0.5 3.0 14.0 
 6.18                                   0.0 14.0 
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 12.10                                   0.0 14.0 
1999 3.17                                   0.0 14.0 
 7.01                                   0.0 14.0 
 12.08                                   0.0 14.0 
2000 5.18                                   0.0 14.0 
 6.06   -1.0           0.5   0.5               0.0 14.0 
 6.07                                   0.0 14.0 
 6.15                                   0.0 14.0 
 7.01                                   0.0 14.0 
2001 3.15                                   0.0 14.0 
 3.19                                   0.0 14.0 
 3.28                                   0.0 14.0 
 4.06                                   0.0 14.0 
 6.18                                   0.0 14.0 
 10.08           0.5                       0.5 14.5 
 12.10                                   0.0 14.5 
2002 1.07                                   0.0 14.5 
 1.15   1.0     1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5                   3.5 18.0 
 6.22             0.5                     0.5 18.5 
 7.24                                   0.0 18.5 
 9.05                                   0.0 18.5 
 12.01                                   0.0 18.5 
 12.01                                   0.0 18.5 
 12.13                                   0.0 18.5 
2003 1.06                                   0.0 18.5 
 2.01                                   0.0 18.5 
 3.24             0.5                     0.5 19.0 
 3.26                                   0.0 19.0 
 6.24                                   0.0 19.0 
 8.28                                   0.0 19.0 
 12.01                                   0.0 19.0 
 12.22                                   0.0 19.0 
2004 1.06                                   0.0 19.0 
 1.07                                   0.0 19.0 
 12.07                                   0.0 19.0 
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 12.13   0.5     0.5 0.5                       1.5 20.5 
2005 4.29                                   0.0 20.5 
 6.16                                   0.0 20.5 
 8.23                                   0.0 20.5 
 9.04                                   0.0 20.5 
 11.14                                   0.0 20.5 
 12.15                                   0.0 20.5 
 12.16                                   0.0 20.5 
2006 1.01                                   0.0 20.5 
 1.01 1.0       1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.0       2.0     -1.0 9.0 29.5 
 1.01                                   0.0 29.5 
 3.16                               -0.5   -0.5 29.0 
 3.16   0.5   1.0                           1.5 30.5 
 5.06   0.5                               0.5 31.0 
 5.18                       1.0           1.0 32.0 
 6.07                                   0.0 32.0 
 6.29                                   0.0 32.0 
 7.01                                   0.0 32.0 
  8.14                                   0.0 32.0 
 9.01                                   0.0 32.0 
 11.07                                   0.0 32.0 
2007 1.30                                   0.0 32.0 
 3.26                                   0.0 32.0 
 4.05                                   0.0 32.0 
  6.28                                   0.0 32.0 
 6.29                                   0.0 32.0 
 8.15                                   0.0 32.0 
 12.17                                   0.0 32.0 
2008 4.18                                   0.0 32.0 
 5.18                                   0.0 32.0 
 8.27                                   0.0 32.0 
 10.09                                   0.0 32.0 
2009 2.28                       0.5           0.5 32.5 
 5.19                                   0.0 32.5 
 11.04                                   0.0 32.5 
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  EXIT  SMINTEGR   
Year  Date 18 19 20 21 T TT 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 T TT 
1991 3.03         0.0 0.0           2.0     2.0 2.0 
1992 5.15 -1.0       -1.0 -1.0   1.0     1.0       2.0 4.0 
 10.00         0.0 -1.0             2.0   2.0 6.0 
1993 4.22       1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0       1.0       2.0 8.0 
 6.12         0.0 0.0 0.5           0.5   1.0 9.0 
 9.02         0.0 0.0         0.5       0.5 9.5 
 12.17         0.0 0.0     1.0           1.0 10.5 
1994 1.01         0.0 0.0   1.5             1.5 12.0 
 1.10         0.0 0.0 0.5               0.5 12.5 
 6.25         0.0 0.0 0.5               0.5 13.0 
 7.01 2.0 2.0     4.0 4.0   1.0             1.0 14.0 
 9.28         0.0 4.0     0.5           0.5 14.5 
 10.27         0.0 4.0 0.5   0.5           1.0 15.5 
 11.03         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 16.0 
  11.03         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 16.5 
1995 12.21         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 17.0 
1996 1.24         0.0 4.0 0.5   0.5           1.0 18.0 
  2.10         0.0 4.0                 0.0 18.0 
 4.22         0.0 4.0         0.5       0.5 18.5 
 6.29         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 19.0 
 7.24         0.0 4.0     0.5           0.5 19.5 
 8.01         0.0 4.0         0.5       0.5 20.0 
 12.20         0.0 4.0             0.5   0.5 20.5 
1997 1.10         0.0 4.0 0.5     1.0         1.5 22.0 
 1.06         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 22.5 
 3.03         0.0 4.0 0.5       0.5       1.0 23.5 
 4.01         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 24.0 
 10.01         0.0 4.0 1.5               1.5 25.5 
 12.16         0.0 4.0   0.5   0.5         1.0 26.5 
1998 2.20         0.0 4.0                 0.0 26.5 
 6.18         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 27.0 
 12.10         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 27.5 
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1999 3.17         0.0 4.0 0.5               0.5 28.0 
 7.01       1.5 1.5 5.5 1.0       1.5   1.5   4.0 32.0 
 12.08         0.0 5.5 0.5               0.5 32.5 
2000 5.18         0.0 5.5                 0.0 32.5 
 6.06         0.0 5.5 0.5     0.5         1.0 33.5 
 6.07         0.0 5.5             0.5   0.5 34.0 
 6.15         0.0 5.5 0.5               0.5 34.5 
 7.01         0.0 5.5   1.5             1.5 36.0 
2001 3.15         0.0 5.5     0.5           0.5 36.5 
 3.19         0.0 5.5             0.5   0.5 37.0 
 3.28         0.0 5.5     0.5           0.5 37.5 
 4.06         0.0 5.5 0.5               0.5 38.0 
 6.18         0.0 5.5                 0.0 38.0 
 10.08         0.0 5.5             0.5   0.5 38.5 
 12.10         0.0 5.5 0.5               0.5 39.0 
2002 1.07         0.0 5.5 0.5     0.5         1.0 40.0 
 1.15         0.0 5.5                 0.0 40.0 
 6.22         0.0 5.5 0.5               0.5 40.5 
 7.24         0.0 5.5     0.5           0.5 41.0 
 9.05         0.0 5.5       0.5         0.5 41.5 
 12.01         0.0 5.5 0.5               0.5 42.0 
 12.01       0.5 0.5 6.0                 0.0 42.0 
 12.13         0.0 6.0 0.5               0.5 42.5 
2003 1.06         0.0 6.0 0.5               0.5 43.0 
 2.01         0.0 6.0                 0.0 43.0 
 3.24         0.0 6.0 0.5               0.5 43.5 
 3.26         0.0 6.0 0.5               0.5 44.0 
 6.24         0.0 6.0 0.5               0.5 44.5 
 8.28         0.0 6.0       0.5         0.5 45.0 
 12.01         0.0 6.0 0.5               0.5 45.5 
 12.22         0.0 6.0 0.5               0.5 46.0 
2004 1.06         0.0 6.0 0.5               0.5 46.5 
 1.07       0.5 0.5 6.5                 0.0 46.5 
 12.07         0.0 6.5                 0.0 46.5 
 12.13         0.0 6.5 0.5               0.5 47.0 
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2005 4.29         0.0 6.5               1.0 1.0 48.0 
 6.16         0.0 6.5               0.5 0.5 48.5 
 8.23         0.0 6.5               0.5 0.5 49.0 
 9.04         0.0 6.5 0.5             0.5 1.0 50.0 
 11.14         0.0 6.5   0.5           0.5 1.0 51.0 
 12.15         0.0 6.5 0.5               0.5 51.5 
 12.16         0.0 6.5 0.5               0.5 52.0 
2006 1.01 1.0 1.0 2.0   4.0 10.5   1.0   1.0 1.5       3.5 55.5 
 1.01       1.0 1.0 11.5 1.0       1.0 1.0 1.0   4.0 59.5 
 1.01         0.0 11.5 0.5               0.5 60.0 
 3.16         0.0 11.5                 0.0 60.0 
 3.16         0.0 11.5                 0.0 60.0 
 5.06         0.0 11.5 0.5   0.5           1.0 61.0 
 5.18         0.0 11.5 0.5               0.5 61.5 
 6.07         0.0 11.5 0.5       0.5       1.0 62.5 
 6.29         0.0 11.5 1.5               1.5 64.0 
 7.01         0.0 11.5           0.5     0.5 64.5 
  8.14         0.0 11.5               0.5 0.5 65.0 
 9.01       0.5 0.5 12.0 0.5               0.5 65.5 
 11.07         0.0 12.0         0.5       0.5 66.0 
2007 1.30         0.0 12.0 0.5               0.5 66.5 
 3.26         0.0 12.0 0.5               0.5 67.0 
 4.05         0.0 12.0         0.5       0.5 67.5 
  6.28         0.0 12.0 0.5               0.5 68.0 
 6.29         0.0 12.0 0.5               0.5 68.5 
 8.15         0.0 12.0 0.5               0.5 69.0 
 12.17         0.0 12.0 0.5               0.5 69.5 
2008 4.18       0.5 0.5 12.5                 0.0 69.5 
 5.18       0.5 0.5 13.0                 0.0 69.5 
 8.27       0.5 0.5 13.5                 0.0 69.5 
 10.09         0.0 13.5     0.5           0.5 70.0 
2009 2.28         0.0 13.5 1.5               1.5 71.5 
 5.19       0.5 0.5 14.0                 0.0 71.5 
 11.04         0.0 14.0             0.5   0.5 72.0 
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  ANTIBLOCK 
Year  Date 5 6 8 9 12 13 15 16 20 21 25 26 ST T 
1991 3.03                         0.0 0.0 
1992 5.15           1.0 1.0 -1.0       1.0 2.0 2.0 
 10.00                         0.0 2.0 
1993 4.22                   1.0   1.0 2.0 4.0 
 6.12                         0.0 4.0 
 9.02                       0.5 0.5 4.5 
 12.17                         0.0 4.5 
1994 1.01                         0.0 4.5 
 1.10                         0.0 4.5 
 6.25                         0.0 4.5 
 7.01     2.0 2.0   1.0 1.0 -1.0         5.0 9.5 
 9.28                         0.0 9.5 
 10.27                         0.0 9.5 
 11.03                         0.0 9.5 
  11.03                         0.0 9.5 
1995 12.21                         0.0 9.5 
1996 1.24                         0.0 9.5 
  2.10                         0.0 9.5 
 4.22                       0.5 0.5 10.0 
 6.29                         0.0 10.0 
 7.24                         0.0 10.0 
 8.01                       0.5 0.5 10.5 
 12.20                         0.0 10.5 
1997 1.10                     1.0   1.0 11.5 
 1.06                         0.0 11.5 
 3.03                       0.5 0.5 12.0 
 4.01                         0.0 12.0 
 10.01                         0.0 12.0 
 12.16   1.0 0.5       0.5       0.5   2.5 14.5 
1998 2.20                         0.0 14.5 
 6.18                         0.0 14.5 
 12.10                         0.0 14.5 
1999 3.17                         0.0 14.5 
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 7.01                   1.5   1.5 3.0 17.5 
 12.08                         0.0 17.5 
2000 5.18     0.5                   0.5 18.0 
 6.06                     0.5   0.5 18.5 
 6.07                         0.0 18.5 
 6.15                         0.0 18.5 
 7.01                         0.0 18.5 
2001 3.15                         0.0 18.5 
 3.19                         0.0 18.5 
 3.28                         0.0 18.5 
 4.06                         0.0 18.5 
 6.18   0.5                     0.5 19.0 
 10.08                         0.0 19.0 
 12.10                         0.0 19.0 
2002 1.07 1.0 0.5 0.5               0.5   2.5 21.5 
 1.15                         0.0 21.5 
 6.22                         0.0 21.5 
 7.24                         0.0 21.5 
 9.05                     0.5   0.5 22.0 
 12.01                         0.0 22.0 
 12.01                   0.5     0.5 22.5 
 12.13                         0.0 22.5 
2003 1.06                         0.0 22.5 
 2.01                         0.0 22.5 
 3.24                         0.0 22.5 
 3.26                         0.0 22.5 
 6.24                         0.0 22.5 
 8.28                     0.5   0.5 23.0 
 12.01                         0.0 23.0 
 12.22                         0.0 23.0 
2004 1.06                         0.0 23.0 
 1.07                   0.5     0.5 23.5 
 12.07 0.5 0.5                     1.0 24.5 
 12.13                         0.0 24.5 
2005 4.29                         0.0 24.5 
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 6.16                         0.0 24.5 
 8.23                         0.0 24.5 
 9.04                         0.0 24.5 
 11.14                         0.0 24.5 
 12.15                         0.0 24.5 
 12.16                         0.0 24.5 
2006 1.01 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0   0.0     2.0   1.0 1.5 9.0 33.5 
 1.01                   1.0   1.0 2.0 35.5 
 1.01               -0.5         -0.5 35.0 
 3.16                         0.0 35.0 
 3.16                         0.0 35.0 
 5.06         1.0               1.0 36.0 
 5.18                         0.0 36.0 
 6.07                       0.5 0.5 36.5 
 6.29                         0.0 36.5 
 7.01                         0.0 36.5 
  8.14                         0.0 36.5 
 9.01                   0.5     0.5 37.0 
 11.07                       0.5 0.5 37.5 
2007 1.30                         0.0 37.5 
 3.26                         0.0 37.5 
 4.05                       0.5 0.5 38.0 
  6.28                         0.0 38.0 
 6.29                         0.0 38.0 
 8.15                         0.0 38.0 
 12.17                         0.0 38.0 
2008 4.18                   0.5     0.5 38.5 
 5.18                   0.5     0.5 39.0 
 8.27                   0.5     0.5 39.5 
 10.09         0.5               0.5 40.0 
2009 2.28                         0.0 40.0 
 5.19                   0.5     0.5 40.5 
 11.04                         0.0 40.5 
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  ANTIDIRECT 
Year  Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 12 14 25 26 ST T 
1991 3.03                           0.0 0.0 
1992 5.15 1.0 1.0             -1.0       1.0 2.0 2.0 
 10.00                           0.0 2.0 
1993 4.22                         1.0 1.0 3.0 
 6.12                           0.0 3.0 
 9.02                         0.5 0.5 3.5 
 12.17                           0.0 3.5 
1994 1.01                           0.0 3.5 
 1.10                           0.0 3.5 
 6.25                           0.0 3.5 
 7.01 1.0 1.0         2.0 2.0 2.0   -2.0     6.0 9.5 
 9.28                           0.0 9.5 
 10.27                           0.0 9.5 
 11.03                           0.0 9.5 
  11.03                           0.0 9.5 
1995 12.21                           0.0 9.5 
1996 1.24                           0.0 9.5 
  2.10                           0.0 9.5 
 4.22                         0.5 0.5 10.0 
 6.29                           0.0 10.0 
 7.24                           0.0 10.0 
 8.01                         0.5 0.5 10.5 
 12.20                           0.0 10.5 
1997 1.10                       1.0   1.0 11.5 
 1.06                           0.0 11.5 
 3.03                         0.5 0.5 12.0 
 4.01                           0.0 12.0 
 10.01                           0.0 12.0 
 12.16   0.5       1.0 0.5   0.5     0.5   3.0 15.0 
1998 2.20                           0.0 15.0 
 6.18                           0.0 15.0 
 12.10                           0.0 15.0 
1999 3.17                           0.0 15.0 
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 7.01                         1.5 1.5 16.5 
 12.08                           0.0 16.5 
2000 5.18   -1.0             0.5         -0.5 16.0 
 6.06                       0.5   0.5 16.5 
 6.07                           0.0 16.5 
 6.15                           0.0 16.5 
 7.01                           0.0 16.5 
2001 3.15                           0.0 16.5 
 3.19                           0.0 16.5 
 3.28                           0.0 16.5 
 4.06                           0.0 16.5 
 6.18           0.5               0.5 17.0 
 10.08                           0.0 17.0 
 12.10                           0.0 17.0 
2002 1.07   1.0     1.0 0.5 0.5         0.5   3.5 20.5 
 1.15             0.5             0.5 21.0 
 6.22                           0.0 21.0 
 7.24                           0.0 21.0 
 9.05                       0.5   0.5 21.5 
 12.01                           0.0 21.5 
 12.01                           0.0 21.5 
 12.13                           0.0 21.5 
2003 1.06                           0.0 21.5 
 2.01             0.5             0.5 22.0 
 3.24                           0.0 22.0 
 3.26                           0.0 22.0 
 6.24                           0.0 22.0 
 8.28                       0.5   0.5 22.5 
 12.01                           0.0 22.5 
 12.22                           0.0 22.5 
2004 1.06                           0.0 22.5 
 1.07                           0.0 22.5 
 12.07   0.5     0.5 0.5               1.5 24.0 
 12.13                           0.0 24.0 
2005 4.29                           0.0 24.0 
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 6.16                           0.0 24.0 
 8.23                           0.0 24.0 
 9.04                           0.0 24.0 
 11.14                           0.0 24.0 
 12.15                           0.0 24.0 
 12.16                           0.0 24.0 
2006 1.01 1.0       1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0   2.0 1.0 1.5 11.0 35.0 
 1.01                         1.0 1.0 36.0 
 1.01                           0.0 36.0 
 3.16   0.5   1.0                   1.5 37.5 
 3.16   0.5                       0.5 38.0 
 5.06                   1.0       1.0 39.0 
 5.18                           0.0 39.0 
 6.07                         0.5 0.5 39.5 
 6.29                           0.0 39.5 
 7.01                           0.0 39.5 
  8.14                           0.0 39.5 
 9.01                           0.0 39.5 
 11.07                         0.5 0.5 40.0 
2007 1.30                           0.0 40.0 
 3.26                           0.0 40.0 
 4.05                         0.5 0.5 40.5 
  6.28                           0.0 40.5 
 6.29                           0.0 40.5 
 8.15                           0.0 40.5 
 12.17                           0.0 40.5 
2008 4.18                           0.0 40.5 
 5.18                           0.0 40.5 
 8.27                           0.0 40.5 
 10.09                   0.5       0.5 41.0 
2009 2.28                           0.0 41.0 
 5.19                           0.0 41.0 
 11.04                           0.0 41.0 
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  ANTIMANAGE ANTINONTRADABLE 
Year  Date 7 10 11 13 14 25 26 ST T 29 ST T 
1991 3.03               0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 
1992 5.15   -1.0   1.0     1.0 1.0 1.0   0.0 0.0 
 10.00               0.0 1.0   0.0 0.0 
1993 4.22             1.0 1.0 2.0   0.0 0.0 
 6.12               0.0 2.0   0.0 0.0 
 9.02             0.5 0.5 2.5   0.0 0.0 
 12.17               0.0 2.5   0.0 0.0 
1994 1.01               0.0 2.5   0.0 0.0 
 1.10               0.0 2.5   0.0 0.0 
 6.25               0.0 2.5   0.0 0.0 
 7.01 2.0 2.0     -2.0     2.0 4.5   0.0 0.0 
 9.28               0.0 4.5   0.0 0.0 
 10.27               0.0 4.5   0.0 0.0 
 11.03               0.0 4.5   0.0 0.0 
  11.03               0.0 4.5   0.0 0.0 
1995 12.21               0.0 4.5   0.0 0.0 
1996 1.24               0.0 4.5   0.0 0.0 
  2.10               0.0 4.5   0.0 0.0 
 4.22             0.5 0.5 5.0   0.0 0.0 
 6.29               0.0 5.0   0.0 0.0 
 7.24               0.0 5.0   0.0 0.0 
 8.01             0.5 0.5 5.5   0.0 0.0 
 12.20               0.0 5.5   0.0 0.0 
1997 1.10           1.0   1.0 6.5   0.0 0.0 
 1.06               0.0 6.5   0.0 0.0 
 3.03             0.5 0.5 7.0   0.0 0.0 
 4.01               0.0 7.0   0.0 0.0 
 10.01               0.0 7.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.16 0.5 0.5       0.5   1.5 8.5   0.0 0.0 
1998 2.20               0.0 8.5   0.0 0.0 
 6.18               0.0 8.5   0.0 0.0 
 12.10               0.0 8.5   0.0 0.0 
1999 3.17               0.0 8.5   0.0 0.0 
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 7.01             1.5 1.5 10.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.08               0.0 10.0   0.0 0.0 
2000 5.18   0.5           0.5 10.5   0.0 0.0 
 6.06           0.5   0.5 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 6.07               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 6.15               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 7.01               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
2001 3.15               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 3.19               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 3.28               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 4.06               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 6.18               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 10.08               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.10               0.0 11.0   0.0 0.0 
2002 1.07 0.5         0.5   1.0 12.0   0.0 0.0 
 1.15 0.5             0.5 12.5   0.0 0.0 
 6.22               0.0 12.5   0.0 0.0 
 7.24               0.0 12.5   0.0 0.0 
 9.05           0.5   0.5 13.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.01               0.0 13.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.01               0.0 13.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.13               0.0 13.0   0.0 0.0 
2003 1.06               0.0 13.0   0.0 0.0 
 2.01 0.5             0.5 13.5   0.0 0.0 
 3.24               0.0 13.5   0.0 0.0 
 3.26               0.0 13.5   0.0 0.0 
 6.24               0.0 13.5   0.0 0.0 
 8.28           0.5   0.5 14.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.01               0.0 14.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.22               0.0 14.0   0.0 0.0 
2004 1.06               0.0 14.0   0.0 0.0 
 1.07               0.0 14.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.07               0.0 14.0   0.0 0.0 
 12.13               0.0 14.0   0.0 0.0 
2005 4.29               0.0 14.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
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 6.16               0.0 14.0 0.5 0.5 1.5 
 8.23               0.0 14.0 0.5 0.5 2.0 
 9.04               0.0 14.0 0.5 0.5 2.5 
 11.14               0.0 14.0 0.5 0.5 3.0 
 12.15               0.0 14.0   0.0 3.0 
 12.16               0.0 14.0   0.0 3.0 
2006 1.01 1.5 1.0   0.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 7.0 21.0   0.0 3.0 
 1.01             1.0 1.0 22.0   0.0 3.0 
 1.01               0.0 22.0   0.0 3.0 
 3.16               0.0 22.0   0.0 3.0 
 3.16               0.0 22.0   0.0 3.0 
 5.06               0.0 22.0   0.0 3.0 
 5.18               0.0 22.0   0.0 3.0 
 6.07             0.5 0.5 22.5   0.0 3.0 
 6.29               0.0 22.5   0.0 3.0 
 7.01               0.0 22.5   0.0 3.0 
  8.14               0.0 22.5 0.5 0.5 3.5 
 9.01               0.0 22.5   0.0 3.5 
 11.07             0.5 0.5 23.0   0.0 3.5 
2007 1.30               0.0 23.0   0.0 3.5 
 3.26               0.0 23.0   0.0 3.5 
 4.05             0.5 0.5 23.5   0.0 3.5 
  6.28               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
 6.29               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
 8.15               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
 12.17               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
2008 4.18               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
 5.18               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
 8.27               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
 10.09               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
2009 2.28               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
 5.19               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
 11.04               0.0 23.5   0.0 3.5 
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JX 
5.32 
AH 
6.93 
JS  
8.35 
SH 9.62 
 
ZJ 
8.96 
FJ 
7.37 
HUB 
6.24 
HUN 
6.04 
SD  
6.94 
HEB  
6.63 
HEN  
6.04 
SX 
5.46 
BJ 7.33 
 TJ 7.07 
 
LN 
6.81 
JL 
5.54 
HLJ   5.04 
 
IM   5.05 
 
SAX 
5.41 
NX 
5.41 
GS 
4.43 
QH   4.07 
 
      SC   6.73 
 
CQ 
6.47 
GZ 
4.09 
GX 
5.33 
GD 
8.26 
HAN 
 4.79 
YN 
6.10 
TB   2.32 
 
XJ   5.03 
 
China 
